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Chapter 1
Dissertation Introduction
In 2008, the world experienced the deepest and most consequential financial crisis
since the 1930s. The financial turmoil and ensuing credit crunch culminated in
an economic downturn that caused a historic contraction in global gross domestic
product during 2009. The crisis affected developed and developing countries alike.
In response to the crisis, the leading central banks cut monetary policy rates to
unprecedented low levels (Figure 1.1a). They also introduced a set of non-standard
monetary policy measures, such as quantitative easing, credit easing and liquidity
injections (Kohn, 2010; ECB, 2010a, 2011), which inflated the central banks’ balance
sheets (Figure 1.1b). These measures were aimed at stabilizing financial markets,
maintaining the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and
improving financing conditions for the private sector.
Figure 1.1: Post-Crisis Monetary Policy
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It has been widely acknowledged that the immediate implementation of conventional
and unconventional policy measures helped to avoid a meltdown in the global financial
system. Furthermore, the IMF (2013) stated that the central banks’ emergency
measures prevented a much deeper recession. However, more than eight years after
the outbreak of the financial crisis, many central banks – including the European
Central Bank (ECB) – remain in permanent crisis mode, and ultra-loose monetary
policies have become the new normal.
Owing to the continuing economic stagnation in the euro area, the ECB launched
a massive asset purchase programme in January 2015. Under this programme the
ECB has been purchasing private and public sector securities amounting to 60 to
80 billion EUR per month (ECB, 2017a). Furthermore, in 2014 the ECB was the
first large central bank to introduce negative deposit facility rates. While the US
Federal Reserve Bank announced its monetary policy normalization in 2015 and has
ever since been slowly raising its policy rate (FED, 2017), the ECB continues its
low-interest rate policy in response to persistently low inflation rates in the euro
area.
Figure 1.2: Post-Crisis Financing Conditions in Germany
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The ECB’s post-crisis monetary policy has profoundly changed the financing environ-
ment of the corporate sector in the euro area, including in Germany. Short- and
long-term interest rates have substantially declined to record-low levels (Figure 1.2a).
This development has significantly reduced firms’ financing costs. In Germany, the
borrowing costs for non-financial corporations fell from 6 percent in September 2008
to 1.8 percent in March 2017. Average corporate bond yields declined from 7.6
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percent in October 2008 to 1.8 percent in April 2017 (Figure 1.2b). In addition,
German firms’ access to finance has improved considerably. In December 2016, only
12.6 percent of German manufacturing-sector firms indicated that credit access was
restricted, compared with 54 percent in September 2009.
The improvement in credit conditions – that is, in the price and availability of funds
– in parts of the euro area can be regarded as a success of the ECB’s conventional
and unconventional monetary policy. However, the persistence of low growth in
recent years has raised doubts about the policies’ effectiveness. At the same time,
concerns about adverse side-effects of a prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates
have escalated.1 It has been argued, inter alia, that interest rates have lost their
allocation and signalling function as they are compressed towards zero or below.
Theoretically, the interest rate can be regarded as a price that balances people’s
willingness to consume now versus their eagerness to save for future consumption
(Fisher, 1930). Because interest rates reflect people’s time preferences, they guide
the intertemporal and the intersectoral allocation of resources, particularly the
allocation of capital. On a microeconomic level, interest rates also influence a
variety of entrepreneurial decisions. Firms’ investment decisions – that is, decisions
about whether or not to invest, and choices between different investment projects –
are influenced by the rate of interest, among others things (Fisher, 1930; Keynes,
1936). Interest rates also affect firms’ financing decisions because they determine
the availability and relative pricing of different types of funds (Kashyap et al., 1993;
Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996b). Furthermore, interest rates can provide incentives for
improving efficiency and productivity because they determine firms’ costs (Hoffmann
and Schnabl, 2016).
The long-term consequences of the ECB’s low-interest rate policy, both for the general
economy and for the corporate sector in particular, are not yet determinable, as
empirical evidence for the euro area and Germany is limited. However, the Japanese
economy provides a guiding example, because the Bank of Japan (BOJ) was the first
central bank to set policy rates permanently to zero (Bayoumi and Collyns, 2000). In
2001, the BOJ additionally introduced quantitative easing. Nevertheless, economic
growth in Japan has remained low and deflationary pressure has persisted (Schnabl,
1 For a general discussion on the impact of quantitative easing and ultra-low interest rates see
for instance Belke (2013). Dobbs et al. (2013) discuss distributional effects of the low-interest
rate policy. For impacts on the banking sector see Borio et al. (2017). For impacts on insurance
companies see Kablau and Weiß (2014). Freytag and Schnabl (2017) discuss the effect of the
low-interest rate policy on the economic order in Germany.
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2015). Instead of stimulating real growth, Japan’s zero-interest rate policy has
contributed to a misallocation of credit towards unproductive and highly indebted
firms, thereby depressing aggregate productivity growth (Caballero et al., 2008).
Two lost decades have in spite of massive monetary policy interventions taken a toll
on the Japanese corporate sector’s competitiveness.
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the persistent low-interest rate policy in the
wake of the financial crisis has affected the corporate sector. Stimulative short-term
effects and long-term economic consequences are analysed. Chapter 2 evaluates
the working of the interest rate channel – one of the key monetary transmission
channels – with regard to its stimulating effect on German business investment in
the post-crisis period. Uncertain or pessimistic business expectations have been
identified as a main reason for weak business investment activities in Germany (e.g.
Gerstenberger and Schwartz, 2014; Schwartz, 2015; Heymann and Schneider, 2017).
Therefore, special focus is placed on the role of business expectations and the effect
of those expectations on the link between interest rates and investment. Based on
the neoclassical investment theory of Jorgenson (1963), the user cost elasticity of
capital for a sample of 1,277 German SMEs is estimated, covering the period 2008
to 2015. The results confirm that firms were responsive to user cost changes, with
the long-run user cost elasticity of capital ranging between -0.79 and -0.67. The
estimates are similar to those of pre-crisis studies and indicate that declining interest
rates have generally been able to stimulate business investment through changes in
the firms’ user cost of capital. However, the estimation results are driven by firms
with positive business expectations, depicting a user cost elasticity of capital close to
unity. Firms with neutral or negative expectations are shown to be unresponsive to
user cost changes. The findings presented in Chapter 2 confirm the importance of
business expectations for firms’ investment decisions. They also reveal the limitations
of low-interest rate policy as a means to stimulate the economy.
Chapter 3 analyses how declining interest rates have influenced firms’ financing
behaviour, in particular their demand for bank loans. On the one hand, data from
peripheral countries in the euro area during the pre-crisis period indicate that a decline
in interest rates can trigger a substitution effect. That is, firms increase their bank
borrowing and substitute alternative funds (such as internal funds) with bank loans.
As a result, firms’ demand for bank loans increases. This can cause an acceleration in
corporate-sector debt levels. On the other hand, the balance-sheet-channel literature
argues that declining interest rates strengthen firms’ internal financing capacity,
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which is defined as income effect (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). If it is additionally
assumed that firms follow a financial pecking order and prefer internal over external
funds, a reduction in interest rates would decrease the share of bank loans in firms’
financing mix. An empirical analysis based on a firm-level dataset of 8,274 German
SMEs provides evidence that in the period 2005 to 2014, the income effect of declining
interest rates dominated. As a result, corporate-sector bank loan demand in Germany
has declined. A substitution effect (i.e. increased preference for bank loans relative
to internal funds) cannot be confirmed for our observation period. Thus, the results
provide evidence that a low-interest rate policy can depress corporate-sector bank
loan demand.
Post-crisis productivity growth has been exceptionally weak in many countries,
including Germany. It has been argued that the ECB’s ultra-loose monetary policy
has impeded creative destruction and market dynamics in Europe, and has thus
contributed to low productivity growth (e.g. Forbes, 2015; Freytag and Schnabl,
2017). Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the impact of a prolonged period of low
interest rates on the capital allocation process in a market economy. The literature is
synthesised and evaluated, and at a theoretical level the post-crisis monetary policy
is shown to have severely impaired the allocative function of financial institutions.
Three main causes by which the efficient allocation of capital has been disrupted
are identified. Firstly, the restructuring process within the banking sector has
been impeded. Secondly, banks’ lending behaviour has been distorted; thirdly, low
borrowing costs have slowed down the restructuring process in the corporate sector.
Firm-level data of SMEs are used to empirically test whether the German productivity
slowdown in the post-crisis period has been caused by a less efficient allocation of
capital. The results provide evidence that low-productive firms have had easier
access to credit in the post-crisis period compared with the years before the crisis.
This ease of access might have increased their odds of survival, and might also have
lowered the incentive for those firms to increase their efficiency and productivity. The
impaired reallocation and restructuring process is likely to have contributed to the
low productivity growth in Germany. The findings of this chapter thus highlight the
negative economic consequences of a prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates and
unconventional monetary policy measures. The results lend support to the argument
that exceptionally low interest rates contribute to weak economic growth.
Chapter 5 presents an analysis of how an extended period of low interest rates,
combined with declining bank-loan demand from the corporate sector, affects the
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banking sector. This study, a joint work with Gunther Schnabl, focuses on the
Japanese banking sector. It is shown how Japanese monetary policy has contributed to
a growing gap between deposits and loans in the financial system, and has compressed
interest margins, which were the banks’ traditional source of income. Japanese banks
have adjusted to the decline in their interest income by increasing their lending to the
public sector and by diversifying their sources of income. Furthermore, it is shown
how the Japanese banking sector underwent an increasing concentration process. For
banks to remain profitable in an environment of declining interest margins, efficient
utilization of resources is crucial. Therefore, using Data Envelopment Analysis,
the trends for Japanese banks’ technical efficiency in the period 1999 to 2015 are
analysed. The effects of the low-interest rate environment and the banks’ adjustment
measures on the banks’ technical efficiency are tested. The estimation results show
that although banks’ efforts to increase their efficiency has paid off – especially
among regional banks, the erosion of interest margins has triggered a loss in efficiency.
Furthermore, the results imply that the increased concentration process, especially
among city banks, has reduced rather than increased banks’ efficiency.
Chapter 2
Is the Interest Rate Channel still
Working? Post-Crisis Evidence
from German SMEs
Abstract
Using a unique dataset from German small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), we test whether pessimistic business expectations have impeded
the functioning of the interest rate channel during the post-crisis period.
We estimate firms’ user cost elasticity of capital for the period 2008–2015,
and test whether this elasticity differs for firms that hold pessimistic
business expectations compared with those that hold positive expectations.
Our results show that SMEs have significantly responded to changes in
the user cost of capital during the post-crisis period. However, the results
are mainly driven by SMEs that hold positive business expectations.
Firms having neutral or negative expectations depict a much smaller user
cost elasticity, which is not statistically different from zero. Our results
reveal the limitations of an expansionary monetary policy, and confirm
the important role that expectations play for firms’ investment decisions.
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2.1 Introduction
In 2008, Europe experienced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression,
which was followed by a severe economic downturn. In response, the European
Central Bank (ECB) reduced monetary policy rates to unprecedented low levels
and introduced unconventional monetary policy measures. The aim was to stabilize
financial markets, prevent a credit crunch and stimulate the real economy (ECB,
2010b). More than eight years later, short- and long-term interest rates in the euro
area are still close to zero. Despite record low interest rates, economic recovery
continues to be sluggish (ECB, 2017b). The apparent inability of ever-declining
interest rates to stimulate the real economy raises questions about the effectiveness of
the ECB policy measures and the proper functioning of traditional monetary policy
transmission channels. In this paper we present an evaluation of the functioning of
the interest rate channel in the post-crisis period.
The interest rate channel is one of the core monetary policy transmission channels
and links short-term policy rates with economic agents’ spending decisions. Declining
interest rates should reduce households’ and firms’ cost of capital, and should
encourage them to consume and invest (Mishkin, 1995). However, business investment1
in particular has recovered rather slowly in many euro area countries, including
Germany (EIB, 2016). Although interest rates on loans to the corporate sector in
Germany have fallen substantially since 2009 and firms’ access to finance is excellent,
business investment continues to be weak and has still not recovered to its pre-crisis
level. Thus, cheap and readily accessible finance seems not to have provided a strong
enough stimulus for business investment in Germany.
Several studies, some based on surveys among German corporations, have identified
uncertainty and gloomy business expectations as main reasons for firms’ post-crisis
reluctance to invest (e.g. Gerstenberger and Schwartz, 2014; Schwartz, 2015; Heymann
and Schneider, 2017). For the G7 economies, Banerjee et al. (2015) find that
expectations of future economic conditions appear to be more important in driving
business investment than the availability of low-cost finance. Such findings raise the
question whether pessimistic business expectations have impaired the traditional
link between interest rate and investment, thus mitigating the effectiveness of the
ECB’s expansionary monetary policy.
1 In this paper we define business investment as gross investment in machinery, equipment and
non-residential construction (EIB, 2013).
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Using a unique dataset of German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the
aim of this study is twofold. First, following the neoclassical investment theory
pioneered by Jorgenson (1963), we estimate firms’ user cost elasticity of capital for
the period 2008 to 2015 to evaluate whether firms responded to interest rate changes.
Thus, we contribute to the existing interest rate channel literature by focusing on
the post-crisis period. Most studies that have investigated the user cost elasticity
of capital among German firms have used data up to 2007 (von Kalckreuth, 2001;
Harhoff and Ramb, 2001; Bu¨ttner and Ho¨nig, 2011; Dwenger, 2014). Only Bu¨ttner
et al. (2015) included data from after the financial crisis, but only up to 2012.
Second, as our dataset includes firm-specific information on sales expectations, we are
able to analyse how business expectations have affected SMEs’ investment behaviour
in the post-crisis period. We empirically test whether firms’ user cost elasticity of
capital would change according to different business expectations. The results of
our analysis provide insight into the causes of the restrained business investment
activities in Germany in the post-crisis period.
2.2 Interest Rates and Business Investment: Conventional Wisdom
The success of the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy in the post-crisis period
rests on its ability to lower market interest rates, to improve economic agents’ access
to finance and to encourage economic agents to increase their spending. The latter
particularly applies to business investment. The link between interest rates and
investment has for decades been the focus of extensive research.
2.2.1 The Interest Rate Channel
That monetary policy can influence the real economy is widely accepted.2 However,
how monetary policy impulses are transmitted to the real economy is not as clear,
and the monetary transmission process has not been called a ’black box’ without
reason (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Extensive research on monetary transmission
mechanisms over the past 30 years has examined this question and has identified a
complex combination of various channels.3
2 Studies that have shown that monetary policy affects economic activities include Friedman and
Schwartz (1963), Romer and Romer (1989), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Gal´ı (1992), Christiano
et al. (1996), Leeper et al. (1996), Boivin et al. (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2014).
3 For an overview of monetary transmission channels see Mishkin (1995).
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The standard monetary policy transmission channel discussed in the economic
literature over the past 80 years has been the interest rate channel. It is the key
transmission mechanism in the Keynesian IS-LM textbook model, as it connects
monetary policy impulses with economic agents’ spending decisions (Hicks, 1937). The
model is still a standard feature in many central bank publications (e.g. Ireland, 2005;
ECB, 2000, 2008, 2010b) and remains one of the core channels in macro-economic
modelling (Boivin et al., 2010). Summarizing the findings of the Eurosystem Monetary
Transmission Network, Angeloni et al. (2003) argue that the interest rate channel is
the most important transmission channel in the euro area.
The transmission of an expansionary monetary policy shock to the real economy
through the interest rate channel can be summarized as follows. A loose monetary
policy causes a decline in nominal short-term interest rates. Assuming that wages
and goods prices are sticky, a decline in nominal short-term interest rates translates
into a decline in real short-term interest rates. Since long-term interest rates are the
expected weighted average of future short-term interest rates, as described by the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure (Sargent, 1972), real long-term interest
rates also decline. Assuming that investment decisions are sensitive to alterations in
the real long-term interest rate because of the impact on economic agents’ costs of
capital, investment will rise. Therefore, aggregate demand and output will also rise
(Taylor, 1995; Mishkin, 1995).
From the above description it follows that the functioning of the interest rate channel
is based on two key assumptions. First, monetary policy measures must be able
to alter short-term and long-term market rates. This particularly applies to bank
lending rates, as bank loans are the most important source of external finance for
the non-financial corporate sector (EIB, 2015). Second, economic agents must react
to these interest rate changes – that is, entrepreneurs will consider interest rates
when making their investment decisions. In various large-scale macro-econometric
models4 used for forecasting and policy analysis at central banks, this relationship has
traditionally been modelled according to the neoclassical investment theory (Boivin
et al., 2010). Pioneered by Jorgenson (1963) the theory links firms’ capital demand
with interest rates via the firms’ user cost of capital.
4 Models that incorporate the neoclassical link between interest rates, the user cost of capital and
business investment include the Federal Reserve Board’s MIT-Penn-SSRC model (Brayton et al.,
1997), the ECB’s Area-Wide Model, the Bank of England Quarterly Model (Harrison et al., 2005)
and the Bank of Canada’s Quarterly Projection Model (Coletti et al., 1996).
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2.2.2 Neoclassical Investment Theory
The idea of a negative interest rate elasticity of investment had already been a
standard feature in the dogma of classical economists (e.g. Smith, 1776; Ricardo,
1817). The first microeconomic foundation for this concept was laid down by early
neoclassical economists, such as Alfred Marshall, who argued that investment is
pushed to the point where the marginal utility of investment equals the rate of
interest (Marshall, 1920).5 Later, this concept formed the basis of modern capital
and investment theories (e.g. Fisher, 1930; Keynes, 1936).
In the neoclassical theory of investment, Dale Jorgenson extended the approach of
his predecessors beyond interest rates to include taxes, depreciation rates and capital
gains in the analysis. These extra dimensions introduced the concept of user costs of
capital in connection with investment decisions (Jorgenson, 1963). The starting point
of the neoclassical investment theory is the assumption that a firm’s demand for
capital is determined by its objective to maximize its net worth.6 A firm’s optimal
capital stock is reached when the marginal product of capital f
′
K is equal to the
rental price of one unit of capital service, which is the so-called user cost of capital
UCC:
f
′
K =
pI
p
(1− k − τZ)
(1− τ)
(
δ + r − p˙
I
pI
)
= UCC (2.1)
where p denotes the output price, pI the price of investment goods, k the rate of
investment tax credit on new capital purchases, Z the present value of depreciation
allowances, τ the corporate tax rate, δ the depreciation rate and r the real interest
rate.7 According to Jorgenson (1963), the rate of investment is determined by the
firm’s adjustment to the optimal capital stock.
In line with equation (2.1), according to the neoclassical investment theory interest
rates do not affect business investment directly, but are embedded in the firms’ user
cost of capital, which in turn is linked to the investment decision. The successful
5 ’When they have this amount, the marginal utility of the machinery [...] is measured by 4 percent.
A rise in the rate of interest would diminish their use of machinery; for they would avoid the use
of all that did not give a net annual surplus of more than 4 percent on its value. And a fall in the
rate of interest would lead them to demand the aid of more capital, and to introduce machinery
which gave a net annual surplus of something less than 4 percent on its value’ (Marshall, 1920,
p.299).
6 Despite the neoclassical theory of factor demand being well known at that time, the profit
maximizing consideration had been almost entirely ignored in the early empirical literature on
business investment (Gould and Waud, 1973).
7 See Appendix A.1 for a derivation of equation (2.1).
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transmission of monetary policy impulses to business investment hinges on the
significance and size of firms’ user cost elasticity of capital.8 Empirical studies that
have examined the workings of the interest channel in Germany during the pre-crisis
period have found a statistically significant effect of the user cost of capital on
business investment (Table 2.1). The user cost of capital elasticity estimates range
between -0.12 (Bu¨ttner et al., 2015) and -1.16 (Dwenger, 2014) depending on the
dataset and estimation model employed.
Table 2.1: Studies on the Interest Rate Channel in Germany
Paper Data UCC Elasticity estimates
Mojon et al. (2001) Semi-aggregated (1988-1997) Between -0.68 and -0.15
von Kalckreuth (2001) Firm level data (1988-1997) Between -0.66 and -0.38
Harhoff and Ramb (2001) Firm-level data (1987-1997) Between -0.63 and -0.42
Bu¨ttner and Ho¨nig (2011) Firm-level data (1994-2007) Between -1.16 and -1.03
Dwenger (2014) Firm-level data (1987-2007) Between -1.18 and -0.48
Dwenger and Walch (2014) Firm-level data (1995-2004) Between -0.52 and -0.43
Bu¨ttner et al. (2015) Firm-level data (1994-2012) Between -0.47 and -0.12
Jorgenson’s neoclassical investment theory has substantially influenced the empirical
literature on investment demand. By taking into account depreciation, interest rates
and taxes, the theory suggests that both fiscal and monetary policy can influence
business investment. This logic renders the theory highly appealing to policy makers,
who have called for low interest rates and tax incentives – such as investment tax
credit or accelerated depreciation – to stimulate investment. Though it is not free
from criticism9 and alternative investment theories have emerged, the neoclassical
investment theory has remained a key framework for analysing investment demand.
It has been widely employed in macro-econometric models at central banks (Boivin
et al., 2010).
8 The user cost elasticity of capital measures the percentage change of capital given a 1-percent
change in the user cost of capital.
9 Empirical evidence on the validity of the neoclassical investment theory is mixed. Early
econometric studies based on aggregate time-series data did not definitively prove a statistically
significant impact of the user cost of capital on investment. For an overview of studies, see
Chirinko (1993) and Hassett and Hubbard (2002). Later empirical studies employing firm-level
data were able to provide clearer evidence of a statistically significant effect of the user cost on
investment, although not always of an economically relevant size (e.g. Cummins and Hassett,
1992; Cummins et al., 1994, 1996; Chirinko et al., 1999).
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2.3 Interest Rates and Business Investment: Stylized Facts
The link between interest rates and investment, via firms’ user cost of capital, is well
established in the literature, as shown in the preceding section. Doubts about the
proper functioning of this link have been raised, owing to weak investment activities
in the post-crisis period despite record low interest rates. Using aggregate data
we analyse to what extent business investment and interest rates in Germany have
covaried during the past two decades.
2.3.1 The Link Between Interest Rate and Investment in Germany
Business investment in Germany has fluctuated dramatically since the early 1990s
(Figure 2.1). The reunification boom was followed by a sharp contraction in corporate
investment activities. During the subsequent recovery between 1995 and 2000,
business investment grew by almost 50 percent. The bursting of the dot-com
bubble and ensuing economic stagnation in Germany caused contraction in business
investment between 2001 and 2004; this was followed by another period of strong
increase during the run-up to the financial crisis. Real business investment grew by
more than 40 percent between 2003 and the end of 2007. With the outbreak of the
financial crisis, the boom ended. Real business investment contracted by almost 30
percent between the end of 2007 and the end of 2009.
Although business investment recovered quickly after the financial crisis, increasing
by 24 percent between mid-2009 and mid-2011, it has not changed much since then.
Between mid-2011 and late 2016, real business investment increased by only 6.6
percent and remained below the pre-crisis level. Furthermore, business investment
as a share of GDP is still rather low. It accounted for around 5.9 percent at the end
of 2016, compared with more than 9 percent after the reunification, 8 percent at the
turn of the millennium, and 7.8 percent at the end of 2007 (Figure 2.1).
The post-crisis weakness in business investment is surprising. Owing to the ECB’s
expansionary monetary policy, the borrowing costs of non-financial corporations
(NFCs) have substantially declined and firms’ access to finance is excellent (Figure
2.2). This raises the question whether the traditional link between interest rates and
investment still functions. Following Boivin et al. (2010), we evaluate the link by
analysing the co-movement of the growth rates of real business investment, the ECB
monetary policy rate and the borrowing cost for NFCs in Germany.
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Figure 2.1: Real Business Investment in Germany
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Source: Destatis, own calculations. Business investment defined as private sector
equipment investment, which comprises investment in machinery and vehicles.
Figure 2.2: Borrowing Costs and Credit Constraints of German NFCs
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Source: ECB, Ifo. ECB Interest Rate - interest rate on the main refinancing
operations. BC - borrowing costs for NFCs defined as the weighted average
interest rate charged by banks to NFCs on new loans. CC (credit constraints) -
share of manufacturing sector firms reporting restrictive lending by the banks.
Figure 2.3a shows the year-over-year growth rate of real business investment in
Germany, plotted against the growth rate of the ECB monetary policy rate. In
Figure 2.3b we plot the correlation coefficients of the growth rate of real business
investment and several lags of the growth rate of the monetary policy rate. According
to the interest rate channel theory, the correlation should be negative. This would
mean a decline in the policy rate should be followed by an increase in business
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investment. However, the rather strong co-movement of the two series, shown in
Figure 2.3a – particularly until 2011 – suggests a positive interrelationship. The
positive correlation coefficients between the growth in business investment and
lagged changes in the monetary policy rate in the sample period from 2000Q1 to
2009Q4 support this notion. Boivin et al. (2010) argue that the positive relationship
reflects policy makers’ focus on inflation stability and the tendency to lean against
strengthening (or weakening) in demand. In the period 2010Q1 to 2016Q4, however,
correlations have become negative, indicating that a reduction in the monetary policy
rate was followed by an increase in business investment within three to four quarters.
However, the post-crisis sample is rather small and the null-hypothesis that the
correlation is statistically significant from zero cannot be rejected.
Figure 2.3: Real Business Investment and ECB Key Interest Rate
(a) YoY Growth Rates
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Source: Destatis, ECB, own calculations. Correlation between the growth rate of real business investment and the
lagged growth rate of the ECB interest rate on main refinancing operations. Total Sample: 2000q1-2016q4; Before
2010:2000q1-2009q4; After 2010: 2010q1-2016q4.
Analogous evidence can be found for the relationship between the growth rates of
real business investment and borrowing costs for NFCs, as shown in Figure 2.4a and
Figure 2.4b. Because bank loans are one of the most important sources of external
finance for most corporations, particularly SMEs, borrowing costs should be an
important driver of firms’ user cost of capital (EIB, 2015). Similar to the monetary
policy rate, changes in real business investment seem to closely follow changes in
NFC borrowing costs – indicating a positive interrelationship (Figure 2.4a). The
correlation between the lags of borrowing costs changes and business investment
changes was positive for the period 2004Q1 to 2009Q4. Thereafter it shifted to the
negative, without being statistically significant (Figure 2.4b.).
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Figure 2.4: Real Business Investment and Borrowing Costs of NFCs
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Overall, aggregate data do not offer strong support for a negative investment–interest
rate relationship such as that proposed by the interest rate channel and neoclassical
investment theory – neither during the pre-crisis period nor during the post-crisis
period. However, the existence of a neoclassical link between interest rates and
investment should not yet be rejected. Chirinko et al. (1999) point out that the results
of studies based on aggregate data may be biased due to simultaneity problems,
capital market frictions as well as firm heterogeneity.
2.3.2 Expectations and Business Investment
The post-crisis business investment development in Germany has been the focus of
numerous studies, which analysed the potential causes of the weakness (e.g. Schwartz
and Gerstenberger, 2014, 2015; Alm and Meurers, 2015). Some of these studies
have identified uncertain and gloomy business expectations as the main cause of
firms’ reluctance to invest (e.g. Gerstenberger and Schwartz, 2014; Schwartz, 2015;
Heymann and Schneider, 2017).
The data show that business expectations of the German corporate sector have
indeed been rather volatile in the post-crisis period. According to the ifo Business
Expectations Index shown in Figure 2.5, firms’ business outlook reached an all-time
low in early 2009 but quickly recovered in 2010. However, the intensification of
the sovereign debt crisis in 2012 severely lowered business expectations in Germany.
After a modest recovery in 2013, firms’ business outlook remained at a level that
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was lower than in 2006 and 2007.
Research has shown that medium- to long-term business expectations are important
drivers of investment. The irreversibility of investment decisions and the durability
of capital goods make it necessary for firms to incorporate not only current demand
conditions in their investment decisions but also expectations of future demand
(Eckstein, 1965). Keynes (1936) emphasized the role of entrepreneurs’ ’state of
confidence’ as significantly affecting investment decisions.10 Using micro-data from
a survey among Chief Financial Officers, Gennaioli et al. (2016) provide empirical
evidence that expectations about earnings growth are important predictors of planned
and actual investment.
Figure 2.5: Business Expectations of the German Corporate Sector
90
95
10
0
10
5
11
0
20
05
=1
00
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Source: Ifo Business Expectations Index (2005=100).
Higher values indicate positive expectations.
The likely importance of business expectations for investment decisions is supported
by an analysis of aggregate data. Figure 2.6a shows a strong co-movement between
German firms’ business expectations and real business investment, with changes
in expectations leading investment changes. There is a strong and statistically
significant positive correlation between changes in real investment and the various
lags of business expectation changes (Figure 2.6b). Furthermore, the correlation
strengthened notably after 2010Q1. Hence, expectations seem to have become even
more important after the crisis.
10 Keynes (1936) argued that ’[...] economic prosperity is excessively dependent on a political and
social atmosphere which is congenial to the average business man’, and that ’[...]in estimating
the prospects of investment, we must have regard, therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even
the digestions and reactions to the weather of those upon whose spontaneous activity it largely
depends’ (p.103)
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Figure 2.6: Real Business Investment and Business Expectations
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
Based on aggregate data, we cannot identify the negative link between interest
rates and investment that is predicted by the interest rate channel and neoclassical
investment theory. Pessimistic business expectations might have played a role in
depressing post-crisis investment dynamics. We proceed our analysis with firm-level
data and test the proposed neoclassical link between business investment and the
user cost of capital, as described in Section 2.2.
2.4.1 Estimation Strategy
The aim of our empirical analysis is to estimate the user cost elasticity of capital
among German SMEs in the post-crisis period. Furthermore, we evaluate how
expectations of future business conditions affected the firms’ responsiveness to user
cost changes. The starting point for our empirical model is a capital demand equation,
derived from a neoclassical model of a profit-maximizing firm. Following Eisner and
Nadiri (1968) we assume a CES-production function with a constant elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour:
F (Li,t, Ki,t) ≡ Si,t = At[αiK−ρi,t + (1− αi)L−ρi,t ]−v/ρ (2.2)
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with: Si,t = output defined as net sales
Ki,t = capital input
Li,t = labour input
At = year specific production technology (productivity)
v = elasticity of scale
ρ = (1/σ)− 1 determines the elasticity of substitution
σ = elasticity of substitution between capital and labour
αi = capital share
The optimal capital stock K∗ is derived from the first order condition of a profit
maximizing firm. That is, the marginal productivity of capital is equal to its marginal
cost (i.e. the user cost of capital):11
K∗i,t = Hi,tS
β
itUCC
−σ
it (2.3)
with: Hi,t = DiTt = (αiv)
σA
[σ−1
v
]
t
β = σ + 1−σ
v
Equation (2.3) shows that the optimal capital stock of a firm depends on the
firm’s level of output (sales) Si,t, the firm’s user cost of capital UCCi,t, a firm-specific
distribution parameter Di
12 and a productivity parameter Tt (in equation 2.3 reflected
by Hi,t). Taking the log of both sides, we obtain the following linear equation:
ki,t = hi,t + βsi,t − σucci,t (2.4)
where ki,t denotes the log of the optimal capital stock, si,t the log of sales, ucci,t the
log of the user cost of capital and hi,t the log of Hi,t.
13
Differencing equation (2.4) and approximating the net growth in capital stock, ∆ki,t,
using the formula Ii,t/Ki,t−1−δi, with Ii,t and δi denoting investment and depreciation,
respectively, we obtain the following model:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= β∆si,t − σ∆ucci,t + ui,t (2.5)
11 See Appendix A.2 for a detailed derivation of equation (2.3).
12Di captures the firm’s relative factor shares of capital and labour.
13 Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with σ = 1 and constant returns to scale (v = 1)
equation (2.4) reduces to ki,t = logαi + si,t − ucci,t.
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with: ui,t = ηi + λt + i,t
The change of hi,t is captured by including time-specific shocks, λt, a firm-specific
constant, ηi (reflecting depreciation δi and possible trends in the capital demand
equation 2.4) and idiosyncratic transitory shocks, i,t (von Kalckreuth, 2001; Chatelain
et al., 2001). Equation (2.5) links the percentage change in capital stock (∆ki,t) –
approximated by the ’investment rate’ Ii,t/Ki,t−1 – to percentage changes in sales
and the user cost of capital.
To account for the fact that adjustment to the desired capital stock is not instant,14
we follow the empirical literature and assume an econometric adjustment process in
the form of an autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL) model (e.g. Harhoff and Ramb,
2001; von Kalckreuth, 2001; Bond et al., 2003). We derive our baseline model:
Iit
Ki,t−1
=
L∑
l=0
λl
Ii,t−l
Ki,t−l−1
+
M∑
m=0
βm∆si,t−m −
N∑
n=0
σn∆ucci,t−n + ui,t (2.6)
where L, M and N denote the maximum included lags of the explanatory variables.15
From equation (2.6) we can derive the short-run and long-run effect of a one-period
change in ∆ucct. The short-run effect corresponds to:
d∆kt
d∆ucct
= σ0, (2.7)
whereas the long-run effect is the sum of the effects of shocks in each period. It is
given by: ∑N
h=0 σh
1−∑Lh=1 λh = ηucc (2.8)
The long-run user cost elasticity of capital, ηucc, captures the long-run percentage
change in the capital stock K as a reaction to a one-percent change in the level of
the user cost of capital (due to a one-period increase in the growth rate of the user
cost of capital) (see e.g. von Kalckreuth, 2001). The analogous definition applies to
the short-run and long-run effects of a one-period change in ∆st.
16
14 Frictions prohibiting the instantaneous adjustment of the capital stock include, inter alia,
adjustment costs, delivery lags, irreversibility constraints and time-to-build lags (von Kalckreuth,
2001).
15 Economic theory does not provide information about the optimal lag-structure, so it must be
determined empirically. We determine the optimal number of lags in the estimation model by
testing various specifications and comparing the test statistics described below.
16 The long-run sales elasticity of capital is given by ηs = (
∑M
h=0 βh)/(1−
∑L
h=1 λh).
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We estimate equation (2.6) using data from the post-crisis period, as described below.
We compare the estimates of the long-run user cost elasticity of capital with pre-crisis
findings reported in earlier studies. The aim is to evaluate whether firms have been
responsive to user cost changes (i.e. interest rate changes) in the period after the
financial crisis, during which the ECB’s monetary policy measures have led to a
significant decline in interest rates.
In addition to the re-estimation of the user cost elasticity of capital for the post-crisis
period, we are interested in the effect of business expectations on firms’ investment
decisions. To test the effect of business expectations, we proceed in two steps. First
we include a firm-specific categorical variable BEi,t, which captures whether the
firm had positive, neutral or negative business expectations (e.g. Bu¨ttner and Ho¨nig,
2011). We expect firms with neutral or negative business expectations to display
a lower investment rate than firms with positive expectations. We estimate the
following model:
Iit
Ki,t−1
=
L∑
l=0
λl
Ii,t−l
Ki,t−l−1
+
M∑
m=0
βm∆si,t−m −
N∑
n=0
σn∆ucci,t−n + αBEi,t + ui,t (2.9)
Second, to assess whether firms with different business expectations reacted differently
to user cost changes, we estimate equation (2.6) for subgroups of firms that differ in
business expectations. We expect that firms with neutral or negative expectations
would react less strongly to user cost changes, and hence would display a lower user
cost elasticity of capital than firms which had positive expectations.
The econometric specifications in equation (2.6) and (2.9) might suffer from several
shortcomings, which could lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates if standard
panel data models are applied. First, the lagged dependent variable Ii,t−l/Ki,t−l−1
is positively correlated with the error term ui,t due to the presence of individual
fixed-effects ηi.
17 Second, research has shown that simultaneity between interest rates
and investment shocks distorts the user cost elasticity towards zero and that firm
17 Hence, estimating equations (2.6) and (2.9) using ordinary least squares (OLS) would give
inconsistent estimates. The positive correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the
error term leads to a upward bias of its estimated coefficients λl. Since λl enters equation (2.8)
as denominator, the UCC elasticity ηucc would be biased downwards. To solve this endogeneity
problem one can transform the data and remove the fixed effects ηi for instance by applying the
fixed effects (within) estimator (FE). However, Nickell (1981) shows that the transformed lagged
dependent variable and the transformed error term are still (negatively) correlated resulting in
an underestimation of the true coefficients λl and thus an overestimation of ηucc. A consistent
estimator of λl would lie within or near the boundaries of the OLS and FE estimates (Bond,
2002).
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investment shocks could also be contemporaneously correlated with sales (Chirinko
et al., 1999).
We therefore estimate equations (2.6) and (2.9) using a General Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator, which allows one to deal with the dynamic structure of the
model as well as with predetermined or endogenous explanatory variables. More
specifically, we employ the two-step System-GMM as outlined by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
and a Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. The System-GMM estimator is
consistent only in the absence of higher-order serial correlation of the error-term i,t.
To test the validity of this condition, we use the Arellano–Bond test (Arellano and
Bond, 1991). Whereas the AR(1) autocorrelation statistic should be significant, the
AR(2) statistic should be such that the null hypothesis (no autocorrelation) cannot
be rejected. Furthermore, we test for overidentifying restrictions using the Sargan
test.
2.4.2 Data and Variable Definition
The basis of our empirical analysis is the KfW Mittelstandspanel, an annual survey
covering German micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises having less than EUR
500 million annual turnover. The database comprises qualitative and quantitative
data from 60,653 firms over a 14-year period (2002–2015). We extend previous
research by including in our analysis firms that were not subject to publication
requirements and whose data were therefore not captured by other widely-used sources
of accounting data at the firm level (e.g. Hoppenstedt database). Furthermore, our
study is the first to include data beyond the year 2012 (Bu¨ttner et al., 2015); hence,
our analysis covers a longer timespan of the post-crisis period than previous work.
To control for outliers, we discard firm-year observations that belong to the 1st or
99th percentile of the variables of interest, which are the investment-capital ratio,
the user cost of capital and real sales (e.g. von Kalckreuth, 2001; Dwenger, 2014).
Furthermore, we restrict the sample to include only firms that have participated
in the survey over four consecutive years or more.18 Taking into account missing
observations, the final sample contains 8,970 observations for 1,277 SMEs for the
18 Since we analyse changes in the explanatory variables, and include at least two lags in the analysis,
a firm is required to appear in the dataset in the three preceding years.
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period 2004–2015.19 The sample is unbalanced owing to missing data and differing
participation behaviour among the firms. Appendix A.3 provides an overview of the
sample structure.
Dependent Variable
The dataset includes information on the amount invested in year t (depicted Ii,t).
20
This value is divided by the capital stock value of the preceding year (Ki,t−1) – that
is, tangible assets – to derive the dependent variable, the investment–capital ratio
Ii,t/Ki,t−1, which captures the growth in capital stock.
Figure 2.7: Annual Average Investment Rate
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Source: KfW, own calculations.
Figure 2.7 shows the resultant average yearly investment rate among our sample.
The investment rate of German SMEs increased significantly between 2005 and 2007,
reflecting the pre-crisis investment boom. After the sharp decline in 2008/2009 and
the recovery in 2010, investment rates slowly declined. The trends for the investment
rate among the studied firms resembles the aggregate data as discussed in Section
2.3.1. Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables are shown in
Table 2.2.
Explanatory Variables
The variable sales (Si,t) is measured as turnover, deflated using an industry-specific
output-price deflator. German SMEs experienced strong growth in real sales prior
19 Our sample covers fewer years than the original sample, owing to some variables not being
available for all survey years.
20 Our study differs from previous studies that define investment as additions to plant, property and
equipment, taken from the Anlagespiegel, less disposals from fixed tangible assets (e.g. Dwenger,
2014). In those studies, capital stock K is calculated by applying a perpetual inventory method.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Ii,t/Ki,t−1 0.224 0.282 0.000 1.500
UCCi,t 0.083 0.022 0.018 0.138
∆ucci,t -0.050 0.163 -1.864 0.828
Si,t (in 1000 EUR) 13,731 21,692 106 213,857
∆si,t 0.021 0.299 -4.344 6.977
to the crisis, with an average annual increase of 5.1 percent between 2004 and 2008
(Figure 2.8). Real sales dropped dramatically in 2009 by 11.2 percent, but quickly
recovered in 2010 (by 5.6 percent) and 2011 (7.5 percent). As of 2012, real sales
growth was rather low or even negative, with an average annual growth rate of
around -1 percent between 2012 and 2015.
Figure 2.8: Annual Average Real Sales Growth
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Source: KfW, own calculations.
The construction of the firm-specific user cost of capital variable is based on Jorgenson
(1963) and Jorgenson and Hall (1967). Following Auerbach (1983) and Hayashi
(2000), we employ a weighted-average definition of the user cost of capital:21
UCCi,t =
P It
Pj,t
1− Aj,t
1− τt
(
WACCi,t + dj,t − (1− dj,t)∆P
I
t+1
P It
)
(2.10)
where UCCi,t represents the user cost of capital for firm i at time t, P
I
t is the price
level of investment goods, and Pj,t is the industry-specific output price index. The
term Aj,t is the industry-specific discounted value of depreciation allowances, τt is
21 This is in contrast to other studies that use German firm-level data, such as Harhoff and Ramb
(2001), von Kalckreuth (2001) and Dwenger (2014) which use the King and Fullerton (1984)
approach.
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the corporate tax rate, WACCi,t is the weighted average cost of capital, dj,t is the
industry-specific depreciation rate, and the ratio ∆P It+1/P
I
t is a forward-looking
inflation component for investment goods. Appendix A.4 provides details of the data
used in the construction of the user cost of capital variable.
The firm-specific weighted average cost of capital WACCi,t takes into account the
financial structure of firm i, by weighting the costs of debt and equity with their
respective shares in total funds (e.g Mojon et al., 2001; Luennemann and Mathae,
2001; Chatelain et al., 2001):
WACCi,t =
Di,t
Di,t + Ei,t
∗ ari,t ∗ (1− τt) + Ei,t
Di,t + Ei,t
∗ ert (2.11)
where Di,t denotes gross debt, Ei,t denoted equity, and ari,t refers to the apparent
interest rate. The term ert is the equity rate approximated by the long-term interest
rate.22 The apparent interest rate is measured as interest expenses over gross debt:
with ari,t =
interest expensesi,t
Di,t
(2.12)
Figure 2.9 shows that SMEs’ user cost of capital declined substantially during
the observation period. The average user cost of capital among the sample firms
was around 10.2 percent in 2004, but by 2015 it had dropped to 5.7 percent. To
evaluate which factors had caused the decline in SMEs’ user cost of capital during
the observation period, we re-estimate various user cost specifications. We hold
various components constant in turn, as follows: the tax rate (UCC TAX), prices
(UCC PRICE), the capital structure (UCC CSTRUC), and interest rates – both the
equity rate and the apparent interest rate (UCC INTR). The results are shown in
Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10a illustrates the development of the various user cost specifications. Figure
2.10b shows the respective differences between the user cost specifications and the
baseline user cost specification (UCC). The results suggest that changes in tax rates,
capital structure and prices accounted for minimal changes in SMEs’ user cost of
capital during the observation period. The respective differences between UCC TAX,
UCC CSTRUC and UCC PRICE relative to the baseline specification are small.
The largest changes in the user cost of capital were associated with interest rate
22 Following for instance Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) and Chatelain et al. (2001), we use the
German 10-year government bond yield.
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Figure 2.9: Annual Average User Cost of Capital
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Figure 2.10: User Cost of Capital Specifications
(a) Components
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Notes: UCC: user cost calculated following equation (2.10). UCC TAX: holding the tax rate constant at the rate
in 2004. UCC CSTRUC: holding the capital structure constant at the sample mean in 2004. UCC INTR: holding
the equity rate constant at the rate in 2004, and the apparent interest rate constant at the sample mean in 2004.
UCC PRICE: holding output and investment goods prices constant at the rate in 2004. TAX: difference between
UCC and UCC TAX; equivalent for CSTRUC, INTR and PRICE.
changes, as illustrated by the plot for the variable UCC INTR. If interest rates had
remained at the 2004 level, SMEs’ user cost of capital would have been around 2.7
percentage points higher in 2015 than they actually were.
Business Expectations
As explained in the previous section, we include business expectations in our
empirical analysis. This information is included as the categorical variable BEi,t,
and by splitting the sample according to firms’ business expectations. For the
years 2004 to 2011, our dataset includes information on one-year sales expectations,
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reflecting short-term business expectations.23 As of 2010, the dataset also includes
three-year sales expectations, reflecting medium-term business expectations. As
business investments are generally of a long-term character, we regard medium or
long-term business expectations as being particularly relevant to investment decisions.
As our medium-term business expectation indicator does not cover the entire sample
period but is available only from 2010 onwards, we approximate the data for 2008
and 200924 based on the one-year sales expectations.25
Figure 2.11: Sales Expectations
(a) Current Year
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(b) Next three Years
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Notes: Firms were asked how they expect their sales to develop in the current year/in the next three years. Positive
- sales will increase. Neutral - sales will remain constant. Negative - sales will decline.
As shown in Figure 2.11a, during the years preceding the financial crisis, our sample
firms’ business expectations were rather optimistic. In 2008, around 40 percent of
the SMEs in the sample expected their sales to increase. Only 13.5 percent expected
their sales to decline. In the crisis year, 2009, business expectations plummeted
dramatically. Around 50 percent of the firms expected their sales to decline, and
only 15 percent expected sales to increase. Owing to the fast economic recovery, the
firms’ business outlook quickly recovered, too. In 2011, almost 50 percent of the firms
expected sales increases during that year, and 53 percent expected sales increases over
the next three years (Figure 2.11b). However, after 2011, firms’ medium-term business
23 The participating firms were asked to state whether they expected their sales to (i) increase, (ii)
remain constant or (iii) decline in the current year.
24 The estimation period covers the years 2008 to 2015, and differs from the sample period
(2004–2015) due to the inclusion of several lags as instrumental variables in our estimation
equation. As BE is not instrumented, only the data from 2008 onwards is necessary.
25 Because we have access to data on both the one-year and the three-year sales expectations for the
period 2010 to 2012, we can compare their values. We find that for 72 percent of all observations,
both indicators are identical. This finding implies that short-term expectations are relatively
good approximates for medium-term business expectations.
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outlook became less optimistic. The number of firms expecting sales increases in the
following three years declined to around 35 percent in 2015. Around 65 percent of
the firms expected no sales increases or even a decline.
Descriptive statistics suggest SMEs’ investment rates differ according to their business
expectations. As shown in Table 2.3, the average investment rate of firms with positive
three-year sales expectations is almost 26 percent. Firms with negative expectations
display a much lower investment rate (19.5 percent).
Table 2.3: Investment Rate and Business Expectations
Sample Mean Positive Exp. Neutral Exp. Negative Exp.
22.1 25.8 20.1 19.5
Notes: Positive - sales are expected to increase in the next three years. Neutral - sales
are expected to remain constant. Negative - sales are expected to decline.
2.4.3 Estimation Results
Table 2.4 shows the estimation results of the ADL-model specified in equation (2.6).
After testing several specifications with various lag-structures, we include in our
preferred model two lags of the dependent variable Ii,t/Ki,t−1, the contemporary
value and two lags of ∆si,t, and the contemporary value and three lags of ∆ucci,t.
26
We also include a constant, as well as year dummies to control for macroeconomic
influences on firm investment. Table 2.4 shows the complete list of coefficients of the
included variables, the sum of the lagged dependent variable (
∑
Ii,t−l/Ki,t−l−1), and
the estimated long-run elasticities of sales and the user cost of capital (ηs and ηucc).
As a starting point we estimate equation (2.6) using OLS and the fixed-effects
(FE) estimator. The results are shown in columns (1) an (2) of Table 2.4. For
both estimation methods, the coefficients of the lags of the dependent variable are
statistically significant at the 1-percent level. However, they differ in sign. In the OLS
estimation the coefficients are positive but in the FE estimation they are negative.
The difference is due to the OLS estimates being biased upward and the FE estimates
26 Using System-GMM we ran several specifications of models (2.6) and (2.9), for the total sample
and subsamples, using various lag-lengths and instruments. We evaluated each specification
based on the Arellano-Bond and Sargan test statistics. We chose the specification that gave
consistent results for all models (2.6 and 2.9) and subsamples using the same set of instruments
(see e.g. von Kalckreuth, 2001). Our lag-length choice is consistent with previous studies that
used ADL models (Chatelain et al., 2001; von Kalckreuth, 2001).
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being biased downward, owing to autocorrelation. For both models the sum of the
autoregressive coefficients is within the unit interval, which is consistent with model
stability (Debarsy et al., 2012).27
Table 2.4: Results - Baseline Model
(1) (2) (3)
Ii,t/Ki,t−1 OLS FE GMM
Ii,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.2800∗∗∗ -0.1665∗∗∗ 0.1102
[0.0247] [0.0336] [0.1171]
Ii,t−2/Ki,t−3 0.1668∗∗∗ -0.1547∗∗∗ 0.0657∗∗
[0.0199] [0.0229] [0.0295]∑
Ii,t−l/Ki,t−l−1 0.4468∗∗∗ -0.3212∗∗∗ 0.1759
[0.0258] [0.0425] [0.1164]
∆si,t 0.0961
∗∗∗ 0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0145
[0.0207] [0.0295] [0.0579]
∆si,t−1 0.0936∗∗∗ 0.1130∗∗∗ 0.0355
[0.0171] [0.0293] [0.0339]
∆si,t−2 0.0285∗ 0.0643∗∗ 0.0065
[0.0163] [0.0258] [0.0211]
ηs 0.3944
∗∗∗ 0.1974∗∗∗ 0.0686
[0.0818] [0.0588] [0.1177]
∆ucci,t -0.0984
∗∗∗ -0.0663 -0.2048
[0.0368] [0.0433] [0.1332]
∆ucci,t−1 -0.1119∗∗∗ -0.0582 -0.1554∗
[0.0388] [0.0516] [0.0828]
∆ucci,t−2 -0.0818∗∗ -0.1253∗∗ -0.1287∗
[0.0358] [0.0543] [0.0687]
∆ucci,t−3 -0.0056 -0.0632 -0.0620
[0.0288] [0.0384] [0.0431]
ηucc -0.5382
∗∗∗ -0.2369∗∗ -0.6685∗
[0.1706] [0.1161] [0.3821]
Observations 3,283 3,283 3,283
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0007
AR(2) (p-value) 0.7486
Sargan test (p-value) 0.3501
Notes: Dependent variable is Ii,t/Ki,t−1. Column (1) is estimated using OLS. Column (2) is estimated
using the FE estimator. Column (3) is estimated using System-GMM. The lagged investment–capital ratio,
sales and the user cost of capital are treated as endogenous and are instrumented. Instruments are the
values (in levels) of ∆ucci,t and ∆salesi,t, lagged at least two periods and earlier when feasible, and the
second lag of Ii,t/Ki,t−1. Year dummies and a constant are included. Standard errors in parentheses,
*p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
27 Values outside the unit interval imply an unstable dynamic of the model, ’[...] with accelerating
divergence away from the equilibrium values’ (Roodman, 2009a, p.103).
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Furthermore, the point estimates (short-run coefficients)28 of contemporary and
lagged sales growth are statistically significant, which implies a positive relationship
with a change in capital stock. Hence, a short-term increase in sales growth is
associated with a short-term increase in capital. The long-run elasticity of sales
varies between 0.2 and 0.39; these results are statistically significant at the 1-percent
level in both estimation models.29 The point estimates of the contemporary and
lagged user cost of capital growth rate are negative, implying an inverse relationship
with the growth in capital stock. However, not all lags are statistically significant
in both models. The long-run user cost elasticity of investment is estimated based
on equation (2.8) and varies between -0.54 and -0.24 depending on the estimation
method. The null hypothesis, which stated that the long-run effect of user cost of
capital would be equal to zero, is rejected for both estimations at the 1-percent level.
Because the coefficients of the OLS and FE models might be biased, we re-estimate
the baseline model using System-GMM. The results are shown in column (3) of Table
2.4. Our set of instruments in the first-difference equation includes the values of
∆ucci,t and ∆si,t, lagged at least two periods or earlier if feasible, and the second
lag of Ii,t/Ki,t−1. The model is evaluated using the Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test. According to both test statistics, our model
is correctly specified. The GMM estimation results differ in terms of coefficient sign
and significance from both the OLS and FE estimates.
The coefficients of both lags of the dependent variable are positive, a finding that is
generally consistent with previous studies (e.g. Chatelain et al., 2001; von Kalckreuth,
2001). However, only the second lag is statistically significant at the 5-percent
level. Furthermore, point estimates of sales growth are positive, but statistically
not significant. In addition, the long-run elasticity of sales becomes rather small
(0.07) and is also statistically not significant. This finding contrasts with the results
reported by previous studies, which have confirmed a statistically significant positive
effect of sales on investment (Harhoff and Ramb, 2001; von Kalckreuth, 2001; Bu¨ttner
and Ho¨nig, 2011).30 Our results imply, that during the observation period, SMEs did
not necessarily take contemporary and past changes in their sales into consideration
when making investment decisions.
28 Point estimates refers to the coefficients βm with m = 0...2, and σn with n = 0...3 in model (2.6).
They can be interpreted as short-run effects of temporary changes in sales and the user cost of
capital growth rates.
29 Standard errors of ηucc and ηs are computed using the delta method.
30 Only Dwenger (2014) reports a long-run sales elasticity of similar size (0.09), which was also not
statistically significant.
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Regarding the point estimates of the user cost of capital growth rate, the coefficients
are negative and larger in value than in the OLS and FE estimations. Both the first
and second lag of the growth rate are statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
The user cost’s distributed lag coefficients decline sharply, implying that most of
the impact of user cost changes is transmitted within two years. The long-run user
cost elasticity is estimated at -0.67, which is larger than the OLS and FE estimates.
The value implies that a one-percent decline in the user cost of capital will increase
capital by 0.67 percent in the long run.31 The null hypothesis, which stated that
the long-run effect of user cost of capital would be equal to zero, is rejected at the
10-percent level. Our findings – based on the total sample – hence suggest that the
basic link between the user cost of capital and business investment has generally
functioned during the post-crisis period. This finding implies that declining interest
rates had a stimulating effect on business investment through a change in the firms’
user cost of capital.
In the next step we augment our baseline model with a categorical variable representing
sales expectations, using BE neutral for neutral medium-term business expecta-
tions and BE negative for negative expectations. Positive business expectations
(BE positive) is the reference category. Following Bu¨ttner and Ho¨nig (2011) the
BE indicators are treated as exogenous. The estimation results for model (2.9) using
OLS, the FE estimator and System-GMM are shown in Table 2.5. The coefficients
for both business expectations indicators are negative and statistically significant
in the OLS and GMM estimations. This finding implies that neutral and negative
three-year sales expectations have a negative effect on the capital stock. This is in
line with our assumptions.
Our results also show that expectations of declining sales have a larger negative effect
than neutral expectations, reducing the capital stock by almost 5.7 percent. An
expectation of constant sales reduce the capital stock by 3.8 percent. Our findings are
similar to those of Bu¨ttner and Ho¨nig (2011), who report that pessimistic expectations
about the future decrease the capital stock by about 8 percent. Furthermore, we
find that in our extended model, the point estimates of the user cost growth rate
increase in value. As a result, the long-run user cost elasticity of capital increases to
-0.79, which is statistically significant at the 5-percent level. This implies that the
31 The results are similar to previous estimates for German corporations (von Kalckreuth, 2001;
Harhoff and Ramb, 2001; Bu¨ttner and Ho¨nig, 2011; Simmler, 2012; Dwenger, 2014), although the
studies used different databases and focused on different time periods.
32 CHAPTER 2. INTEREST RATE CHANNEL
long-run effect of the user cost of capital is even larger when business expectations
are controlled for. As in the baseline model, the long-run elasticity of sales remains
small and not statistically significant.
Table 2.5: Results - Model with Business Expectations
(1) (2) (3)
Ii,t/Ki,t−1 OLS-BE FE-BE GMM-BE
Ii,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.2790∗∗∗ -0.1665∗∗∗ 0.1252
[0.0248] [0.0334] [0.1152]
Ii,t−2/Ki,t−3 0.1651∗∗∗ -0.1546∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗
[0.0198] [0.0229] [0.0297]∑
Ii,t−l/Ki,t−l−1 0.4441∗∗∗ -0.3211∗∗∗ 0.1904∗
[0.0259] [0.0424] [0.1152]
∆si,t 0.0888
∗∗∗ 0.0812∗∗∗ 0.0128
[0.0202] [0.0294] [0.0564]
∆si,t−1 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.1126∗∗∗ 0.0387
[0.0172] [0.0295] [0.0338]
∆si,t−2 0.0281∗ 0.0649∗∗ 0.0091
[0.0164] [0.0258] [0.0218]
ηs 0.3718
∗∗∗ 0.1958∗∗∗ 0.0749
[0.0815] [0.0588] [0.1196]
∆ucci,t -0.1014
∗∗∗ -0.0664 -0.2508∗
[0.0369] [0.0433] [0.1352]
∆ucci,t−1 -0.1157∗∗∗ -0.0583 -0.1796∗∗
[0.0388] [0.0515] [0.0838]
∆ucci,t−2 -0.0860∗∗ -0.1248∗∗ -0.1434∗∗
[0.0359] [0.0544] [0.0691]
∆ucci,t−3 -0.0080 -0.0626 -0.0681
[0.0287] [0.0386] [0.0438]
ηucc -0.5599
∗∗∗ -0.2362∗∗ -0.7928∗∗
[0.1697] [0.1161] [0.4041]
BE neutrali,t -0.0153
∗ -0.0066 -0.0381∗∗∗
[0.0093] [0.0135] [0.0127]
BE negativei,t -0.0269
∗∗ -0.0101 -0.0570∗∗∗
[0.0128] [0.0174] [0.0165]
Observations 3,283 3,283 3,283
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0004
AR(2) (p-value) 0.8857
Sargan test (p-value) 0.4149
Notes: Dependent variable is Ii,t/Ki,t−1. Column (1) is estimated using OLS. Column (2) is estimated
using the FE estimator. Column (3) is estimated using System-GMM. The lagged investment–capital ratio,
sales and the user cost of capital are treated as endogenous and are instrumented. Instruments are the
values (in levels) of ∆ucci,t and ∆salesi,t, lagged at least two periods and earlier when feasible, and the
second lag of Ii,t/Ki,t−1. Year dummies and a constant are included. Standard errors in parentheses,
*p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
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To test whether firms with different business expectations react differently to user
cost of capital changes, we re-estimate our baseline model (2.6) for two subgroups:
SMEs with positive sales expectations, and SMEs with neutral or negative sales
expectations.32 The GMM estimation results are shown in Table 2.6. As can be
seen in column (2) firms with positive sales expectations show a significantly higher
user cost elasticity of capital, which is close to unity. The value implies that a one
percent decline in the user cost of capital translates to a one percent increase in
capital. Firms that expect no sales increases in the next three years, or expect a
decline, show a much smaller user cost elasticity of (-0.44). However, the value is
not significantly different from zero. Our findings suggest that firms with pessimistic
sales expectations (neutral or negative expectations) seem insensitive to changes in
the user cost of capital. Monetary policy-induced interest rate changes would, hence,
not be effective for these firms. We also find that for both subgroups the long-run
elasticity of sales remains statistically not significant.
Past research has shown that estimation results based on GMM are quite sensitive
to the set of instruments used (Roodman, 2009b). Furthermore, Eisner and Nadiri
(1968) show that estimation results of the long-run user cost of capital effect may vary,
depending on the lag-structure choice of the estimation model. As robustness check,
we therefore re-estimate the link between the user cost of capital and investment
using a parsimonious model which omits the lagged dependent variable and includes
only the contemporary changes in sales and the user cost of capital. We estimate this
model using the fixed-effects estimator.33 A similar approach is used by Bu¨ttner et al.
(2015). The estimation results based on this simple model support the findings of
our analysis presented above. The results imply that the link between the user cost
of capital and investment has become weaker in the wake of the crisis. Furthermore,
the important role of business expectations for investment decisions is confirmed.
Overall, the estimation results of our empirical analysis provide insight into the
subdued business investment dynamics of the post-crisis period – despite a substantial
decline in the user cost of capital. The results highlight the importance of business
expectations for the functioning of the interest rate channel. The persistence of
gloomy business expectations among parts of the corporate sector in the post-crisis
period – as highlighted by several surveys – have decreased firms’ investment directly
32 We also tested our model for a subgroup of firms with neutral expectations and for a subgroup
with negative expectations. However, both estimations suffer from various problems, as indicated
by the test statistics. We therefore combine both subgroups of firms.
33 For more details, see Appendix A.5.
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and indirectly. The indirect effect is a dampening of business investment through a
lower responsiveness of the firms to changes in the user cost of capital.
Table 2.6: Results - Sample Split by Business Expectations
(1) (2) (3)
Ii,t/Ki,t−1 Total Positive Neutral/Negative
Ii,t−1/Ki,t−2 0.1102 0.0539 0.0871
[0.1171] [0.1176] [0.1153]
Ii,t−2/Ki,t−3 0.0657∗∗ 0.1033∗∗ 0.0602∗
[0.0295] [0.0481] [0.0319]∑
Ii,t−l/Ki,t−l−1 0.1759 -0.1572 0.1472
[0.1164] [0.1309] [0.1156]
∆si,t 0.0145 0.0400 0.0906
∗∗
[0.0579] [0.0673] [0.0425]
∆si,t−1 0.0355 0.1051 0.0286
[0.0339] [0.0776] [0.0301]
∆si,t−2 0.0065 0.0498 0.0101
[0.0211] [0.0423] [0.0274]
ηs 0.0686 0.2313 0.1517
[0.1177] [0.2070] [0.0964]
∆ucci,t -0.2048 -0.2127 -0.1859
[0.1332] [0.1808] [0.1690]
∆ucci,t−1 -0.1554∗ -0.3061∗∗ -0.0768
[0.0828] [0.1553] [0.0929]
∆ucci,t−2 -0.1287∗ -0.2346∗ -0.0671
[0.0687] [0.1341] [0.0728]
∆uccit−3 -0.0620 -0.1040 -0.0421
[0.0431] [0.0741] [0.0512]
ηucc -0.6685
∗ -1.0173∗ -0.4361
[0.3821] [0.5694] [0.4225]
Observations 3,283 1,229 2,054
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0007 0.0061 0.0010
AR(2) (p-value) 0.7486 0.1328 0.9415
Sargan test (p-value) 0.3501 0.2091 0.2397
Notes: Dependent variable is Ii,t/Ki,t−1. Estimated using System-GMM. Instruments are the
values (in levels) of ∆ucci,t and ∆salesi,t, lagged at least two periods and earlier when feasible,
and the second lag of Ii,t/Ki,t−1. Year dummies and a constant are included. Standard errors in
parentheses, *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
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2.5 Conclusion
After the financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, the ECB introduced
an ultra-loose monetary policy. The aim was to strengthen aggregate demand and
lift the euro area’s inflation rate closer to its target rate of 2 percent. To date, the
ECB has not yet achieved this goal and questions arise whether the expansionary
monetary policy causes more harm than good. Business investment, in particular,
remains below pre-crisis levels in most euro area countries. Given the extraordinary
monetary stimulus, the subdued development of business investment in Germany
after the financial crisis is surprising. Concerns have been raised about whether
traditional monetary transmission channels still function properly.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the functioning of the interest rate channel
in the post-crisis period. More specifically, we focus on the relationship between
firms’ user cost of capital and investment, and test whether business expectations
affect this link. We find that during our observation period, the ECB’s expansionary
monetary policy was quite successful at lowering German SMEs’ user cost of capital.
Furthermore, we confirm that SMEs significantly responded to user cost changes,
with the long-run user cost elasticity of capital ranging between being -0.79 and
-0.67, depending on the model. This is similar to elasticity estimates based on data
from the pre-crisis period. These findings suggest that the interest rate channel
has generally been working during the post-crisis period and that firms are still
responsive to user cost changes. However, our empirical analysis also reveals that
the results are predominantly driven by SMEs that held positive sales expectations.
These businesses react more strongly to user cost changes, with the long-run user
cost elasticity of capital being close to unity. By contrast, SMEs that expect constant
or declining sales display a much smaller long-run user cost elasticity, which in our
analysis does not differ statistically from zero.
Our results confirm the importance of expectations in firms’ investment decisions.
Pessimistic business expectations, owing to slow economic growth and an uncertain
business environment, seem to have been an impediment to business investment
activities in Germany in the post-crisis period. Expectations can be regarded as
one of the reasons for the seemingly ineffective expansionary monetary policy. Our
results also support the view that monetary policy alone cannot fix the euro area’s
growth problems. To stimulate business investment, more than low interest rates
and good access to finance is needed, although both of those factors are important
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prerequisites. Providing a stable business environment that raises firms’ growth
expectations is equally important. This leads to questions about the impact that a
prolonged period of low interest rates has on long-term growth expectations.
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Appendix A
A.1 Neoclassical Investment Theory
The neoclassical investment theory starts from the assumption that a firm’s demand
for capital is determined by its objective to maximize its net worth which is defined
as the integral of discounted net revenues (Jorgenson, 1963). The tax adjusted net
revenue of a firm is defined as:
Rt = (1− τ)ptYt − pIt (1− k − τZ)It − wtLt (A.1)
with: pt = real output price
τ = corporate tax rate
Yt = F (Kt, Lt) production function with capital Kt and labour Lt
pIt = real price of investment goods
k = rate of investment tax credit on new capital purchases
Z =
∫∞
0
e−rtDtdt is the present value of depreciation allowances D
It =
dKt
dt
+ δKt is gross investment
wt = wage rate
The net worth of a firm is defined as the discounted stream of earnings (with r being
the opportunity cost of capital) and shall be maximized::
max V =
∫ ∞
0
[(1− τ)ptF (Kt, Lt)− pIt (1− k − τZ)It − wtLt]e−rtdt
s.t.
dK
dt
= It − δKt = K˙
lim
t→∞
e−rtKt ≥ 0
K0 > 0 given
(A.2)
Solving the optimization problem we derive the present value Hamiltonian:
H = e−rt
(
(1− τ)ptF (Kt, Lt)− pIt (1− k − τZ)It − wtLt
)
+ λt(It − δKt) (A.3)
where λt is the shadow price of one unit of installed capital at time t, representing
the contribution of one unit of capital at time t to the value of the firm at time zero.
It can thus be regarded as the present value shadow price. To get the current value
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shadow price we multiply λt with the current value factor e
rt:
qt = e
rtλt (A.4)
Differentiating H we obtain the following set of first order conditions:
∂H
∂I
= −e−rtpIt (1− k − τZ) + λt = 0→ −pIt (1− k − τZ) + qt = 0 (A.5)
∂H
∂L
= ((1− τ)ptf ′L − w)e−rt = 0→
w
(1− τ)pt = f
′
L (A.6)
∂H
∂λ
=
∂K
∂t
= I − δK = 0 (A.7)
∂H
∂K
= −λ˙ = e−rt(1− τ)ptf ′K − λδ (A.8)
lim
t→∞
λtKt = 0→ lim
t→∞
e−rtqtKt (A.9)
From equation (A.5) we can derive that the current shadow value of one unit of
capital qt should be worth its tax adjusted cost (1 − k − τZ)pIt . Equation (A.6)
illustrates the condition that real wages w/(1− τ)pt shall be equal to the marginal
product of labour f
′
L. Equation (A.7) states that in equilibrium gross investment
shall be equal to the depreciation of K. Equation (A.8) illustrates the marginal
condition for capital and equation (A.9) the transversality condition. Furthermore,
we determine that:
− λ˙ = −q˙e−rt + rqe−rt (A.10)
We can thus rewrite equation A.8 as follows:
− q˙e−rt + rqe−rt = e−rt(1− τ)ptf ′K − λδ (A.11)
If we divide both sides by e−rt, substitute (1 − k − τZ)pIt = qt in equation (A.11)
and solve for the marginal product of capital f
′
K , we get the following expression:
f
′
K =
pIt
pt
(1− k − τZ)
(1− τ)
(
δ + r − p˙
I
pI
)
= UCC (A.12)
Jorgenson denoted this term the user cost of capital. The rent of one unit of capital
must be able to cover the opportunity cost r and the depreciation δ of the unit of
capital corrected by the expected capital gains p˙I .
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A.2 Capital Demand Equation
Starting point for the empirical model is a CES production function:
F (Li,t, Ki,t) ≡ Si,t = At[αiK−ρi,t + (1− αi)L−ρi,t ]
−v
ρ (A.13)
with: Si,t = output defined as net sales
Ki,t = capital input
Li,t = labour input
At = year specific production technology (productivity)
v = elasticity of scale
ρ = (1/σ)− 1 determines the elasticity of substitution
σ = elasticity of substitution between capital and labour
αi = capital share
From equation (A.13) we derive the marginal product of capital:
FK(Li,t, Ki,t) = αivA
[− ρ
v
]
t S
[1+( ρ
v
)]
i,t K
[−(1+ρ)]
i,t (A.14)
Equalizing the marginal product of capital with the marginal cost UCCi,t we can
derive the desired capital stock K∗i,t:
UCCi,t ≡ αivA[−
ρ
v
]
t S
[1+ ρ
v
]
i,t K
[−(1+ρ)]
i,t (A.15)
K∗i,t = (αiv)
1
(1+ρ)A
[
(−ρ/v)
(1+ρ)
]
t S
[
1+(ρ/v)
(1+ρ)
]
i,t UCC
[− 1
(1+ρ)
]
i,t (A.16)
K∗i,t = (αiv)
σA
[σ−1
v
]
t S
[σ+ 1−σ
v
]
i,t UCC
−σ
i,t (A.17)
K∗i,t = HtS
β
itUCC
−σ
it (A.18)
with: Ht = DiTt = (αiv)
σA
[σ−1
v
]
t
β = σ + 1−σ
v
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A.3 Sample Structure
Table A.1: Number of Observations by Year
Year Observations
2004 520
2005 602
2006 785
2007 896
2008 897
2009 985
2010 952
2011 952
2012 807
2013 688
2014 548
2015 338
Total 8,970
Table A.2: Number of Firms by Sector
Sector No. of Firms
Accommodation 19
Agriculture 16
Construction 227
Energy and Water 31
Information 13
Manufacturing 434
Mining 2
PA, Education, Healthcare 15
Real Estate 32
Trade 361
Transportation 58
Other Services 42
Technical Services 42
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A.4 User Cost of Capital - Data
Price Indices P It and Pj,t
P It denotes the national price index for investment goods. The data is provided by
the German Statistical Office (Fachserie 17/Reihe 2 - Erzeugerpreise gewerblicher
Produkte - Investitionsgu¨ter). Pj,t denotes the industry-specific output price index.
It is derived from industry-specific nominal and real gross-value added data, provided
by the German Statistical Office.
Rate of economic depreciation dj,t
The industry-specific rate of economic depreciation dj,t is calculated dividing industry-
specific economic depreciation by the industry-specific stock of assets. Both data
series are obtained from the Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung (Fachserie 18/Reihe
1.4) provided by the German Statistical Office.
Tax rate τt
The annual statutory tax rates on retained earnings (distributed profits) τt is
calculated following von Kalckreuth (2001).
τt = (1 + st)τ
r
t (1− gt) + gt (A.19)
with: st = solidarity surcharge
τ rt = corporate income tax on retained earnings (distributed profits)
gt = business tax
The data is provided by the German Federal Ministry of Finance. Table A.3 displays
the tax parameters used in the user cost of capital calculation.
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Table A.3: Tax Parameters 2004-2015
Year Corporate income tax Solidarity surcharge Business tax τt
2004 25% 5.5% 19.4% 40.7%
2005 25% 5.5% 19.5% 40.7%
2006 25% 5.5% 19.6% 40.8%
2007 25% 5.5% 19.4% 40.7%
2008 15% 5.5% 13.6% 27.2%
2009 15% 5.5% 13.6% 27.2%
2010 15% 5.5% 13.7% 27.3%
2011 15% 5.5% 13.7% 27.4%
2012 15% 5.5% 13.8% 27.4%
2013 15% 5.5% 13.8% 27.5%
2014 15% 5.5% 13.9% 27.5%
2015 15% 5.5% 14.0% 27.6%
Notes: Corporate income tax rate refers to taxes on retained earnings and distributed profits.
Business tax rate is calculated using the basic federal tax rate (Steuermesszahl) – which was
5% until 2007 and 3.5% thereafter – times the average collection rate (Hebesatz ), which differs
year-over-year.
Depreciation Allowances Aj,t
The industry-specific net present value of depreciation allowances is calculated as
the weighted average of asset-specific depreciation allowances (machinery AMat and
building ABuit ).
Aj,t = w
Ma
j,t A
Ma
t + w
Bui
j,t A
Bui
t (A.20)
The weights wMaj,t and w
Bui
j,t are industry-specific shares of machinery and building out
of fixed assets. The data for is obtained from the Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung
(Fachserie 18/Reihe 1.4) provided by the German Statistical Office.
Depreciation allowances differ by asset type due to different depreciation methods that
have to be applied. Buildings are depreciated on straight-line basis. Machinery is also
allowed to be depreciated according to the declining-balance method34 until 2007 and
also temporarily in 2009/2010. Rates of depreciation are set in the German income
tax law. To be consistent with the German tax system we calculate depreciation
allowances for buildings according to the straight-line depreciation method for the
total sample period. Depreciation allowances for machinery are calculated according
to the declining-balance method until 2010 and according to the straight-line method
thereafter. The net present value of allowances according to the declining-balance
34 The straight-line depreciation method spreads an asset’s costs evenly over its ’useful life’. The
declining-balance method expenses the asset at a constant rate. Hence, depreciation charges
decline each successive period.
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and straight-line depreciation method are calculated following ZEW (2014):
ADB =
τtφDB
φ+ r
(A.21)
ASL =
τtφSL
φ+ r
(
1− 1
(1 + r)n
)
(A.22)
with: τt = statutory tax rate estimated as in equation A.19
φ = allowance rate
r = discount rate
n = life time of asset
We assume a taxation-relevant lifetime, n, of 33.3 years for buildings and of 7 years
for machinery. The allowance rate for the declining-balance depreciation method
φDB is assumed to be 0.3 for buildings and 0.1429 for machinery. The allowance rate
for straight-line depreciation φSL is 0.2 until 2005, 0.3 between 2006 and 2008 and
0.25 in 2009 and 2010.
A.5 Robustness Checks
Our empirical analysis presented above has several limitations. First, the lag-structure
of model (2.6) is not theoretically determinable, but must be tested empirically. The
lag-length choice is hence fairly arbitrary. Eisner and Nadiri (1968) show that
estimation results of the long-run user cost of capital elasticity may vary depending
on the choice of the lag-structure. Second, past research has shown that GMM
estimations are sensitive to the set of instruments employed (e.g. Roodman, 2009b).
These problems might render our results highly ’model dependent’ in the sense of
being sensitive to specification choices (e.g. lag-structure and set of instruments).
As robustness check, we therefore evaluate the link between the user cost of capital
and investment using a parsimonious model that omits any lags:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= β∆si,t + σ∆ucci,t + ui,t (A.23)
In this model the coefficient β captures the percentage-point change in the investment
rate due to a one-percent change in the level of sales. Similarly, the coefficient σ
captures the percentage-point change in the investment rate due to a one-percent
change in the level of the user cost of capital.
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To test whether firms’ responsiveness to user cost changes has declined during the
post-crisis period, we interact ∆ucci,t with a dummy variable indicating the period
after the outbreak of the financial crisis, Post08t. We estimate the following model:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= β∆si,t + σ1∆ucci,t + σ2∆ucci,t*Post08t + ui,t (A.24)
If the sample firms have been less responsive to user cost changes after 2008, we
expect the coefficient of the interaction term to be positive.
In addition, we augment model (A.24) with the business expectation indicator BEi,t:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= β∆si,t + σ1∆ucci,t + σ2∆ucci,t*Post08t + αBEi,t + ui,t (A.25)
Furthermore we estimate equation (A.24) for subgroups of firms that differ in business
expectations. We estimate models (A.23) to (A.25) using the fixed-effects estimator.35
Table A.4: Robustness Check - Parsimonious Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base Crisis BE Positive Neutral Negative
∆si,t 0.0434
∗∗∗ 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0387∗∗ 0.0324∗ 0.0525∗
[0.0119] [0.0118] [0.0114] [0.0174] [0.0195] [0.0275]
∆ucci,t -0.0278 -0.0695
∗∗ -0.0290 -0.1873∗∗ -0.0342 -0.0630
[0.0211] [0.0333] [0.0213] [0.0801] [0.0448] [0.0687]
∆ucci,t*Post08t 0.0740
∗ 0.1395 0.0603 0.0408
[0.0425] [0.0940] [0.0619] [0.0958]
BE neutrali,t -0.0275
∗∗∗
[0.0083]
BE neutrali,t -0.0413
∗∗∗
[0.0100]
Constant 0.2215∗∗∗ 0.2197∗∗∗ 0.2465∗∗∗ 0.2868∗∗∗ 0.1940∗∗∗ 0.1682∗∗∗
[0.0134] [0.0134] [0.0146] [0.0345] [0.0198] [0.0265]
Observations 8,321 8,321 8,144 3,059 3,664 1,421
Adjusted R2 0.0078 0.0082 0.0106 0.0193 0.0016 0.0170
Notes: Dependent variable is the investment rate Ii,t/Ki,t−1. Estimated using fixed-effects model. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Year dummies are included.
Standard errors in parentheses, *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
35 Results from a Hausman test and an F-test, respectively, suggest that a panel fixed-effects model
is to be preferred to both a random-effects panel model and a pooled ordinary least squares
model.
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The estimation results presented in Table A.4 confirm our previous findings. In the
baseline model (column 1) the coefficient of the user cost of capital is not significant.
If we control for differences between the pre- and post-crisis period by including an
interaction (column 2), we find that effect of user cost of capital changes on the
investment rate was negative and statistically significant before 2008. However, after
the outbreak of the financial crisis, the relationship became insignificant. Furthermore,
the results presented in columns (3) to (6) confirm the important role of business
expectations. First, business expectations directly effect the investment rate, the
coefficient of both indicators are negative and statistically significant at the 1-percent
level. Second, firms with neutral or negative business expectations are insensitive to
user cost of capita changes – both during the pre-crisis and post-crisis period.
Chapter 3
Declining Interest Rates and
German SMEs’ Use of Bank Debt
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of declining interest rates
on the use of bank loans by German small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). Assuming that SMEs follow a pecking order when making
financing decisions, we theoretically distinguish between an income and a
substitution effect of declining interest rates. A unique firm-level dataset,
covering the period 2005 to 2014, enables us to derive SMEs’ desired
share of bank loans in the financing mix of investment projects, and
to empirically test the impact of declining interest rates isolated from
supply and total demand effects of that decline. The estimation results
provide evidence that interest rate reductions have strengthened SMEs’
internal financing capacity and reduced their demand for bank loans. A
substitution effect (i.e. increased preference for bank loans relative to
internal funds) cannot be confirmed for our observation period.
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3.1 Introduction
The years leading up to the financial crisis were characterized by a sharp increase
in corporate sector debt in the euro area.1 This development resulted in a severe
deleveraging and adjustment process after the crisis. The debt accumulation was
largely driven by an excessive use of bank debt, as non-financial corporations (NFCs)
shifted away from equity towards debt financing and increased the share of bank
loans in their liabilities (ECB, 2013).2 Understanding the drivers of this development
is important, as an excessive accumulation of debt – especially bank debt – by
the corporate sector has been identified as a major source of macroeconomic and
financial instability (Minsky, 1977; Kindleberger, 1978). Building on the empirical
literature about financing decisions by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
(e.g. Coleman, 2006; Lo´pez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008; Mac an Bhaird and Lucey,
2010; Cowling et al., 2012), this paper adds an understanding of the drivers of
corporate debt by analysing the connection between interest rates3 and German
SMEs’ demand for bank loans.4
It has been argued that the increase in corporate-sector debt prior to the crisis was,
inter alia, driven by low interest rates and loose financing conditions, causing a
vicious cycle of over-investment and over-borrowing (ECB, 2013). Easy monetary
conditions and low lending rates have long been known to play an important role
in the excessive expansion of credit (Hayek, 1929). On the one hand, low interest
rates increase the supply of bank credit through their impact on the balance sheets
of firms and banks (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). On the other hand, a decline in
interest rates may increase firms’ investment spending and thus their total demand
for finance, including bank debt (Mishkin, 1996).
It remains unclear whether a decline in interest rates increases the demand for all
types of finance equally. An assumption underlying most empirical analyses of the
effects of monetary policy shocks on the financing mix of companies is that a shock
1 The debt-to-GDP ratio of euro area non-financial corporations increased from around 60 percent
at the beginning of the millennium to a peak of 81 percent at the end of 2008 (ECB, 2012).
2 A key source of debt financing for euro area NFCs are loans from monetary financial institutions,
this applies particularly to small and medium-sized enterprises for which market-based debt
instruments such as bonds are generally not available (ECB, 2007).
3 By interest rates we refer to the interest rates NFCs face when borrowing from monetary financial
institutions (also called borrowing costs), as these are the decisive interest rates for borrowing
decisions made by firms.
4 SMEs account for more than 99% of all corporations in Germany, and are particularly bank
dependent. Therefore, they are likely to be an important driver of loans to NFCs.
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which works through the conventional interest rate channel will alter the demand
for all types of financing equally. In such studies, changes in the relative use of
bank debt are seen as reflecting changes in the supply of bank loans caused by the
credit channel, rather than by the firm having changed its preference for bank debt
(Kashyap et al., 1993; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996b).
However, experiences prior to the financial crisis indicate that firms may increase
their use of bank debt disproportionally to other funds if interest rates decline.
A unique firm-level dataset, covering the period 2005 to 2014, enables us to derive
SMEs’ desired share of bank loans in the financing mix of investment projects.
We are hence able to investigate the effect of declining interest rates on firms’ use
of bank loans, isolated from supply effects, and the total demand effects of that
decline. Starting from the assumption that SMEs follow a pecking order when making
financing decisions, we empirically test whether interest rate reductions increase firms’
use of bank debt by increasing firms’ preference for bank loans relative to internal
funds. We also test the counterhypothesis that declining interest rates reduce firms’
demand for bank loans because – owing to declining interest expenses – firms’ internal
financing capacity is strengthened (Mishkin, 1996). To our knowledge, no other
studies have examined the manner in which declining interest rates might trigger
substitution or income effects. Our results provide insight into the consequences of a
prolonged period of low interest rates for the corporate sector’s demand for bank
debt.
3.2 SME Financing Decisions and the Role of Interest Rates
To finance their daily operations and investment projects, firms can choose from a
variety of funds. These funds differ in terms of their source (internal versus external)
and the legal position of the capital provider (equity versus debt) (Bundesbank,
2012). The choice is influenced by various firm-specific factors but also by the
macroeconomic environment, which determines the availability and price of the
different types of funds.
3.2.1 Corporate Finance Theories
Corporate financing decisions have been the focus of extensive research for several
decades. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that in the absence of taxes, transaction
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costs, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information, a firm’s market value and
weighted average cost of capital are unaffected by the firm’s capital structure.
Entrepreneurs would thus be indifferent about debt or equity financing. Internal
funds and external debt would be perfect substitutes (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010).
In the following decades, two competing capital structure theories emerged that
relaxed Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) assumptions.
The trade-off theory argues that firms seek to reach a target debt level which balances
the costs and benefits of an additional unit of debt (Frank and Goyal, Frank and
Goyal). Advantages of using debt derive from interest payments being deductible
from taxable profits (Modigliani and Miller, 1963).5 However, these tax benefits
are offset by rising bankruptcy costs as the increased indebtedness raises the risk of
financial distress (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973).6 The pecking order theory (POT)
incorporates asymmetric information and incentive problems among the capital
providers and the firm’s management, and predicts a hierarchical order of financing
instruments (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Aiming to minimize adverse
selection costs, firms prefer internal funds (e.g. retained earnings) over external
funds. If external finance is needed, firms prefer low-risk short-term debt followed
by riskier long-term debt. The last option is external equity raised by the emission
of stocks (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Most importantly, the POT
sees the use of debt as reacting passively to changes in a firm’s internal funds (Opler
et al., 1999).
In the traditional corporate finance literature, no particular distinction is made
between firms of different sizes. However, differences in regulatory and institutional
conditions as well as operating practices lead to considerable divergence in financial
decision-making for large versus small firms (Brighi and Torluccio, 2007). Empirical
studies on corporate finance have documented the differing financing behaviour
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002). Groves and Harrison (1974)
argue that the ’finance gap’ between large and small enterprises is due to a ’supply
gap’ and a ’knowledge gap’. The supply gap stems from the observation that certain
funds are either not available or are more costly for small firms, owing to greater
5 See Graham (2003) for a general overview on taxes and corporate finance.
6 Financial distress is defined as ’the inability of a firm to pay its financial obligations as they
mature’ (Beaver, 1966, p.71).
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informational asymmetries.7 Higher external finance premiums8 leave SMEs at
a disadvantage when trying to raise external funds. Financial intermediaries are
generally able to overcome informational asymmetries more effectively than financial
markets can, and can thus provide funds to SMEs at better terms (Diamond, 1984;
Berger and Udell, 1998). In addition, the transaction and regulatory costs of issuing
publicly traded equity or debt are high enough to generally discourage SMEs from
issuing shares or bonds (Coleman, 2006). Thus, small firms do not have access to
the full range of funding sources that large companies can access. In addition to
this supply gap, SMEs are sometimes not even aware of the full scope of possible
funding sources; this is known as the knowledge gap (Holms and Kent, 1991). As a
result SMEs tend to depend on internally generated funds, informal funding sources
(e.g. family and friends), bank loans, trade credit and government-subsidized loans
(Berger and Udell, 1998).
Alternative approaches related to Myers’ (1984) pecking order concept emphasize the
role of the entrepreneur in the financial decision making process of SMEs. Small and
medium-sized enterprises are generally organized in different legal forms and have
different ownership structures compared with large companies. For example, sole
proprietorship and partnership are commonly favoured by SMEs, and management
and ownership are often the same entities within an SME. This gives rise to a strong
influence of owner preferences on financing decisions (Norton, 1991; Achleitner et al.,
2011). Holms and Kent (1991) argue that owners prefer funding sources that will
minimally dilute their ownership or control of the firm. This particularly applies to
internal funds.
In line with these theoretical considerations, many empirical studies have shown that
SMEs follow a preference order when making financing decisions (e.g. Chittenden
et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999; Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias, 2000; Mac an
Bhaird and Lucey, 2010). To finance their daily operations and investment projects,
SMEs mainly rely on internal financing sources followed by external borrowing from
financial intermediaries. Capital market financing is rarely used.
7 Informational opacity is a defining characteristic of small business finance, as information about
contracts, projects, customers and so on is generally not publicly available as it is for larger firms
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Hence, the problem of asymmetric information is more severe for SMEs,
which are relatively unable to signal their creditworthiness.
8 The external finance premium reflects the lender’s expected costs of monitoring, evaluation and
information collection (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
51 CHAPTER 3. GERMAN SMES’ USE OF BANK DEBT
3.2.2 SME Financing Decisions: a Simple Model
We subsume the characteristics of SME financing decisions as discussed above into a
simplified model for SME investment financing, illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: SME Financing Hierarchy
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Assuming that SMEs follow a pecking order when making financing decisions, a firm
will first draw on its internal funds before turning to external funds. It will finance
its investment project with internal sources up to the threshold C, which we define
following Leary and Roberts (2010) as the point at which the investment volume
equals the amount of internal funds the firm is willing to employ:
0 = Investmenti,t − ((1− αi,t) ∗ InternalFundsi,t) (3.1)
where Investmenti,t denotes the size of the investment project of firm i in year t,
InternalFundsi,t denotes the firm’s total available internal funds and αi,t is the
share of total available internal funds the firm does not want to use for financing
investment projects.
In a literal interpretation of the POT, αi,t equals 0. That is, the firm would first
exhaust all internally available funds before using external funds. However, Myers
(1984) argues that although firms generally follow a certain pecking order when
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making financing decisions, they might consider using funds of a lower preference
order if the associated benefits (e.g. tax advantages) outweigh the cost of asymmetric
information. Furthermore, firms may wish to retain a certain reservoir of internal
funds to ensure that profitable future investment opportunities can be realized even
when cash flow is low and alternative funds are too expensive (Ferreira and Vilela,
2004).9 Hence, αi,t can lie between 0 and 1.
Figure 3.2: SME Financing Mix (2004-2015)
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Source: KfW. Share of financing instruments in the realized financing mix of German
SMEs’ investment projects.
If the size of the investment project exceeds the threshold C in Figure 3.1, the firm
has to turn to external financing sources to cover its financing needs. Given the
limited access to the capital market and the resulting dependency of SMEs on banks,
we assume that SMEs cover their external financing needs for investment projects
almost entirely through bank loans. Data from German SMEs’ realized financing
mix for investment projects support this assumption: on average, around 80 percent
of an investment project is financed with internal funds (50 percent) and bank loans
(30 percent) (Figure 3.2). A further 12 percent is financed with subsidized loans and
a mere 8 percent with other funding sources, such as venture capital or mezzanine
9 Stafford (2001) finds empirical evidence that firms do not minimize the use of external funds by
initially exhausting internal funds as the POT predicts. Viswanath (1993) shows that strategic
long-term considerations can lead firms to prefer external funds despite having enough internal
funds available.
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capital.10,11
Hence, we define a firm’s latent bank loan demand D∗i,t as the difference between the
investment project amount and the amount of internal funds that the firm is willing
to employ:
D∗i,t = Investmenti,t − ((1− αi,t) ∗ InternalFundsi,t) (3.2)
However, the actual observed loan demand Di,t (which is observable in the firm’s
loan application) may differ from the latent loan demand D∗i,t. The reason is that
firms are sometimes reluctant to apply for a bank loan owing to the fear of being
rejected (Levenson and Willard, 2000). In such cases the latent bank loan demand
D∗i,t is larger than 0 but the observed loan demand Di,t equals 0. The decision to
apply for a bank loan to finance the investment project is governed by the following
equation:
APPLYi,t =
1, if D∗i,t > 0 ∧DISCi,t = 0.0, if D∗i,t = 0 ∨ (D∗i,t > 0 ∧DISCi,t = 1). (3.3)
where DISCi,t takes the value of 1 if the firm feels discouraged from applying for a
bank loan. An increase in the loan application rate is observed if (a) firms switch
from feeling discouraged to feeling encouraged to apply for a bank loan, or (b) the
latent loan demand increases from D∗i,t = 0 to D
∗
i,t > 0. Given the firm has applied
for a bank loan, the observed desired bank loan share in the finance mix is defined
as follows:
SHAREi,t = Di,t/Investmenti,t (3.4)
The observable desired loan share SHAREi,t increases if ceteris paribus Di,t increases.
3.2.3 SME Financing Decisions and Interest Rates
A structural decline in interest rates can alter the above described financing decisions
of SMEs in several respects. First, it can impact the firm’s willingness to apply for a
bank loan (‘encouragement effect’). Second, it can affect the availability of internal
funds that the firm can employ to finance the investment project (‘income effect’).
10 Mezzanine capital is a hybrid of debt and equity financing.
11 Although the use of bonds has become increasingly popular among German SMEs, these so-called
Mittelstandsanleihen are still limited to a comparatively small number of rather large SMEs.
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Third, it can influence the firm’s willingness to substitute internal funds for external
funds by altering αi,t (‘substitution effect’).
Encouragement Effect
Assuming positive application costs and imperfect screening by banks, Kon and
Storey (2003) show that firms are discouraged from applying for a bank loan when
the effective costs of borrowing exceed the firm’s expected return on investment ROI.
The firm’s decision to approach a bank depends on the loan interest rate R, the
opportunity costs OC12, the application costs AC13 and the bank’s screening error
se14. The formula is as follows:
ROI = R +OC +
AC
1− se (3.5)
Kon and Storey (2003) argue that bank application rates are high when (a) the
costs of alternative sources of finance are high, (b) application costs are low, (c) the
expected return on investment is high, and (d) the interest rate R is low.15 It can be
concluded that:
H 1 If the encouragement effect holds, a reduction in interest rates has ceteris paribus
a positive effect on the loan application rate.
Income Effect
Interest rate changes can substantially affect a firm’s liquidity position and hence its
internal financing capacity. This transmission mechanism of monetary policy-induced
interest-rate changes on a firm’s financial position and real spending activities is
called the balance sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). To finance inventory
and working capital, firms mainly rely on short-term and floating debt. Therefore,
an interest rate change directly affects a firm’s cost of new and outstanding debt
12 Opportunity costs are defined as the net return after interest payments that are yielded if the
project was financed by other external capital providers (e.g. money lenders). It is assumed that
other lenders charge higher interest rates than the banks (Kon and Storey, 2003).
13 According to Kon and Storey (2003), application costs include financial costs (incurred to provide
the bank with required information), in-kind costs (due to time spent on the application process)
and psychic costs (due to discomfort in passing information about the firm or its owners to a
third party).
14 The value of se lies between 0 and 1 and can be regarded as the probability that a bank cannot
perfectly distinguish ’good’ from ’bad’ borrowers.
15 For the U.S. Ferrando and Mulier (2015) provide empirical evidence that lower loan interest rates
reduce the probability of firms feeling discouraged from bank lending.
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and hence its interest expenses. If interest expenses decline, the firm’s profit and
cash flow increase, which in turn strengthens the firm’s internal financing capacity
(Mishkin, 1996).16 This argument can be summed up in the following hypothesis:
H 2 The availability of internal funds is c.p. negatively related to the level of interest
rates.
If SMEs follow the POT sequence and first draw on internal funds, and if interest
rate reductions increase SMEs’ internal funds, we can conclude that:
H 3 If the income effect dominates, a reduction in interest rates will c.p. decrease
the loan application probability and will also decrease the desired bank loan share in
the financing mix.
Substitution Effect
From equations (3.2) to (3.4) it can be derived that the loan application probability
and the desired loan share are inversely related to the share of internal funds the firm
wishes to retain (αi,t). As mentioned in the preceding section αi,t may be influenced
by the firm’s desire to keep a cash reserve in order to finance future investment
projects, as well as by cost-benefit considerations concerning funding sources that
would normally be lower in the order of preference.
According to the trade-off model of cash holdings, firms equate the cost and benefits
of holding cash (Opler et al., 1999). As interest rates decline, the opportunity costs
of holding cash decline – and the direct costs of bank debt also decrease. At the
same time the expectation of future interest rate hikes – owing for instance to a
monetary policy tightening – that could make bank debt more expensive or even
unavailable raises the benefits of holding cash. These cost-benefit considerations of
cash holdings could induce firms to retain more cash and switch to bank loans when
interest rates are low and loans are easily available. This can be particularly true for
SMEs which are financially constrained.17
16 The impact of interest rate changes on a firm’s financial position has been widely confirmed in
empirical studies. Simulating a tightening of monetary policy, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) show
that over 40 percent of the subsequent short-term decline in corporate profits is the direct result
of the increase in interest payments. Ippolito et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence that firms
which use more bank debt and do not hedge against interest rate risks show a strong sensitivity
of their interest expenses and cash flow with respect to interest rate changes.
17 Using a panel of 860 small and medium-sized firms from Spain during the period 1996–2001
Garc´ıa-Teruel and Mart´ınez-Solano (2008) show that SMEs increase (decrease) their cash holdings
if interest rates drop (rise).
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If firms take advantage of favourable financing conditions by substituting internal
funds for bank debt to top up cash holdings for future investment opportunities, we
can conclude that:
H 4 If the substitution effect dominates, a decline in interest rates c.p. increases
the loan application probability and the desired bank loan share in the financing mix.
To sum up, our theoretical considerations show that the effect of interest rate
reductions on the bank loan application rate and the desired loan share are ambiguous.
A predominant encouragement effect and substitution effect would lead to an increase
in loan application rates and in the desired bank loan share if interest rates decline.
If the income effect is stronger, a reduction in interest rates will cause a decline
in the relative use of bank debt and a concomitant drop in the probability of loan
applications.
In the following sections, we test the derived hypothesis with regard to German
SMEs. Using aggregate data we first analyse how financing conditions and corporate
sector borrowing have covaried in the past 15 years, during which period interest
rates have declined owing to an increasingly expansionary monetary policy.
3.3 Financing Conditions and Corporate Sector Borrowing in Germany
The ECB’s monetary policy since the early 2000s was driven by a sequence of crises –
the dot-com crash in 2000, the financial crisis in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis
in 2012 – and has resulted in an unprecedented decline in interest rates in the euro
area. This has significantly influenced borrowing costs and firms’ access to funds.
If interest rates influence firms’ financing decisions these developments should be
somehow reflected in aggregate loan data and SMEs’ financing mix.18
3.3.1 Pre-Crisis
The period of the run-up to the financial crisis (2001-2007) was characterized by
a rather accommodative monetary policy in the euro area. Due to the economic
down-turn that followed the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001 the ECB had
gradually lowered its key interest rate from 4.75 percent at the end of 2001 to 2
18 The SMEs’ financing mix discussed in this section is the realized financing mix, hence the result
of demand and supply of the different sources of funds. The share of bank loans in the financing
mix is therefore not necessarily the desired share of bank loans.
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percent in June 2003 - a historic low at that time (Figure 3.3). It remained at this
level until the end of 2005. Short-term and long-term lending rates in Germany and
other euro area countries closely followed the path of the monetary policy rate and
continuously fell until 2005.
Figure 3.3: Borrowing Costs and Credit Constraints of NFCs
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Source: ECB, Ifo. ECB Interest Rate - interest rate on the main refinancing
operations. BC - borrowing costs for NFCs. CC (credit constraints) - share of
manufacturing sector firms reporting restrictive lending by the banks.
Borrowing costs for NFCs in Germany – that is, the weighted average of interest rate
charged to NFCs on new loans – declined from around 6 percent in 2000 to less than 4
percent in mid-2005, which was still slightly higher than the euro area average (Figure
3.3). Owing to recovering economic growth and increasing inflationary pressure in
the euro area since 2006, the ECB gradually raised the key interest rate to 4 percent
by June 2007. Borrowing costs for German NFCs started to increase again and
reached a high of around 6 percent in mid-2008.
Whereas declining interest rates in the pre-crisis period had spurred borrowing
by NFCs in many euro area countries, causing an increase of private-sector debt,
Germany experienced a steady decline in loans to the corporate sector between 2001
and mid-2005 (Figure 3.4). This development is also reflected in the financing mix
of German SMEs (Figure 3.5). The share of bank loans in the financing mix of new
investment projects declined to a low of 27 percent in 2005, whereas the share of
internal funds increased to roughly 51 percent. Borrowing by NFCs in Germany
increased only as of 2006 once interest rates had already increased. Between the
end of 2005 and the end of 2008 the number of outstanding loans to NFCs increased
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Figure 3.4: Bank Lending to NFCs in Selected Euro Area Countries
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Source: ECB. Loans to NFCs by domestic monetary financial institutions.
Figure 3.5: Share of Internal Funds and Bank Loans in SMEs’ Financing Mix
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Source: KfW. Share of internal funds and bank loans used to finance investment
projects of German SMEs. Data only available after 2003.
by 15 percent. Among SMEs, the share of bank loans in the investment financing
mix increased from 2005 to 2007 by almost 10 percentage points, to 36 percent.
Simultaneously, the share of internal funds dropped to 44 percent in 2007.
The pre-crisis development of German SMEs’ financing mix as well as aggregate
corporate-sector borrowing seem not to support the prevalence of a strong substitution
effect (as described in the preceding section). This is in contrast to other euro area
countries and might be attributed to three main reasons. Firstly, the pre-crisis
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Figure 3.6: Internal Funds of German NFCs
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firms’ operating income – that is, gross value added minus the cost of production.
Retained earnings is proxied using corporate savings (operating surplus and the
financial income of NFCs, after interest payments, dividends, rents and corporate
taxation)(ECB, 2013).
differences in aggregate borrowing partly reflect diverging economic developments
in euro area core and periphery countries (Schnabl and Wollmersha¨user, 2013).
Whereas the periphery experienced strong economic growth after the turn of the
millennium, Germany slipped into a recession in 2003 and grew only moderately
in 2004 and 2005. Weak economic growth was accompanied by weak corporate
investment activities, dampening the overall demand for financing – particularly
external financing. (Bundesbank, 2012). The ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS)
indicates that low investment demand was a major reason for low credit demand in
Germany until 2005.
Secondly, the ECB BLS results indicate that since around 2004, German firms
increasingly substituted bank loans for alternative funds, particularly internal funds.
This substitution process was spurred by the firms’ strategies to strengthen their
equity base and by rapid growth in profits, which increased the firms’ internal
financing capacity (Figure 3.6) (Bundesbank, 2012, 2014). This pattern suggests
that the declining share of bank loans in SMEs’ financing mix until 2005 might have
been partly caused by an income effect of declining interest rates.
Thirdly, although borrowing costs for German NFCs declined, banks were reluctant
to supply credit. In mid-2003 more than half of the manufacturing sector firms
signalled significant credit constraints (Ifo, 2016). Firms’ credit access improved
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considerably after 2003; however, at the end of 2005 around a third of all companies
still faced credit constraints. Hence, the declining share of bank loans as well as the
total number of NFC loans until 2005 might also have been influenced by supply
restrictions.
3.3.2 Crisis
The financial tensions that turned into a global financial crisis in September 2008
brought a sudden stop to the accelerated economic growth in Germany and the
rest of the euro area. To sustain financial intermediation and the availability of
credit to the private sector, monetary authorities worldwide reduced interest rates
to unprecedented low levels and implemented non-standard policy measures (ECB,
2010b). The ECB’s key interest rate was lowered to 1 percent throughout 2009.
Borrowing costs of the German corporate sector fell considerably, from around 6
percent in September 2008 to 3.2 percent at the end of 2009 (Figure 3.3).
Despite the immediate measures taken by the ECB, lending in the euro area contracted
in 2009. NFC borrowing in Germany continued to increase throughout 2008 but
collapsed at the start of 2009. The share of bank loans in the investment financing
mix of German SMEs dropped from 36 percent in 2007 to 30 percent in 2009. The
decline in corporate sector borrowing was on the one hand caused by a rather sharp
fall in the demand for finance, as the German economy was severely hit by the crisis.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 5.6 percent in 2009, and gross fixed
capital formation in all sectors fell by more than 10 percent in real terms, dampening
the demand for external finance (Destatis, 2016). On the other hand, the supply
of credit contracted. In mid-2009, around 45 percent of manufacturing-sector firms
signalled that lending conditions were restrictive. The limited availability of external
funds such as bank loans increased firms’ reliance on internally generated funds. The
share of internal funds in the financing mix of SMEs increased from 44 percent in
2007 to 50 percent in 2009.
3.3.3 Post-Crisis
Monetary policy decisions in the euro area after the financial crisis were influenced
by the perpetuation of the sovereign debt crisis, the staggering economic recovery in
the euro area, and the gradual fall of the inflationary expectations that cumulated in
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a fear of deflation. Owing to sluggish growth and subdued inflation in the euro area,
the key interest rate was gradually lowered to 0 percent. The cost of borrowing for
German NFCs fell from 3.2 percent at the end of 2009 to 1.71 percent in February
2017 (Figure 3.3).
However, the number of outstanding loans to the corporate sector in Germany
increased only slightly until 2016. The subdued credit growth is rather surprising as
there were – in contrast to the period 2003–2005 – no indications of credit restrictions.
Credit supply improved considerably as of 2010 and was soon back to pre-crisis
levels. In addition, contrary to other euro area countries, the German economy
quickly recovered from the financial crisis and output grew substantially in 2010 and
2011. Nevertheless, the subdued investment demand has dampened the demand for
external finance such as bank loans in the wake of the financial crisis (Bundesbank,
2013). However, even if firms invested, historically low lending rates and good access
to finance seem not to have encouraged German NFCs to use more bank debt or
to increase the share of bank loans in their financing mix. The share of bank loans
in the investment financing mix of SMEs remained at around 30 percent between
2010 and 2015. As a corollary, SMEs increased the share of internal funds in their
financing mix to a record high of 54 percent in 2011 (Figure 3.5). In 2015 it was still
at 53 percent.
The results of this section show that corporate sector borrowing in Germany has
shown few dynamics in the past 15 years despite favourable credit conditions in many
years. Looking at aggregate data on loans and SMEs’ financing mix, the interest
rate changes seem not to have triggered a substitution effect. It rather seems that
a positive income effect of declining interest rates has, at times, dampened firms’
demand for bank loans.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
Aggregate data, as presented in the preceding section, might not necessarily reflect
changes in firms’ preferences for bank loans, as they reflect supply and demand
changes. In this section, therefore, we proceed our analysis using firm-level data of
German SMEs to evaluate the impact of interest rate reductions on SMEs’ use of
bank loans. In the analysis we test for an income and substitution effect.19
19 Due to data limitations we cannot test for an explicit encouragement effect of interest rate
reductions.
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3.4.1 Data
The basis of our empirical analysis is the KfW Mittelstandspanel, a representative
annual survey that covers German micro, small and medium-sized enterprises with
less than EUR 500 million annual turnover. The database comprises qualitative
and quantitative data from 60,653 firms over a period of 14 years (2002–2015). In
addition to firm-level characteristics, the dataset includes information on planned
investment activities and bank loan applications.
We discard firm-year observations that belong to the 1st or 99th percentile of the
variables of interest to control for outliers. Taking into account missing observations,
our final sample contains 18,090 observations from 8,274 SMEs for the period
2005–2014.20 The sample covers a period during which nominal and real interest
rates declined to unprecedented low levels.21 The sample is unbalanced owing to
missing data as well as varying participation behaviour by the firms. Appendix B.1
contains more information on the sample structure.
Our analysis of SMEs’ financing decisions differs from that of other studies, as we
do not focus on the corporate capital structure but rather on SMEs’ incremental
financing decisions. The capital structure of a firm reflects aggregated past financing
decisions, whereas the financing mix of a particular investment project reflects the
immediate entrepreneurial decision given the prevailing financing conditions. In the
survey the firms are asked whether they applied for a bank loan to finance their
planned investment projects. Given this information, we construct the variable
APPLY , which equals 1 if the respective firm applied for a bank loan and 0 if it did
not. We find that in years when interest rates22 declined, the average loan application
rate was 43.5 percent. In all other years the average rate was 44.3 percent (Figure
3.7). Descriptive statistics thus indicate that in the sample period, SMEs were less
likely to apply for a bank loan when interest rates declined, although the difference
is statistically not significant.23
Furthermore, the firms are asked to state the amount they wanted to borrow to
finance investment projects. These data allow us to derive the desired bank loan
20 Our estimation sample covers less years than the original sample due to some variables being not
available for all survey years.
21 The main refinancing rate of the ECB declined from 2 percent in 2005 to 0.05 percent in 2014.
22 Defined as borrowing costs of NFCs as explained below.
23 A t-test was conducted. The p-value of 0.2603 indicates that the null hypothesis, which states
that the difference is equal to 0, cannot be rejected.
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share in the financing mix, defined as:24
SHARE =
amount of loan applied for
planned investment volume
(3.6)
As we focus on the desired rather than the realized loan share in the financing mix
we are able to study the effect of interest rate reductions on firms’ preferences for
bank loans, isolated from supply side effects of the reduction. Descriptive statistics
show that during years when interest rates declined, the average desired bank loan
share was 68.1 percent (Figure 3.7). During years of interest rate increases, the
average share was only slightly higher at 68.8 percent. A t-test shows no significant
difference in the means of SHARE between periods of declining versus increasing
interest rates (p-value of 0.2503).
Figure 3.7: Desired Loan Share and Loan Application Rate (2005-2014)
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In addition to information on investment activities and loan applications, our
dataset includes firm-specific balance sheet and income statement data. Given
this information we can construct a proxy variable for the amount of internal funds
that the firm had available to finance its investment projects. The POT literature
24 SHARE is only measured for those firms that applied for a bank loan, hence it is always larger
than zero.
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often refers to the stock of internal funds, such as cash and marketable securities (e.g.
Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). As our dataset does not include stock information,
we approximate the amount of internal funds using the firm’s cash flow to total
assets ratio, CF (e.g. Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996a; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999;
Lo´pez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira, 2008).
3.4.2 Estimation Framework
Based on the dataset described above, we test – in three steps – for the existence
of an income and substitution effect of interest rate reductions. In the first step
we test the validity of the POT by analysing how the availability of internal funds
influences SMEs’ decision to apply for bank loans, and the desired bank loan share
in the financing mix:
APPLYi,t = β0 + β1CFi,t−1 + β2Yi,t + λj,t + i,t (3.7)
SHAREi,t = β0 + β1CFi,t−1 + β2Yi,t + λj,t + i,t (3.8)
where APPLYi,t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm applied for a
bank loan and 0 if not; SHAREi,t is the desired share of bank loans in the financing
mix of an investment project; CFi,t−1 is the cash flow to total asset ratio as a proxy
for the amount of internal funds, lagged by one year to mitigate the possibility of
simultaneity. If the POT holds, we expect the coefficient of CFi,t−1 to be negative.
That is, greater internal funds would reduce the probability of a SME applying for a
bank loan and would also reduce the desired bank loan share.25
Yi,t is a vector of firm specific control variables. It comprises variables commonly
found in the capital structure literature to describe the firm’s structural and financial
characteristics as well as information asymmetries. We include the debt to total assets
ratio LEV , which captures the firm’s debt capacity (e.g. Vanacker and Manigart,
2010). We expect the coefficient to be negative, because companies with higher
leverage may have difficulty serving additional debt-related payments, and may
therefore abstain from applying for a bank loan and decrease their desired bank loan
25 As the dependent variable SHAREi,t is only observable if APPLYi,t is equal to 1 (i.e. the firm
applied for a bank loan), we might face a selection bias. We rule out selection problems by
estimating a sample selection model as a robustness check (see Appendix B.3)
65 CHAPTER 3. GERMAN SMES’ USE OF BANK DEBT
share. To capture tax shields26 we include non-debt tax shields, NDTS, defined as
depreciation over total assets (e.g. Bradley et al., 1984). Firms can reduce their tax
burden and simultaneously avoid financial distress costs by using more non-debt tax
shields. Higher non-debt tax shields are thus expected to make firms less interested
in bank debt (Michaelas et al., 1999).
We further include the expected cost of financial distress of a firm, determined by
the probability of default and the expected loss in the case of default (Myers, 1984).
Default probability is captured by the firm’s creditworthiness, CW , measured by the
Creditreform Creditworthiness Indicator at the beginning of year t.27 As a proxy for
the cost of financial distress, we include the fixed to total assets ratio, FA (Vanacker
and Manigart, 2010). A lower ratio indicates higher costs of financial distress and
thus reduces the use of debt (Frank and Goyal, Frank and Goyal).28 Agency costs
are captured using a proxy for growth opportunities (Lo´pez-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira,
2008). We include firm-specific growth expectations using the categorical variable
GE, which captures expectations that are either positive (the firm expects its sales
to increase in the next one to three years), neutral (sales is expected to remain
unchanged) or negative (sales is expected to decline). Firms with more growth
opportunities are expected to require less debt (Fama and French, 2002). We further
control for the planned size of the investment project (divided by total assets) INV ;
for firm size, TA, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, and for the age of
the firm, AGE, defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has
been operating. The variables LEV , NTDS, FA and TA are lagged by one period
in order to mitigate the possibility of simultaneity. We also include industry-year
fixed effects, λj,t, to control for macroeconomic shocks at the industry level. The
definitions of variables and the summary statistics are shown in Table B.3 and Table
B.4 in Appendix B.1.
In the second step, we test for the existence of an income effect by analysing how
the reduction in interest rates affects the availability of internal funds, approximated
by the cash flow to total asset ratio. Following the credit channel literature, we
26 The term ’tax shield’ refers to reductions in taxable income through claiming allowable deductions,
such as depreciation and interest payments on certain debts. These deductions ’shield’ parts
of firms’ taxable income from taxation. In general interest expenses are referred to as debt tax
shields (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010).
27 The Creditreform Creditworthiness Indicator is calculated from information about the firm’s
liquidity, profit and asset position. It also takes into account structural risks such as firm size
and legal form as well as sectoral risks (Creditreform, 2015).
28 Fixed tangible assets are easier to collateralize and are expected to suffer smaller losses of value
if the firm goes into financial distress (Frank and Goyal, Frank and Goyal).
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use a dummy variable, INTt, that indicates years in which nominal interest rates
declined in order to capture the effect (e.g. Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996a).29 As the
main target of our analysis is the immediate decision about credit application by
SMEs, we base INTt on the borrowing costs of NFCs. Hence, it takes the value of 1
if borrowing costs declined in year t and 0 otherwise.30 We estimate in our second
step the following model:
CFi,t = β0 + β1INTt + β2Xi,t + λj,t + i,t (3.9)
In accordance with hypothesis (2) we expect the coefficient of INTt to be positive.
That is, years during which borrowing costs declined are associated with a higher
cash flow to total asset ratio. Xi,t is a vector comprising firm-specific control variables
that represent potential drivers of a firm’s cash flow. This includes sales growth,
GROWTH, which we expect to have a positive impact on CF ; the debt to total
assets ratio, LEV (lagged by one period), which we expected to have a negative
impact (due to higher interest expenses associated with higher debt levels); and
the firm’s creditworthiness, CW . Furthermore, we control for firm size and age by
including TA (lagged by one period) and AGE.
If internal funds have a significant negative effect on SMEs’ decision to use bank
debt, as tested in step one, and a reduction in interest rates has a significant positive
effect on internal funds, as tested in step two, the validity of the income effect can be
deduced. A reduction in interest rates in period t− 1 would then lead to an increase
of internal funds in period t− 1, which would reduce the loan application probability
and the desired share of bank loans in period t.
In the third step we test whether a decline in interest rates provides an incentive for
firms to substitute internal financing with bank debt financing (substitution effect).
To do so we interact the dummy variable INTt with the variable measuring the
availability of internal funds CFi,t−1:
29 Alternatively, a set of annual macro-level data, including interest rate data, could be included
in the estimation (e.g. Jime´nez et al., 2012). However, this requires the macro variables to be
uncorrelated. This assumption is not always upheld and the approach can additionally suffer
from an omitted variable bias. We estimate a model including macro variables as a robustness
check (see Appendix B.3).
30 Between 2005 and 2014, borrowing costs declined in six years (2005, 2009, 2010, and 2012-2014)
and increased in four years (2006-2008 and 2011). Data on borrowing costs are provided by the
ECB.
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APPLYi,t = β0 + β1CFi,t−1 + β2(INTt*CFi,t−1) + β3Yi,t + λj,t + i,t (3.10)
SHAREi,t = β0 + β1CFi,t−1 + β2(INTt*CFi,t−1) + β3Yi,t + λj,t + i,t (3.11)
If a reduction in interest rates alters firms to replace internal funds with bank debt,
we expect the coefficient β2 to be positive. This would indicate that during periods
of interest rate reduction, SMEs would rely less on internal funds to finance their
investment projects and would instead turn more quickly to bank loan financing.
To exploit the panel nature of our data and to control for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity at the firm level, we estimate models (3.7) to (3.11) using linear
fixed-effects models.31 As APPLY is a binary variable and SHARE a fractional
response variable confined to the ]0,1] interval, the use of non-linear models to
estimate equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.10) and (3.11) would be preferable to a linear
model. For the case of APPLY a logit model would be suitable. For the case of
SHARE a fractional response model, as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996,
2008), and Wooldridge (2010), could be used. However, the inclusion of firm-fixed
effects in a non-linear model such as logit (for the case of APPLY ) would restrict
our sample to only those firms that had applied at least one time for a bank loan
and one time not. This could cause a selection problem. Furthermore, Jime´nez et al.
(2012) point out that the main advantage of using linear instead of non-linear models
is the intuitive interpretation of the interaction term coefficients in linear models.
Moreover, Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) show that in non-linear
models the ordinarily reported standard errors and marginal effects of interaction
terms would require corrections. Owing to these potential shortcomings we follow
Jime´nez et al. (2012) and use linear models in our analysis. We study non-linear
models as a robustness check (see Appendix B.3).
To test whether firms of varying sizes react differently, we additionally estimate each
model for different size classes: micro firms (up to 9 full-time employees), small
firms (between 10 and 49 full-time employees), and medium-sized firms (50 or more
full-time employees).
31 Results from a Hausman test and an F-test, respectively, suggest that a panel fixed-effects model
is to be preferred to both a random-effects panel model and a pooled ordinary least squares
model.
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3.4.3 Estimation Results
Step 1: Internal funds and SMEs’ financing decisions
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 report the results of our first step, which tests the validity of
the POT for the loan application probability and the desired loan share, respectively.
The first columns show the results for the total sample. In accordance with the POT,
we find that internal funds (proxied by the cash flow to total asset ratio) have a
negative impact on the loan application probability and the desired bank loan share.
However, the effect is statistically significant only for the desired bank loan share.
Our estimation results thus only partly confirm the validity of the POT.
The results show that an increase of one standard deviation (SD) in the cash flow to
total assets ratio – which equates to 13 percentage points – reduces the desired bank
loan share in the financing mix of an investment project by around 1.5 percentage
points.32 The effect size, however, varies considerably by firm size (Table 3.2, columns
2-4). The effect is largest for micro firms, with 1 SD increase in the cash flow ratio
being associated with a decline of 3.6 percentage points in the desired bank loan
share. For medium-sized firms, the effect amounts to a decline of 2 percentage points.
For small firms, the effect is not statistically significant.
In addition to internal funds, the planned size of the investment project has a
significant effect on SMEs’ decisions to use bank debt. However, the effect differs for
loan application probability versus desired loan share. The positive coefficient in the
loan application model (Table 3.1) indicates that larger investment projects increase
the need for external finance, raising the odds that a firm will apply for a bank loan.
This finding is in line with the POT. By contrast, the negative coefficient in the
desired loan share model (Table 3.2) indicates that – given the firm has applied for a
loan – the larger the project, the smaller the desired loan share. This could be an
indication of SMEs’ limited access to high-volume loans, such that SMEs have to
additionally look for alternative external funds to finance their large-scale investment
projects.33
32 Estimated by 0.13*(-0.1126)=-0.014638.
33 Analysing the firm-specific realized financing mix that is also available in our dataset, we find
that the share of subsidized funds (e.g. subsidized loans) considerably increases with increasing
size of the investment project, crowding out ‘normal’ bank loans.
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Table 3.1: Results Step 1 - Loan Application Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
APPLYi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
CFi,t−1 -0.0178 0.0206 -0.0894 -0.0065
[0.0414] [0.0874] [0.0761] [0.0599]
LEVi,t−1 -0.0444 -0.1617∗ 0.0265 -0.0318
[0.0356] [0.0829] [0.0595] [0.0598]
NTDSi,t−1 -0.0649 0.1061 0.1504 -0.2015
[0.1003] [0.2157] [0.1621] [0.1344]
CWi,t -0.0004
∗ -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0000
[0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004]
FAi,t−1 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0000
[0.0004] [0.0010] [0.0006] [0.0007]
GE neutrali,t 0.0104 -0.0158 0.0157 0.0199
[0.0113] [0.0339] [0.0179] [0.0174]
GE positivei,t 0.0337
∗∗∗ -0.0017 0.0208 0.0541∗∗∗
[0.0122] [0.0393] [0.0198] [0.0186]
INVi,t 1.1902
∗∗∗ 0.9154∗∗∗ 1.2307∗∗∗ 1.2940∗∗∗
[0.0517] [0.1576] [0.0722] [0.0891]
TAi,t−1 -0.0145 0.0217 -0.0424∗ -0.0142
[0.0159] [0.0536] [0.0245] [0.0299]
AGEi,t 0.0468 0.3538
∗∗ 0.1973∗∗ -0.1956∗
[0.0541] [0.1527] [0.0773] [0.1003]
Constant 0.4929∗ -0.9329 0.2576 1.2552∗∗
[0.2842] [0.7986] [0.4092] [0.5664]
Observations 18,090 2,579 7,765 7,349
Notes: APPLY is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed-effects linear
probability model. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm
level. Inclusion of industry-year fixed effects. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs),
small firms (10-49 FTEs) and medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses
*p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
The results for the remaining control variables are inconclusive, with coefficients and
levels of significance differing depending on the model and the subsample. We find a
statistically significant negative relationship between SMEs’ desired bank loan share
and fixed assets, which contradicts our assumptions. Furthermore, the size of the
firm, is inversely related with the desired loan share of micro firms. We also find
a statistically significant positive relationship between the age of the firm and the
loan application probability of micro and small firms but a negative relationship for
medium-sized firms.
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Table 3.2: Results Step 1 - Desired Bank Loan Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SHAREi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
CFi,t−1 -0.1126∗∗∗ -0.2767∗∗∗ -0.0507 -0.1530∗∗∗
[0.0380] [0.0904] [0.1099] [0.0538]
LEVi,t−1 -0.0525 -0.0259 -0.0595 -0.0639
[0.0407] [0.1069] [0.0732] [0.0626]
NTDSi,t−1 0.0479 -0.0206 -0.0020 0.0197
[0.0892] [0.2099] [0.1265] [0.1699]
CWi,t 0.0001 0.0011 0.0005 -0.0004
[0.0003] [0.0008] [0.0004] [0.0004]
FAi,t−1 -0.0008∗∗ 0.0008 -0.0011∗ -0.0015∗∗
[0.0004] [0.0013] [0.0006] [0.0006]
GE neutrali,t -0.0015 -0.0232 -0.0158 0.0119
[0.0121] [0.0459] [0.0189] [0.0187]
GE positivei,t 0.0143 -0.0394 0.0007 0.0342
∗
[0.0128] [0.0562] [0.0220] [0.0183]
INVi,t -0.2250
∗∗∗ -0.2893∗∗ -0.1894∗∗∗ -0.2123∗∗∗
[0.0399] [0.1333] [0.0625] [0.0649]
TAi,t−1 -0.0432∗∗∗ -0.1681∗∗ -0.0274 -0.0377
[0.0146] [0.0747] [0.0223] [0.0240]
AGEi,t 0.0468 0.3171 -0.0898 0.1365
[0.0601] [0.2199] [0.0909] [0.0997]
Constant 1.2541∗∗∗ 1.8112 1.4052∗∗∗ 0.9850∗
[0.2946] [1.2162] [0.4327] [0.5313]
Observations 7,979 942 3,428 3,418
Notes: SHARE is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed-effects model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion
of industry-year fixed effects. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms
(10-49 FTEs) and medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1,
**p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
Step 2: Income Effect
Table 3.3 shows the regression results of our second step, testing how the reduction
of interest rates affects SMEs’ internal funds. The results of regression model (3.9)
show that the coefficient of the dummy variable INTt is positive and statistically
different from zero. Hence, a reduction of borrowing costs in period t increases the
cash flow ratio in period t. These findings are in accordance with hypothesis (2)
and are generally consistent with the balance-sheet-channel literature. On average,
a reduction in the borrowing costs for period t increases the cash flow ratio in the
same period by around 5 percentage points, which is not negligible relative to the
cash flow ratio sample average of 15 percent.
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Table 3.3: Results Step 2 - Income Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
INTt 0.0494
∗∗∗ 0.1144∗∗ -0.0023 0.0748∗∗∗
[0.0168] [0.0544] [0.0382] [0.0186]
GROWTHi,t -0.0000 0.0088 -0.0000 -0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0057] [0.0000] [0.0001]
LEVi,t−1 0.0232∗∗ 0.0201 0.0311∗∗ 0.0235∗
[0.0099] [0.0336] [0.0143] [0.0135]
CWi,t 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001]
TAi,t−1 -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0230 -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0241∗∗∗
[0.0039] [0.0166] [0.0054] [0.0064]
AGEi,t 0.0150 0.0560 0.0094 -0.0105
[0.0125] [0.0414] [0.0188] [0.0201]
Constant 0.3952∗∗∗ 0.2231 0.3842∗∗∗ 0.4947∗∗∗
[0.0670] [0.2611] [0.0941] [0.1200]
Observations 18,935 2,671 8,138 7,710
Notes: CF is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed-effects model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion
of industry-year fixed effects. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms
(10-49 FTEs) and medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1,
**p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
However, a statistically significant effect is not observed for small firms. For the other
size classes we find that a reduction in borrowing costs increases the cash flow ratio of
micro firms by 11.4 percentage points, and of medium sized firms by 7.5 percentage
points. For the control variables, we find that only firms’ leverage and size have
statistically significant effects on the cash flow ratio. Contrary to our assumptions,
a higher leverage ratio is positively related to cash flow in our estimation model.
Furthermore, a larger firm size is associated with a lower cash flow ratio.
Summing up the results of steps one and two, we find evidence for the presence of
an income effect of borrowing-cost reductions on SMEs’ decisions to use bank debt.
Declining borrowing costs non-negligibly increase SMEs’ internal financing capacity,
which subsequently reduces their desired bank loan share in the following year.
Step 3: Substitution Effect
To test whether the reduction in interest rates alters SMEs’ preference order, we
interact the dummy variable INTt, which indicates whether borrowing costs declined,
with firms’ cash flow ratio CFi,t−1. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 show the results for the
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loan application and loan share models, respectively. For brevity, we report and
discuss only the coefficients of interest.34 In our estimation model the coefficient of
CFi,t−1 reflects the effect of internal funds on the loan application probability and the
desired bank loan share, in years of nondecreasing borrowing costs. The coefficient
of the interaction term CFi,t−1*INTi,t reflects the difference compared with years
in which borrowing costs declined.35 A positive coefficient of the interaction term
would indicate that the negative effect of internal funds on both dependent variables
decreases when borrowing costs decline.
Table 3.4: Results Step 3 - Loan Application Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
APPLYi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
(1) CFi,t−1 -0.0384 0.0289 -0.1544∗ 0.0248
[0.0481] [0.0934] [0.0849] [0.0793]
(2) CFi,t−1*INTt 0.0338 -0.0159 0.1141 -0.0533
[0.0493] [0.0957] [0.0863] [0.0832]
Observations 18,090 2,579 7,765 7,349
Notes: APPLY is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed-effects model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of
industry-year fixed effects. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms (10-49
FTEs) and medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTE). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05,
***p <0.01.
Table 3.5: Results Step 3 - Desired Bank Loan Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SHAREi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
(1) CFi,t−1 -0.1535∗∗∗ -0.2226∗∗ -0.0949 -0.2012∗∗∗
[0.0546] [0.1084] [0.1271] [0.0770]
(2) CFi,t−1*INTt 0.0617 -0.1257 0.0662 0.0838
[0.0597] [0.1466] [0.1001] [0.1021]
Observations 7,979 942 3,428 3,418
Notes: SHARE is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed-effects model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of
industry-year fixed effects. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms (10-49
FTEs) and medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTE). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05,
***p <0.01.
For the loan application probability (Table 3.4), the coefficient of the interaction
term shows the expected positive sign only for the subsample of small firms, yet it is
34 The complete estimation results are shown in Appendix B.2.
35 The sum of both coefficients would reflect the effect of internal funds on both dependent variables
in years of declining borrowing costs.
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statistically not significant. However, in contrast to our baseline model in step one,
the coefficient of the cash flow ratio is statistically significant for small firms, such
that – in line with the POT – a higher cash flow ratio reduces the probability of
applying for a bank loan. For the desired loan share model (Table 3.5), the interaction
of cash flow with the borrowing cost reduction dummy variable shows the expected
positive sign only for the subsample of small and medium-sized firms. However, the
effect is statistically not significant. In other words, the negative effect of internal
funds on the desired loan share does not differ between periods of increasing and
decreasing borrowing costs.
Summing up the results for step three, we cannot confirm a statistically significant
substitution effect of declining borrowing costs for German SMEs in the period
2005 to 2014. Hence, SMEs did not increase their preference for bank loans in the
observation period. This finding generally parallels those of the previous section
which showed a decline in bank borrowing by German NFCs.
The results of our empirical analysis are robust with regard to alternative estimation
methods. Using fixed-effects logit models for APPLY and fractional logit models
for SHARE as a robustness check, our estimation results vary only slightly in terms
of the coefficient sign and significance, without changing the general findings (Table
B.8 to B.11 in Appendix B.3). Furthermore, replacing the borrowing cost dummy
variable in model (3.9) by a set of macro variables confirms the findings that a drop
in borrowing cost strengthens firms’ internal financing capacity (Table B.12).
3.5 Conclusion
High private sector debt can have long-lasting negative impacts on the economy.
It is therefore crucial to understand the drivers of corporate sector debt financing.
The aim of this study is to analyse how the reduction in interest rates affects
German SMEs’ financing decisions, in particular their willingness to use bank loans
to finance investment projects. Assuming SMEs follow a preference order when
making financing decisions, and assuming too that SMEs depend on bank debt if
they require external finance for investment projects, we theoretically derive several
(partly opposing) effects of interest rate reductions: an encouragement effect, an
income and a substitution effect.
Analysing aggregate data for the period 2003 to 2015, we find that in periods of
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declining interest rates, the outstanding amounts of bank debt in Germany, as well
as the realized share of bank loans in SMEs’ financing mix, declined rather than
increased. These findings suggest a predominant income effect. Our firm-level
analysis of SMEs’ desired bank loan share confirms these findings and disconfirms
a substitution effect in the period 2005 to 2014. Hence, the interest rate decline
caused by the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy has not induced German SMEs
to replace internal funds with bank debt, but has rather strengthened their internal
financing capacity, thus reducing their demand for bank loans.
Our findings of a predominant income effect of declining interest rates highlight the
importance of the interest rate environment for firms’ financing behaviour and bank
loan demand. This has important policy implications. Firstly, our results confirm
that a low-interest rate policy works as a kind of subsidy to the corporate sector, by
significantly affecting firms’ interest expenses and cash flow. Secondly, in times of
low corporate sector demand for external finance (due to low investment activities),
declining interest rates can further suppress corporate sector borrowing. On the one
hand, this reduces the danger of accelerating corporate debt levels – as experienced
prior to the crisis in several countries. On the other hand, low corporate sector
demand for bank loans has a substantial effect on the banking sector, by depressing
financial intermediaries’ traditional sources of income.
Future research on the impact of interest rates on corporate sector bank loan demand
should be conducted. Specific focus points should include variations in the effect
sizes of income and substitution effects associated with interest rate changes, given
different states of the economy and phases of the business cycle.36 This can help to
derive in what circumstances a reduction of interest rates leads to an increase or
decrease in firms’ use of bank debt.
36 The non-existence of a substitution effect in this period might reflect unique circumstances of
German SMEs that resulted in a cautious use of bank debt. Research on possible substitution
effects of interest rate reductions should therefore be extended to other countries that experienced
strong increases in corporate sector debt (e.g. Spain).
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Appendix B
B.1 Sample Structure and Variable Definition
Table B.1: Number of Observations by Year
Year Observations
2005 1,404
2006 1,723
2007 1,881
2008 2,526
2009 2,286
2010 2,195
2011 1,940
2012 1,576
2013 1,605
2014 954
Total 18,090
Table B.2: Number of Firms by Sector
Sector No. of Firms
Accommodation 144
Agriculture 126
Construction 1,274
Energy and Water 108
Financial Services 14
Information 141
Manufacturing 2,597
Mining 5
PA, Education, Healthcare 151
Real Estate 135
Trade 2,299
Transportation 432
Technical Services 516
Other Services 330
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Table B.3: Variable Definition
Dependent Variable
SHARE Desired share of bank loans in financing mix (excluding zeros)
APPLY
1: Firm applied for a bank loan to finance investment project
0: Otherwise
Explanatory Variables
CF Cash flow (net income + depreciation) over total assets
INT
1: Borrowing costs for non-financial corporations declined
0: Otherwise
TA Natural log of total assets
AGE Natural log of one plus age of firm
INV Planned investment volume over total assets
CW Creditreform Creditworthiness Indicator
FA Fixed assets over total assets
LEV Debt over total assets
GE
Growth expectations
negative - Sales will decline
neutral - Sales remains the same
positive - Sales will increase
Table B.4: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
SHARE 0.68 0.27 0.05 1.00
APPLY 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Explanatory Variables:
CF 0.15 0.13 -0.31 1.30
INT 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
INV 0.12 0.13 0.00 1.43
TA 9,028 17,671 40 173112
AGE 41.45 41.51 2 660
CW 228.11 45.26 100 600
FA 33.94 24.41 0.00 96.77
LEV 0.74 0.22 0.08 1.59
GE negative 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
GE neutral 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
GE positive 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Notes: TA in 1000EUR. AGE in levels.
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B.2 Complete Results
Table B.5: Complete Results Step 3 - Loan Application Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
APPLYi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
CFi,t−1 -0.0384 0.0289 -0.1544∗ 0.0248
[0.0481] [0.0934] [0.0849] [0.0793]
CFi,t−1*INTi,t 0.0338 -0.0159 0.1141 -0.0533
[0.0493] [0.0957] [0.0863] [0.0832]
LEVi,t−1 -0.0440 -0.1619∗ 0.0295 -0.0327
[0.0356] [0.0830] [0.0594] [0.0599]
NTDSi,t−1 -0.0670 0.1032 0.1277 -0.1993
[0.0991] [0.2172] [0.1576] [0.1366]
CWi,t -0.0004
∗ -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0000
[0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004]
FAi,t−1 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0000
[0.0004] [0.0010] [0.0006] [0.0007]
GE neutrali,t 0.0104 -0.0159 0.0155 0.0197
[0.0113] [0.0339] [0.0180] [0.0174]
GE positivei,t 0.0338
∗∗∗ -0.0017 0.0205 0.0538∗∗∗
[0.0122] [0.0393] [0.0197] [0.0186]
INVi,t 1.1906
∗∗∗ 0.9152∗∗∗ 1.2317∗∗∗ 1.2934∗∗∗
[0.0518] [0.1576] [0.0722] [0.0891]
TAi,t−1 -0.0147 0.0217 -0.0423∗ -0.0137
[0.0159] [0.0536] [0.0246] [0.0299]
AGEi,t 0.0466 0.3530
∗∗ 0.1956∗∗ -0.1949∗
[0.0541] [0.1529] [0.0773] [0.1004]
Constant 0.4926∗ -0.9587 0.2423 1.2478∗∗
[0.2842] [0.7993] [0.4099] [0.5667]
Observations 18,090 2,579 7,765 7,349
Notes: APPLY is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed-effects linear
probability model. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the
firm level. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms (10-49 FTEs) and
medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
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Table B.6: Complete Results Step 3 - Desired Bank Loan Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SHAREi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
CFi,t−1 -0.1535∗∗∗ -0.2226∗∗ -0.0949 -0.2012∗∗∗
[0.0546] [0.1084] [0.1271] [0.0770]
CFi,t−1*INTt 0.0617 -0.1257 0.0662 0.0838
[0.0597] [0.1466] [0.1001] [0.1021]
LEVi,t−1 -0.0524 -0.0265 -0.0599 -0.0617
[0.0407] [0.1068] [0.0732] [0.0627]
NTDSi,t−1 0.0426 -0.0440 -0.0120 0.0041
[0.0851] [0.2194] [0.1294] [0.1604]
CWi,t 0.0001 0.0010 0.0005 -0.0004
[0.0003] [0.0008] [0.0004] [0.0004]
FAi,t−1 -0.0009∗∗ 0.0008 -0.0011∗ -0.0015∗∗
[0.0004] [0.0013] [0.0006] [0.0006]
GE neutrali,t -0.0017 -0.0185 -0.0162 0.0121
[0.0122] [0.0460] [0.0189] [0.0188]
GE positivei,t 0.0142 -0.0356 0.0005 0.0344
∗
[0.0128] [0.0561] [0.0220] [0.0183]
INVi,t -0.2233
∗∗∗ -0.2960∗∗ -0.1881∗∗∗ -0.2100∗∗∗
[0.0398] [0.1337] [0.0624] [0.0645]
TAi,t−1 -0.0440∗∗∗ -0.1665∗∗ -0.0280 -0.0395
[0.0146] [0.0748] [0.0223] [0.0243]
AGEi,t 0.0469 0.3123 -0.0912 0.1372
[0.0602] [0.2192] [0.0913] [0.0998]
Constant 1.2619∗∗∗ 1.8974 1.4127∗∗∗ 1.0062∗
[0.2946] [1.2084] [0.4329] [0.5326]
Observations 7,979 942 3,428 3,418
Notes: SHARE is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed-effects model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Definition
of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms (10-49 FTEs) and medium-sized firms (≥
50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
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B.3 Robustness Checks
Sample Selection
To rule out a selection bias we estimate a selection model following a two-step
procedure proposed by Wooldridge (1995). We first estimate year-by-year reduced
form probit models for the decision variable APPLY :
APPLYi,t = β0 + β1Zi,t + i,t (B.1)
Except for the explanatory variables that we include in model (3.7) we additionally
include in the selection equation a categorical variable capturing the degree of
urbanization of the firm’s headquarters location: (1) city, (2) region with low degree
of urbanization and (3) rural area. As the density of bank branches is lower in rural
areas bank loan applications are expected to be higher for firm’s in these areas, as the
application costs would be lower. As was shown in equation (3.5) higher application
costs lower the probability of applying for a bank loan.
Based on the results of the probit models we construct for each period the selection
term – that is, the inverse mills ratio λi,t:
λi,t =
φ(Z ′βˆ)
Φ(Z ′βˆ)
(B.2)
Next, we include λi,t in our estimation equation (3.8) to correct for sample selection.
The results are shown in Table B.7. Column (1) reports the results for the loan
share model including the correction term. For comparison, column (2) reports the
results for the baseline model. The correction term λi,t is found to be statistically
not significant. In addition, the estimation results of both models are fairly similar.
Hence, we conclude that sample selection does not seem to be a problem.
Non-Linear Models
Table B.8 and B.9 show the estimation results for the loan application probability
model using a fixed-effects logit model. The coefficient of the cash flow to total asset
ratio remains negative. In contrast to the results of the linear fixe-effects model the
coefficient becomes statistically significant at the 5-percent level for the subgroup
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of small firms. The coefficients from the interaction term remain statistically not
significant.
Table B.10 and B.11 show the estimation results of the loan share model using a
fractional logit model that is based on Papke and Wooldridge (2008) and Wooldridge
(2010).37 The coefficient of the cash flow to total asset ratio remains negative for the
total sample and the subgroups of micro and medium-sized firms. It is statistically
significant only for the total sample and the subgroup of medium-sized firms. The
coefficients of the interaction term remain statistically not significant.
Macro Variables
To test the robustness of our results for step two we estimate a variation of model
(3.9) including a set of macroeconomic control variables:
CFi,t = β0 + β1BCOSTt + β2∆GDPt + β3INFt + β4Xi,t + λj,t + i,t (B.3)
with BCOSTt being the borrowing costs for NFCs in Germany (in levels) in year
t, ∆GDPt is the growth rate of the real gross domestic product, and INFt is the
inflation rate. All other variables are included as defined above.
The estimation results of model (B.3) are shown in Table B.12. The coefficient of
the cost of borrowing indicator is negative and statistically significant for the total
sample and the subgroup of medium-sized firms. This implies that higher borrowing
costs are associated with a decline in the cash flow ratio. Our results hence confirm
that declining interest rates strengthen a firm’s internal financing capacity. We also
find that higher real GDP growth is linked to a higher cash flow ratio.
37 We use the fracreg command of STATA 14.
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Table B.7: Robustness Check - Sample Selection Model
(1) (2)
SHAREi,t Selection Correction No Selection Correction
λi,t 0.0611
[0.0397]
CFi,t−1 -0.1379∗∗∗ -0.1126∗∗∗
[0.0410] [0.0380]
LEVi,t−1 -0.0280 -0.0525
[0.0429] [0.0407]
NTDSi,t−1 0.0751 0.0479
[0.0946] [0.0892]
CWi,t 0.0001 0.0001
[0.0003] [0.0003]
FAi,t−1 -0.0006 -0.0008∗∗
[0.0004] [0.0004]
GE neutrali,t 0.0030 -0.0015
[0.0122] [0.0121]
GE positivei,t 0.0191 0.0143
[0.0132] [0.0128]
INVi,t -0.1148 -0.2250
∗∗∗
[0.0814] [0.0399]
TAi,t−1 -0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0432∗∗∗
[0.0148] [0.0146]
AGEi,t 0.0636 0.0468
[0.0596] [0.0601]
Constant 1.0650∗∗∗ 1.2541∗∗∗
[0.3120] [0.2946]
Observations 7,979 7,979
Notes: SHARE is the dependent variable. Both models estimated using a
fixed-effects model. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustering at the firm level. Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05,
***p <0.01.
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Table B.8: Robustness Check - Logit Model (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
APPLYi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
CFi,t−1 -0.5235 -0.6323 -0.9940∗ -0.4629
[0.3649] [0.9502] [0.5675] [0.6555]
LEVi,t−1 -0.4055 -1.7580∗∗ -0.0010 -0.1968
[0.2673] [0.8159] [0.4267] [0.4470]
NTDSi,t−1 0.2706 0.1716 1.2595 -2.4947
[0.8495] [3.8497] [1.1783] [2.5337]
CWi,t -0.0026
∗ -0.0080 -0.0032 0.0000
[0.0016] [0.0050] [0.0024] [0.0027]
FAi,t−1 0.0007 0.0089 -0.0034 0.0013
[0.0027] [0.0072] [0.0040] [0.0050]
GE neutrali,t 0.0693 -0.1869 0.1177 0.1618
[0.0827] [0.2674] [0.1300] [0.1331]
GE positivei,t 0.2214
∗∗ 0.1330 0.0841 0.3852∗∗∗
[0.0876] [0.3067] [0.1411] [0.1353]
INVi,t 10.1096
∗∗∗ 7.2238∗∗∗ 10.9304∗∗∗ 11.7953∗∗∗
[0.4501] [1.0344] [0.7388] [0.8102]
TAi,t−1 -0.1321 0.0971 -0.4170∗∗ -0.1359
[0.1144] [0.3841] [0.1814] [0.2099]
AGEi,t 0.1618 2.7670
∗∗ 1.4536∗∗ -2.0313∗∗∗
[0.3750] [1.2607] [0.6076] [0.7214]
Observations 7,456 663 2,998 3167
Notes: APPLY is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed-effects logit model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of
year fixed effects. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms (10-49 FTEs)
and medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05,
***p <0.01.
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Table B.9: Robustness Check - Logit Model (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
APPLYi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
CFi,t−1 -0.7811∗ -0.3928 -1.8968∗∗ -0.0728
[0.4717] [1.1793] [0.8065] [0.7990]
CFi,t−1*INTt 0.3950 -0.4203 1.1910 -0.8414
[0.4670] [1.1830] [0.7508] [0.8773]
LEVi,t−1 -0.3979 -1.7628∗∗ 0.0271 -0.2208
[0.2673] [0.8160] [0.4274] [0.4486]
NTDSi,t−1 0.1957 0.1573 1.1779 -2.4468
[0.8535] [3.8576] [1.2448] [2.5937]
CWi,t -0.0026
∗ -0.0083 -0.0033 0.0000
[0.0016] [0.0051] [0.0024] [0.0027]
FAi,t−1 0.0008 0.0088 -0.0034 0.0013
[0.0027] [0.0072] [0.0040] [0.0050]
GE neutrali,t 0.0710 -0.1849 0.1234 0.1550
[0.0827] [0.2677] [0.1302] [0.1334]
GE positivei,t 0.2212
∗∗ 0.1373 0.0763 0.3780∗∗∗
[0.0876] [0.3069] [0.1414] [0.1356]
INVi,t 10.1208
∗∗∗ 7.2196∗∗∗ 10.9788∗∗∗ 11.7958∗∗∗
[0.4506] [1.0342] [0.7413] [0.8100]
TAi,t−1 -0.1370 0.1025 -0.4279∗∗ -0.1320
[0.1147] [0.3838] [0.1825] [0.2104]
AGEi,t 0.1602 2.7306
∗∗ 1.4453∗∗ -2.0183∗∗∗
[0.3751] [1.2656] [0.6073] [0.7205]
Observations 7,456 663 2,998 3,167
Notes: APPLY is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fixed effects logit model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of
year fixed effects. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms (10-49 FTEs)
and medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05,
***p <0.01.
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Table B.10: Robustness Check - Fractional Response Model (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SHAREi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
CFi,t−1 -0.2199∗∗ 0.2085 -0.2018 -0.5408∗∗∗
[0.1066] [0.2193] [0.1648] [0.1942]
LEVi,t−1 0.6209∗∗∗ 0.5314∗∗∗ 0.6829∗∗∗ 0.5635∗∗∗
[0.0692] [0.1801] [0.1086] [0.1077]
NTDSi,t−1 0.4118∗ 0.4784 1.0784∗∗ 0.5168
[0.2422] [0.7588] [0.4368] [0.3196]
CWi,t 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0004
[0.0003] [0.0011] [0.0005] [0.0005]
FAi,t−1 -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0034∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0033∗∗∗
[0.0006] [0.0018] [0.0010] [0.0010]
GE neutrali,t 0.0187 0.0791 -0.0870 0.0694
[0.0390] [0.1229] [0.0600] [0.0587]
GE positivei,t 0.1020
∗∗∗ 0.0289 0.0216 0.1855∗∗∗
[0.0379] [0.1223] [0.0592] [0.0563]
INVi,t -0.8632
∗∗∗ -1.3960∗∗∗ -0.8561∗∗∗ -0.6228∗∗∗
[0.0992] [0.2446] [0.1420] [0.1734]
TAi,t−1 -0.1629∗∗∗ -0.1083∗∗ -0.1628∗∗∗ -0.1063∗∗∗
[0.0112] [0.0491] [0.0210] [0.0215]
AGEi,t 0.0233 -0.0482 0.0363 0.0356
[0.0162] [0.0547] [0.0253] [0.0235]
Constant 2.6447∗∗∗ 2.0579∗∗ 2.5939∗∗∗ 1.6894∗∗∗
[0.2400] [0.8306] [0.4008] [0.4249]
Observations 8,153 971 3,519 3,468
Notes: SHARE is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fractional logit model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion
of industry-year fixed effects. Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms
(10-49 FTEs) and medium-sized firms (≥ 50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1,
**p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
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Table B.11: Robustness Check - Fractional Response Model (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SHAREi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
CFi,t−1 -0.1837 0.5231 -0.4234∗ -0.5932∗∗
[0.1586] [0.3440] [0.2446] [0.2567]
CFi,t−1*INTt -0.0579 -0.4955 0.3536 0.0941
[0.1847] [0.4055] [0.2804] [0.3237]
LEVi,t−1 0.6210∗∗∗ 0.5300∗∗∗ 0.6843∗∗∗ 0.5630∗∗∗
[0.0692] [0.1803] [0.1088] [0.1077]
NTDSi,t−1 0.4166∗ 0.4618 1.1212∗∗ 0.4909
[0.2420] [0.7365] [0.4454] [0.3342]
CWi,t 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0004
[0.0003] [0.0011] [0.0005] [0.0005]
FAi,t−1 -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0033∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0033∗∗∗
[0.0006] [0.0018] [0.0010] [0.0010]
GE neutrali,t 0.0188 0.0802 -0.0869 0.0690
[0.0390] [0.1229] [0.0600] [0.0587]
GE positivei,t 0.1022
∗∗∗ 0.0369 0.0212 0.1852∗∗∗
[0.0379] [0.1225] [0.0592] [0.0563]
INVi,t -0.8652
∗∗∗ -1.4275∗∗∗ -0.8460∗∗∗ -0.6208∗∗∗
[0.0996] [0.2457] [0.1424] [0.1735]
TAi,t−1 -0.1629∗∗∗ -0.1110∗∗ -0.1622∗∗∗ -0.1064∗∗∗
[0.0112] [0.0492] [0.0211] [0.0215]
AGEi,t 0.0232 -0.0525 0.0373 0.0356
[0.0162] [0.0551] [0.0253] [0.0235]
Constant 2.6471∗∗∗ 2.1332∗∗ 2.5558∗∗∗ 1.6880∗∗∗
[0.2401] [0.8321] [0.4024] [0.4247]
Observations 8,153 971 3,519 3,468
Notes: SHARE is the dependent variable. All models estimated using a fractional logit model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Definition
of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms (10-49 FTEs) and medium sized firms (≥
50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
86 CHAPTER 3. GERMAN SMES’ USE OF BANK DEBT
Table B.12: Robustness Check - Macro Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFi,t Total Sample Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms
BCOSTt -0.0348
∗∗∗ 0.0063 -0.0062 -0.0538∗∗∗
[0.0110] [0.0168] [0.0101] [0.0148]
∆GDPt 0.0068
∗ 0.0047 -0.0021 0.0119∗∗∗
[0.0037] [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0028]
INFt -0.0165 0.0015 0.0070 -0.0335
[0.0219] [0.0277] [0.0229] [0.0228]
GROWTHi,t -0.0000 0.0088 -0.0000 -0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0057] [0.0000] [0.0001]
LEVi,t−1 0.0232∗∗ 0.0201 0.0311∗∗ 0.0235∗
[0.0099] [0.0336] [0.0143] [0.0135]
CWi,t 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001]
TAi,t−1 -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0230 -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0241∗∗∗
[0.0039] [0.0166] [0.0054] [0.0064]
AGEi,t 0.0150 0.0560 0.0094 -0.0105
[0.0125] [0.0414] [0.0188] [0.0201]
Constant 0.6029∗∗∗ 0.2806 0.3978∗∗∗ 0.8027∗∗∗
[0.0906] [0.2505] [0.0969] [0.1219]
Observations 18,935 2,671 8,138 7,710
Notes: Dependent variable CF representing the cash flow to total asset ratio; BCOST - cost
of borrowing for NFCs in Germany (in levels); ∆GDP - real GDP growth; INF - inflation
rate; All models estimated using a fixed-effects model. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of year-industry fixed effects.
Definition of size classes: micro firms (≤ 9 FTEs), small firms (10-49 FTEs) and medium sized
firms (≥ 50 FTEs). Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
Chapter 4
Impaired Capital Reallocation in a
Low-Interest Rate Environment –
Evidence from German SMEs
Abstract
Post-crisis productivity growth has been exceptionally weak in many
countries, including Germany. This paper presents an analysis of the
impact of a prolonged period of low interest rates on the capital allocation
process in a market economy. Using firm-level data of SMEs, we empirically
test whether the German productivity slowdown in the post-crisis period
has been caused by a less efficient allocation of capital. The results
provide evidence that low-productive firms have had easier access to
credit in the post-crisis period compared with the years before the crisis.
This might have increased their odds of survival and lowered the incentive
to increase their efficiency and productivity. The impaired reallocation
and restructuring process is likely to have contributed to the low growth
of productivity in Germany.
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4.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008/2009 caused the most sudden and deep recession
since the 1930s. Despite massive monetary policy interventions that pushed short-
and long-term interest rates close to or even below zero, post-crisis GDP growth rates
remain well below pre-crisis levels in most advanced economies, including Germany.
Labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Germany and
other countries has dropped to an all-time low. The global productivity slowdown
has spurred a lively debate on the underlying causes and potential consequences for
future output growth (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011; Gordon, 2014; Andrews et al.,
2015; McGowan et al., 2017).
According to Schumpeter (1942), productivity growth is closely linked to a process
of ’creative destruction’ and resource reallocation, as factors of production are
moved from low-productive to high-productive firms (see also Foster et al., 2001).
Several studies provide evidence that an impeded process of restructuring and
resource reallocation has been one of the main reasons for the post-crisis productivity
slowdown (e.g. Barnett et al., 2014; Gopinath et al., 2015).
In the context of Japan’s weak economic performance since the 1990s, the manner
in which central banks’ crisis management can imped the restructuring process in
the banking and corporate sector has been highlighted (Hoffmann and Schnabl,
2016). The Bank of Japan’s zero-interest rate policy has been associated with a
misallocation of credit towards highly indebted, unproductive and inefficient firms –
so called zombie firms, thereby driving down aggregate productivity growth (Sekine
et al., 2003; Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Caballero et al., 2008).
Similarly, it has been argued that the European Central Bank’s (ECB) post-crisis
ultra-loose monetary policy, in combination with an unstable banking sector, has
impeded creative destruction and market dynamics in Europe (Forbes, 2015). Freytag
and Schnabl (2017) show that monetary policy rescue measures have undermined
the constitutive principles of the German social market economy. This dynamic has
contributed to a decline in productivity growth.
To date there has been little empirical evidence of the connection between the
low-interest rate policy, resource reallocation and the productivity slowdown in
Germany. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. By synthesising and evaluating
the existing literature, we show theoretically how a prolonged period of ultra-loose
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monetary policy contributes to a misallocation of capital. Using firm-level data of
German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)1, we empirically test whether
the German productivity slowdown in the post-crisis period has been caused by
inefficient allocation of capital. The findings of this paper provide insight into the
long-term economic consequences of an extended period of ultra-low interest rates.
4.2 The German Productivity Puzzle
For decades – if not centuries – labour productivity and TFP in Germany and other
advanced economies have risen constantly (Figure 4.1a and 4.1b). German labour
productivity increased by around 168 percent between 1970 and 2016. Total factor
productivity rose by around 39 percent between 1985 and 2015. Because productivity
is a key source of economic growth, its increase has been accompanied by substantial
improvement in the standard of living.
However, productivity growth rates have been declining since the 1980s (Table 4.1;
and Figures 4.1c and 4.1d). In Germany, the annual growth rate of output per hour
worked has dropped from an average of 3.8 percent in the 1970s to 2.3 percent in
the 1990s, and further to 1.2 percent in the period after the financial crisis. Along
with labour productivity, TFP growth rates have also declined, from an average of
1.8 percent in the 1980s to 1.2 percent for the period 2010–2015. Similar trends have
been observed across all industrialized countries.2
Table 4.1: Productivity Growth Rates (Germany)
Labour Productivity Total Factor Productivity
1970-1980 3.78% n.a.
1980-1990* 2.20% 1.82%
1990-2000 2.34% 1.53%
2000-2007 1.65% 1.07%
2010-2015 1.19% 1.15%
2012-2015 0.76% 0.54%
Source: OECD, own calculations. *For TFP only data after 1985 available.
1 SMEs account for around 99 percent of all corporations in Germany and around 50 percent of
gross value added (data provided by Destatis). They are hence important for the aggregate
productivity development in Germany.
2 The global productivity slowdown has spurred a lively debate on the underlying causes with
explanations raging from structural causes such as ageing societies (Summers, 2013), to diminishing
returns of innovation (Gordon, 2014), to errors in the measurement of productivity (Syverson,
2016).
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Figure 4.1: Labour Productivity and Total Factor Productivity
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Source: OECD. Labour productivity (LP): GDP per hour worked, constant prices. Growth rates are
the five year rolling average, including two preceding and two subsequent years.
Although a decline in productivity growth rates has been occurring for several decades,
the period after 2007 is exceptional. The financial crisis and the subsequent recession
during 2009 interrupted a trend of positive – though shrinking – productivity growth
rates. Between 2008 and 2009, output per hour worked in Germany dropped by
almost 2.6 percent. The TFP dropped by 3.6 percent. The substantial decline
contrasted with the productivity dynamics of past recessions.3 Figure 4.2 illustrates
on a quarterly basis the development of labour productivity in Germany before,
during and after the recessions in 1993, 2003 and 2009. During the 1993 recession,
although labour productivity growth slowed for several quarters, output per hour
did not decline and growth rates soon recovered to pre-crisis levels. During the 2003
recession, labour productivity contracted in one quarter, but recovered to pre-crisis
3 Several papers have studied the dramatic productivity decline during the financial crisis. For
the US Redmond and Van Zandweghe (2016) find that distressed credit markets significantly
impeded TFP growth during the crisis years. They argue that an impaired access to credit
curtailed research and development activities of the corporate sector thus impeding innovations.
Franklin et al. (2015) empirically show for the UK that the reduction in credit supply following
the financial crisis reduced investment, labour productivity and wages.
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levels within three quarters. During the 2009 recession, labour productivity sharply
declined in two consecutive quarters. It took another six quarters to recover to the
levels of 2008. The post-crisis recovery has also been rather sluggish and growth
rates as of 2012 have been particularly weak. Labour productivity growth dropped
to an annual average of merely 0.76 percent, and TFP growth fell to 0.54 percent
(Table 4.1).
Figure 4.2: Labour Productivity Germany - Previous Recessions
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Source: Destatis, own calculations. Quarterly labour productivity index (GDP per
hour worked). Base (t=0): 1992Q4 (Recession 1993), 2002Q4 (Recession 2003), 2008Q3
(Recession 2009).
A decline in productivity growth rates has long-term economic consequences. Figure
4.3 illustrates the trajectories of counterfactual growth paths of labour productivity
and TFP – that assume productivity growth rates had remained at the pre-crisis
level – compared with the actual productivity trends. If labour productivity had
grown after the year 2000 at a constant annual rate of 1.65 percent – that is, if no
financial crisis had interrupted the growth path – the labour productivity level would
have been around 9 percent higher in 2015 than it actually was. The TFP would
have been around 6 percent higher. If labour productivity growth had returned to its
pre-crisis level after 2009, output per hour would have been around 3 percent higher
than the actual 2015 level. Owing to the rather strong recovery of TFP growth in
2010/2011, the actual and counter-factual TFP levels are quite similar. However, if
TFP growth remains as low as it has been since 2012, future TFP levels might fall
below the projections based on pre-crisis growth rates.
Our analysis of German productivity data shows that productivity growth has not
deteriorated solely in the wake of the financial crisis. However, it seems the crisis
amplified pre-existing trends (Haldane, 2017). In the debate regarding the underlying
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Figure 4.3: Productivity Growth Trends in Germany
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causes of the post-crisis ‘productivity puzzle’, several studies have highlighted the
role of economic and monetary policy interventions, and the consequences of those
interventions for the restructuring and resource reallocation process in the corporate
sector. (e.g. Arrowsmith et al., 2013; Broadbent et al., 2014; McGowan et al., 2017).
4.3 Impeded Capital Reallocation in a Low-Interest Rate Environment
The important role that corporate sector restructuring and resource reallocation play
in aggregate productivity growth is well-established in the literature. Schumpeter
(1942) coined the term ‘creative destruction’ to refer to the incessant process of
replacing old, outdated products and production technologies with new ones through
innovation. As previously bounded resources are set free by the destruction process,
they can be shifted from sectors or production units that are contracting to those that
are expanding. Hence an integral part of creative destruction is the reallocation of
factors of production – that is, capital and labour – across production units. (Foster
et al., 2001).
Factors of production move to where their marginal rates of return are highest,
eventually equalizing these returns (Barnett et al., 2014). Hence, more productive
firms offering higher rates of return attract capital and labour from less productive
firms. The latter are forced to increase their productivity and efficiency or to leave
the market, thereby freeing up resources. Hence creative destruction allows for a more
efficient allocation of resources across the economy, leading to higher productivity
growth at the aggregate level (Caballero and Hammour, 2000).
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Central to the efficient allocation of capital across the economy are financial institutions
(Wurgler, 2000). They provide a screening mechanism for the allocation of credit,
by assessing which firms or projects are likely to yield the highest returns and
transferring funds to those firms (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1988). Furthermore, they
ensure that funds are used in the agreed manner, thereby playing a monitoring role
(Stiglitz, 1989). Profit-maximizing financial institutions are expected to withdraw
funds from poorly performing firms, which forces firms to improve their productivity
and efficiency or to close down.
Empirical evidence suggests that the allocation of capital has become less efficient
in the post-crisis period.4 We argue that the ECB’s ultra-loose monetary policy in
the post-crisis period might have contributed to this development, as it has severely
impaired the allocative function of financial institutions. The policy has undermined
market discipline on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets and has encouraged
moral hazard on the asset side (Calderon and Schaeck, 2016). There are several
channels through which a prolonged low-interest rate policy can disturb the efficient
allocation of capital.
Firstly, banking sector restructuring is impeded. The financial crisis caused severe
disruptions in the interbank market, tempting central banks to step in and act as
lender of last resort (Garcia-de-Andoain et al., 2016). The supply of cheap and
quasi-unlimited central bank liquidity has become the new normal as the EBC and
other central banks have committed themselves to persistent monetary policy easing.
Although the provision of low-cost liquidity is considered to have had a stabilizing
effect, it impairs the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction by preventing
or delaying a structural adjustment in the banking sector (Hoffmann and Schnabl,
2016). As under-capitalized and unviable banks – so called zombie banks – do not
exit the market, they prey on the market share of healthy institutions.
Zombie banks are less likely than healthy banks to enforce discipline for distressed
borrowers, but instead continue to roll over bad loans. In so doing they tie up
resources with potentially less productive firms (Homar and van Wijnbergen, 2015).
Peek and Rosengren (2005) show that in the 1990s, Japanese banks had an incentive
4 For the UK, Broadbent et al. (2014) identify an increased dispersion of output prices across
sectors arguing that this is a signal of impeded capital mobility because rates of return across
sectors are not equalized. Also for the UK, Broadbent (2012, 2013) note that although sectoral
rates of return on capital have significantly changed after the crisis, a subsequent movement
of capital stock across sectors has not occurred. For the case of southern European countries
Gopinath et al. (2015) find that the dispersion of the return to capital across firms significantly
increased between 1999 and 2007 and further accelerated between 2008 and 2012.
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to continue allocating credit to the weakest borrowers to avoid the realization of losses.
Empirical studies on Japan have shown that the practice of forbearance lending has
severely hampered resource reallocation from less-productive to more-productive
firms, preventing the latter from gaining market shares (Ahearne and Shinada, 2005;
Fukao and Kwon, 2006; Caballero et al., 2008). The problem of zombie banks and
forbearance lending has also emerged in Europe. Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010)
find evidence from small banks in Italy that forbearance lending took place in the
period 2008/2009. Arrowsmith et al. (2013) show that around 6 percent of UK SME
borrowers received some form of forbearance lending in March 2013.
Secondly, banks’ lending behaviour is distorted. Although central banks’ conventional
and unconventional monetary policy measures have helped to keep banks alive, a
prolonged period of ultra-low interest rates undermines commercial banks’ traditional
business model. The flattening of the yield curve depresses lending-deposit spreads
which reduces banks’ interest margins earned on traditional intermediation activities
(for the case of Japan see Gerstenberger and Schnabl, 2017). This dynamic severely
reduces banks’ income and profitability (Borio et al., 2017; Busch and Memmel,
2015), which forces them to adjust their asset mix.
On the one hand, low interest rates can motivate financial intermediaries to lower
their lending standards and ease credit access among riskier borrowers, due to an
increased appetite and excessive tolerance of risk (Rajan, 2005; Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez, 2006; Dell’ Ariccia et al., 2010). Empirical evidence from the pre-crisis
period clearly supports this notion.5 On the other hand, low profits and profitability
can impair banks’ incentives and ability to supply loans to the corporate sector
(Borio and Gambacorta, 2017). As a result, banks embark on a ’flight to quality’.
Brunnermeier and Koby (2017) argue that low interest rates in combination with
tighter financial regulations – as observed in the post-crisis period – reverse the
intended expansionary credit-supply effect of an expansionary monetary policy. As
interest margins shrink and banks’ profits decline, regulatory equity constraints are
tightened and banks are forced to reduce credit. Instead they scale up assets that
5 Jime´nez et al. (2014) find evidence for the Spanish banking sector that low short-term interest
rates induced banks to lend more to risky borrowers. Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) find robust
evidence that low short-term interest rates contributed to a softening of euro area and U.S. bank
lending standards. Altunbas et al. (2010) find that the impact of low interest rates on banks’
risk perception works inter alia through an increased search for yield. Low interest rates are
argued to reduce banks’ incentives to screen borrowers, thereby relaxing credit standards. For the
German banking sector in the period 2005-2014 Memmel et al. (2016) show that below a certain
profitability threshold banks search for yield by increasing their interest rate risk exposure.
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are safe but lower in yield, such as government bonds; this further compresses the
profit. Banks end up reducing their lending to comparatively high-risk borrowers
such as SMEs or start-ups, and increase their lending to the public sector (Hoffmann
and Schnabl, 2016).6
This trend has become particularly apparent in Japan (Schnabl, 2015). However,
for Germany as well, an increasingly asymmetric access to credit is already being
observed. While lending to large corporations has improved steadily since 2010,
lending to small enterprises has shown a less pronounced recovery in recent years
(Figure 4.4). Schwartz (2016) finds that micro-firms, in particular, had problems
obtaining credit to realize their investment plans.
Figure 4.4: Access to Credit by Firm Size - German Manufacturing Sector
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sector firms reporting restrictive lending by the banks.
Thirdly, corporate sector restructuring is impeded due to low borrowing costs. The
reduction of short- and long-term interest rates as a result of central banks’ monetary
policy interventions has substantially reduced firms’ borrowing costs. The composite
cost of borrowing indicator among German non-financial corporations (NFCs) – a
weighted average of short- and long-term lending rates – dropped from a high of 6
percent in September 2008 to 1.7 percent in January 2017, as shown in Figure 4.5.
For any firm, as the cost of its external funding drops, interest expenses also decline
and the firm’s financial position strengthens (Gerstenberger, 2017). In that sense,
low interest rates work as a kind of subsidy to the corporate sector. On the one
hand, this is the intended effect of an expansionary monetary policy – in the hope of
6 The purchase of government bonds receives preferential treatment by the Basel capital adequacy
rules.
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ultimately increasing investment spending and aggregate demand (Mishkin, 1996).
On the other hand, the dynamic helps to lower the rate of business failure, thus
slowing down the restructuring process in the corporate sector. As a result the share
of less productive firms, whose economic viability becomes dependent on cheap credit,
rises, and factors of production are tied up.
Figure 4.5: Borrowing Costs of German NFCs
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average interest rate monetary financial institutions charged on
new loans to the corporate sector.
Calligaris et al. (2016) observe that since 2008, firms operating at low productivity
in the Italian non-manufacturing sector have had a higher chance of survival than
before the crisis. For the UK, Barnett et al. (2014) find that the occurrence of
firm liquidations has been rather low since the financial crisis, whereas the share of
loss-making firms has increased. Chiu et al. (2014) estimate that labour productivity
in the UK would have been 5 percent higher in 2011, had the death rate of firms
after the financial crisis been as high as in the 1990s. A similar development can be
observed in Germany. The annual number of business failures is at an all-time low,
as shown in Figure 4.6, while the share of German SMEs with poor creditworthiness
has increased (Gerstenberger and Zimmermann, 2016).
The decline in interest expenses due to a prolonged period of artificially low interest
rates might not only affect the allocation of capital by slowing the reallocation process;
it can also lead to inefficient use of resources by the firms themselves. Hoffmann and
Schnabl (2016) argue that the expectation of a continuous supply of cheap credit
reduces firms’ motivation to cut costs and pursue innovation, because the pressure
to generate profit through greater efficiency declines. In addition, Forbes (2015)
questions whether low interest rates reduce firms’ incentives to carefully assess and
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evaluate their investment projects; if so, a less efficient use of capital is likely.
Figure 4.6: Number of Corporate Insolvencies in Germany (1999-2016)
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4.4 Empirical Evidence from German SMEs
Although several studies have analysed the weak productivity trends in the German
corporate sector (e.g. Erber and Hagemann, 2012; Schneider, 2013; Eichert and
Frisse, 2016), no study known to us has empirically tested the connection between
the low-interest rate environment and the efficiency of resource reallocation. We
therefore analyse whether the post-crisis productivity slowdown of the German
corporate sector has been influenced by an impeded capital reallocation process. To
evaluate the efficiency of the capital allocation process we focus on the link between
a firm’s productivity and its success in applying for bank loans.
For our analysis we use the KfW Mittelstandspanel, a representative annual survey
covering German micro, small and medium-sized enterprises with an annual turnover
of less than EUR 500 million. The dataset comprises qualitative and quantitative
data from 60,653 firms covering a period of 14 years (2002–2015). In addition to
firm characteristics, the dataset includes information on bank loan applications. To
control for outliers, we discard firm-year observations that belong to the 1st or 99th
percentile of the variables of interest. Taking into account missing observations, the
final sample contains 16,105 observations of 8,481 SMEs for the period 2005–2015.7
7 Our estimation sample covers less years than the original sample due to some variables being not
available for all survey years.
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The sample is unbalanced owing to missing data and differing participation behaviour
among the firms.8
In the survey, firms are asked whether they applied for bank loans to finance their
investment projects, and if so, whether the applications were (a) completely successful,
(b) partly successful or (c) not successful at all. Based on these data we construct
three indicators for a firm’s loan application success (LAS):
• AllSucc takes the value of 1 if all loan applications were successful, and 0
otherwise;
• PartSucc takes the value of 1 if only some – but not all – loan applications
were successful, and 0 otherwise;
• NoSucc takes the value of 1 if no loan application was successful, and 0
otherwise.
In a market economy, firms that are productive should have a relatively good chance
of successfully applying for a bank loan. To test this relationship, we estimate the
following model:
LASi,t = α + βLPi,t−1 + γXi,t + λj,t + i,t (4.1)
where LASi,t is one of the binary indicators of loan application success of firm i in year
t as described above. Hence, equation (4.1) is estimated for three different dependent
variables: AllSucc, PartSucc and NoSucc. The term LPi,t−1 refers to firm i’s labour
productivity, lagged by one period to mitigate problems of simultaneity. In line
with previous studies, we define labour productivity as the natural logarithm of real
turnover divided by the number of full time employees (FTE) (e.g. Baumann and
Kritikos, 2016).9 Based on our theoretical considerations, presented in the previous
section, we expect that more productive firms would be more likely to successfully
complete loan applications. Hence, we expect β to be positive for AllSucc and
negative for PartSucc and NoSucc.
The term X is a vector comprising firm-specific control variables that are expected to
affect a firm’s loan application success. We include the firm’s creditworthiness CW
8 For more information on the sample structure see Appendix C.1.
9 A more accurate measure of labour productivity is gross value added (GVA) over FTE. However,
firm specific information of GVA are not available in our dataset. Comparing aggregate data on
turnover/FTE and GVA/FTE provided by the German statistical office reveals that for the case
of SMEs both measures are fairly similar.
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approximated by the Creditreform Creditworthiness Indicator 10 as measured at the
beginning of year t. This score is an indicator for the firm’s default probability; it is
measured on a scale of 100 to 600, with lower values indicating higher creditworthiness.
We expect creditworthiness to have a positive effect on a firm’s success in applying
for loans.
Furthermore, we control for firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total
assets TA, lagged by one year to mitigate the possibility of simultaneity. We also
control for the age of the firm, AGE, defined as the natural logarithm of the number
of years the firm has been operating. We include the control variable LOAN which
captures the size of the loans applied for (in million euro). We expect larger loans to
be more difficult for SMEs to obtain. Summary statistics and variable definitions are
provided in Table C.4 and Table C.3 in Appendix C.1. Furthermore, we control for
industry-year fixed effects λj,t. The term i,t is the idiosyncratic error term, assumed
to be identically and independently distributed.
In a second step, we test whether the effect of productivity on loan application
success was different before, during and after the financial crisis. We interact LPi,t−1
with dummy variables indicating the periods of crisis (2008–2009) or post-crisis
(2010–2015):
LASi,t = α + β1LPi,t−1+β2LPi,t−1*Crisist + β3LPi,t−1*PostCrt+
γXi,t + λj,t + i,t
(4.2)
In this model the coefficient β1 captures the effect of labour productivity on loan
application success in the pre-crisis period. The coefficients β2 and β3 capture
the difference between the pre-crisis productivity-effect and the effect in the crisis
and post-crisis period, respectively. If the resource allocation process has been less
efficient since the start of the financial crisis, and more capital has been allocated
to less productive firms, β2 and β3 should be negative in the model with ALLSucc
being the dependent variable. Conversely, under the same conditions, β2 and β3
should be positive in the models, with PartSucc and NoSucc being the dependent
variables.
Although the binary nature of the dependent variables requires the use of a non-linear
model, we estimate models (4.1) and (4.2) using a fixed-effects linear probability
10 The Creditreform Creditworthiness Indicator is calculated based on information of the firm’s
liquidity, profit and asset position. It also takes into account structural risks such as firms size
and legal form as well as sectoral risks (Creditreform, 2015).
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model to avoid selection problems.11 Jime´nez et al. (2012) point out that the main
advantage of using a linear probability model is the intuitive interpretation of the
interaction terms’ coefficients – which are the main focus of our empirical analysis.
Furthermore, standard errors of interaction terms do not require correction, as is
the case for non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton et al., 2004). We
additionally estimate logit models as a robustness check (Appendix C.3).
Estimation Results
In columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 4.2 we report the estimation results of the
baseline model (4.1) for each of the three dependent variables. In all estimations the
coefficient of labour productivity has the expected sign and is statistically significant,
except for the model with PartSucc as dependent variable. The positive coefficient
in the model with AllSucc (column 1) indicates that lower labour productivity
decreases the probability of all bank loan applications being accepted. The corollary
is the negative coefficients obtained in the other models. These indicate that lower
labour productivity increases the probability of the firm having its loan applications
only partly accepted (column 3) or not accepted at all (column 5). This finding
implies – as discussed above – that a firm’s labour productivity has a credit-rationing
and hence allocative effect.12
Furthermore, the creditworthiness indicator is statistically significant in columns
(1) and (5). A higher value (i.e. lower creditworthiness) reduces the probability
of all loan applications being accepted, and increases the probability of having no
successful application. This finding is in line with our theoretical assumptions. The
results for the remaining control variables are inconclusive, with most coefficients
not being statistically significant.
In columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 4.2 we report the estimation results for model (4.2),
which includes interaction terms of labour productivity, with two dummies for the
two stages of the post-2007 period: Crisis and PostCr. In this model the coefficient
of labour productivity represents the pre-crisis relationship between productivity
11 Using a fixed-effects logit model would restrict our sample to only those firms who at least one
time completed all loan applications successfully (AllSucc =1) and one time not (analogously for
PartSucc and NoSucc).
12 Our results indicate that a 30 percent reduction in firm’s labour productivity (equivalent to the
standard deviation of labour productivity growth in our sample) is associated with a 1.3 percentage
point decline (ln(0.7)*0.0370= -0.0132) in the probability of having all loan applications accepted
and a 0.64 p.p. (0.59 p.p.) increase in the probability of having only some (no) loan applications
accepted.
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and loan application success. The interaction terms capture the change in this
relationship during the crisis and the post-crisis period. The labour productivity
coefficients are larger in value than in the baseline estimation and are statistically
significant for all three dependent variables. Hence, the isolated pre-crisis impact of
labour productivity on the loan application success is much larger than the effect
measured for the total sample.
Table 4.2: Results - Baseline Model and Crisis Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AllSucc AllSucc PartSucc PartSucc NoSucc NoSucc
LPi,t−1 0.0370∗∗∗ 0.0867∗∗∗ -0.0180 -0.0365∗ -0.0167∗ -0.0491∗∗∗
[0.0139] [0.0197] [0.0131] [0.0195] [0.0096] [0.0131]
LPi,t−1*Crisist -0.0395∗∗ 0.0099 0.0309∗∗
[0.0185] [0.0181] [0.0124]
LPi,t−1*PostCrt -0.0754∗∗∗ 0.0303∗ 0.0467∗∗∗
[0.0193] [0.0178] [0.0117]
CWi,t -0.0006
∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005∗∗ 0.0004∗∗
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
TAi,t−1 -0.0040 0.0005 -0.0069 -0.0086 0.0151 0.0122
[0.0149] [0.0149] [0.0135] [0.0136] [0.0100] [0.0100]
AGEi,t -0.0031 -0.0332 0.0164 0.0293 -0.0081 0.0097
[0.0610] [0.0612] [0.0540] [0.0549] [0.0420] [0.0421]
LOANi,t -0.0106 -0.0097 0.0239
∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗
[0.0083] [0.0084] [0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0044] [0.0044]
Constant 0.6528∗ 0.1097 0.2031 0.4042 0.0515 0.4070
[0.3577] [0.3886] [0.3311] [0.3658] [0.2288] [0.2479]
Observations 16,105 16,105 16,105 16,105 16,105 16,105
Notes: Estimated using a fixed-effects linear probability model. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors
in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Furthermore, except for the model in which PartSucc is the dependent variable, the
coefficients for the Crisis and PostCr interaction terms are statistically significant.
This finding implies that the relationship between labour productivity and loan
application success changed during the crisis and the post-crisis periods, compared
with the years before 2008. For AllSucc, the coefficients of both interaction terms
are negative; for NoSucc they are positive. This implies that the credit-rationing
effect of labour productivity has declined since 2008.
In all three estimations, the coefficients for the PostCr interaction terms are larger
in value than the Crisis interaction terms. This indicates that the allocative
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effect of labour productivity has been even lower during the post-crisis period than
during the financial crisis itself. Compared with the pre-crisis years, the effect of
labour productivity on loan application success dropped by around 82 to 95 percent
after 2009.13 This large decline has reduced the credit-rationing effect of labour
productivity almost to zero.
Table 4.3: Results - Sample Split by Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AllSucc MN CONST TRD SV OTH
Pre-Crisis 0.1250∗∗∗ 0.1185∗∗ 0.0446 0.0631 0.0194
[0.0341] [0.0487] [0.0343] [0.0387] [0.1813]
Crisis 0.04431 0.0513 0.0298 0.0282 0.0284
[0.0339] [0.0522] [0.0265] [0.0284] [0.1059]
Post-Crisis 0.0613∗∗ -0.0013 -0.0170 -0.0318 -0.0483
[0.0308] [0.0273] [0.0279] [0.0289] [0.0804]
Observations 5,194 2,615 5,364 3,937 467
Notes: AllSucc is the dependent variable. Pre-Crisis: LPi,t−1 coefficient estimated using model (4.2).
Crisis: sum of LPi,t−1 and LPi,t−1*Crisist. Post-Crisis: sum of LPi,t−1 and LPi,t−1*PostCrt.
MN-manufacturing, CONST-construction, TRD-Trade, SV-Services, OTH-other industries. All
models estimated using a fixed-effects linear probability model. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of firm-specific control variables and
industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
The results of both our baseline and extended model are robust to alternative
estimation methods. Using a fixed-effects logit model as robustness check, our
estimation results do not change in terms of coefficient sign and significance (see
Table C.8 and C.9 in Appendix C.3). To evaluate whether the results are driven by
a subgroup of firms, we split the sample and re-estimate model (4.2) for different
sectors: manufacturing, construction, trade, services and other industries. For brevity
we only discuss the results for AllSucc.14 The results are summarized in Table 4.3.
The second row shows the pre-crisis labour productivity impact, namely the LPi,t−1
coefficient from model (4.2). The third row shows the labour productivity impact
during the crisis period, calculated by adding up the LPi,t−1 and LPi,t−1*Crisist
coefficients. The fourth row shows the post-crisis impact of labour productivity.15
Our estimation results suggest that the pre- and post-crisis effect of labour productivity
on firms’ loan application success differs by sector. For the manufacturing and
construction sectors, we find a large, statistically significant credit-rationing effect
13 For the case of AllSucc: 87 percent (0.0754/0.0867=0.8697); for PartSucc: 82 percent; for
NoSucc: 95 percent.
14 Complete estimation results for all depended variables are provided in Appendix C.2.
15 Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
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of labour productivity in the years before the financial crisis. However, no similar
significant effect is found for the trade sector, the service sector and other industries.
The results also confirm that the credit-rationing effect of labour productivity has
changed since the crisis. For the manufacturing sector, the effect size has dropped
by around 50 percent. In the construction sector the difference is even stronger. For
this sector we find that since 2010, the credit-rationing effect of labour productivity
has been reduced to almost zero. The strong post-crisis change for the construction
sector might be a symptom of the German construction boom that occurred after
the crisis.16 For the remaining sectors, the effect of labour productivity on loan
application success remains statistically not significant.
To sum up, the results indicate that ceteris paribus, a firm with a constant low
productivity level has had easier access to credit during the crisis and post-crisis
periods than it did pre-crisis. This particularly applies to SMEs in the construction
sector but also in the manufacturing sector. These findings might imply that the
capital allocation process has become less efficient since 2008, as more loans are
directed to less productive firms. In addition, due to the provision of funds these firms
might have had a better chance of survival post-crisis than pre-crisis. As the share
of low-productive firms increases, the aggregate productivity declines. Hence, our
findings indicate that the post-crisis productivity slowdown in the German corporate
sector might have been caused partly by misdirection of credit to less productive
firms.
4.5 Conclusion
Productivity growth in Germany has been rather weak in the post-crisis period. We
argue that the ECB’s ultra-loose monetary policy which was adopted to curtail the
negative impacts of the financial crisis and the following sovereign debt crisis has
contributed to the productivity slowdown because it distorted the efficient allocation
of capital. Using firm-level data from German SMEs, we provide empirical evidence
that during the post-crisis period low-productive firms have had easier access to
credit. This could have increased their odds of survival and lowered the incentive for
them to increase their efficiency and productivity. The impaired reallocation and
restructuring process is likely to have contributed to the weak growth of productivity
16 This development increases the danger of misdirecting credit to the less-productive construction
and real estate sector.
104 CHAPTER 4. IMPAIRED CAPITAL REALLOCATION
in Germany.
Our findings highlight the adverse economic consequences of a prolonged period
of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy measures. As
productivity growth is suppressed, potential output is likely to remain low as well.
This causal direction – low interest rates cause low productivity growth, which in
turn cause low GDP growth – stands in contrast to the secular stagnation hypothesis
(e.g. Summers, 2013). Our findings lend support to the argument that low interest
rates cause low growth (e.g van den End and Hoeberichts, 2014; Ciz˙kowicz and
Rzon´ca, 2014; Hoffmann and Schnabl, 2016).
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Appendix C
C.1 Sample Structure and Variable Definition
Table C.1: Number of Observations by Year
Year Observations
2005 1,155
2006 1,505
2007 1,419
2008 2,188
2009 1,824
2010 1,205
2011 1,472
2012 1,508
2013 1,444
2014 1,303
2015 1,082
Total 16,105
Table C.2: Number of Firms by Sector
Sector No. of Firms
Manufacturing 2,672
Construction 1,350
Retail Trade 1,448
Wholesale Trade 793
Services 1,994
Others 244
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Table C.3: Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
AllSucc
1: All bank loan applications successful
0: Otherwise
PartSucc
1: Some (but not all) bank loan applications successful
0: Otherwise
NoSucc
1: No bank loan application successful
0: Otherwise
Independent Variables
LP Natural lof of real turnover/full time employees
CW Creditreform Creditworthiness Indicator
TA Natural log of real total assets
AGE Natural log of one plus age of firm
LOAN Amount of loans applied for (in million EUR)
Table C.4: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
AllSucc 0.72 0.45 0 1
PartSucc 0.16 0.37 0 1
NoSucc 0.11 0.31 0 1
LP 11.82 0.75 8.72 14.25
CW 232.16 46.94 100 600
TA 14.74 1.48 0.01 21.25
AGE 3.36 0.86 1.10 6.49
LOAN 0.47 0.71 0.00 4.50
Notes: LP, CW, TA and AGE in natural logs. Loan
in million EUR.
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C.2 Results by Sector
Table C.5: Results AllSucc - Sample Split by Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AllSucc MN CONST TRD SV OTH
LPi,t−1 0.1250∗∗∗ 0.1185∗∗ 0.0446 0.0631 0.0194
[0.0341] [0.0487] [0.0343] [0.0387] [0.1813]
LPi,t−1*Crisist -0.0807∗∗∗ -0.0672 -0.0148 -0.0348 0.0090
[0.0289] [0.0533] [0.0278] [0.0353] [0.1715]
LPi,t−1*PostCrt -0.0637∗∗ -0.1198∗∗ -0.0616∗∗ -0.0949∗∗ -0.0676
[0.0323] [0.0510] [0.0313] [0.0382] [0.1601]
CWi,t -0.0007
∗ -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0022
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0017]
TAi,t−1 -0.0202 -0.0011 0.0239 0.0492 0.1528∗∗
[0.0290] [0.0224] [0.0306] [0.0343] [0.0749]
AGEi,t -0.0650 0.0317 -0.0494 -0.0182 -0.3741
[0.1032] [0.1322] [0.1240] [0.1433] [0.5090]
LOANi,t 0.0077 -0.0208 -0.0394
∗∗∗ -0.0506∗∗∗ -0.0138
[0.0123] [0.0326] [0.0133] [0.0158] [0.0559]
Constant -0.1664 -0.7777 0.0701 -0.6512 -0.3431
[0.6096] [0.7272] [0.7060] [0.7861] [2.6032]
Observations 5,194 2,615 5,364 3,937 467
Notes: ALLSucc is the dependent variable. MN-manufacturing, CONST-construction, TRD-Trade,
SV-Services, OTH-other industries. All models estimated using a fixed-effects linear probability model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of firm-specific
control variables and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01.
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Table C.6: Results PartSucc - Sample Split by Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PartSucc MN CONST TRD SV OTH
LPi,t−1 -0.0323 -0.1037∗ -0.0180 -0.0098 -0.1299
[0.0337] [0.0575] [0.0310] [0.0365] [0.1742]
LPi,t−1*Crisist 0.0153 0.0813 0.0071 0.0034 0.0157
[0.0302] [0.0605] [0.0234] [0.0312] [0.1658]
LPi,t−1*PostCrt 0.0038 0.1044∗ 0.0366 0.0388 0.0740
[0.0293] [0.0538] [0.0270] [0.0343] [0.1513]
CWi,t -0.0000 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0001 0.0028
∗
[0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0016]
TAi,t−1 -0.0090 0.0069 -0.0228 -0.0448 -0.0389
[0.0266] [0.0232] [0.0275] [0.0309] [0.0647]
AGEi,t 0.0431 0.0172 0.0279 0.0214 0.1556
[0.0946] [0.1367] [0.0991] [0.1123] [0.4637]
LOANi,t 0.0116 0.0454 0.0444
∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0373
[0.0113] [0.0340] [0.0125] [0.0153] [0.0451]
Constant 0.5911 1.3527∗ 0.5513 0.8772 1.4350
[0.5661] [0.8144] [0.5772] [0.6466] [2.4517]
Observations 5,194 2,615 5,364 3,937 467
Notes: PartsSucc is the dependent variable. MN-manufacturing, CONST-construction, TRD-Trade,
SV-Services, OTH-other industries. All models estimated using a fixed-effects linear probability model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of firm-specific
control variables and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01.
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Table C.7: Results NoSucc - Sample Split by Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NoSucc MN CONST TRD SV OTH
LPi,t−1 -0.0827∗∗∗ -0.0336 -0.0244 -0.0520∗∗ 0.0805
[0.0222] [0.0373] [0.0220] [0.0247] [0.0645]
LPi,t−1*Crisist 0.0580∗∗∗ 0.0070 0.0095 0.0269 -0.0276
[0.0210] [0.0405] [0.0161] [0.0219] [0.0468]
LPi,t−1*PostCrt 0.0566∗∗∗ 0.0285 0.0256 0.0587∗∗∗ -0.0145
[0.0191] [0.0382] [0.0177] [0.0216] [0.0471]
CWi,t 0.0005
∗ 0.0007∗ -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0009
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0006]
TAi,t−1 0.0234 0.0070 0.0046 0.0022 -0.1092∗∗
[0.0164] [0.0154] [0.0207] [0.0238] [0.0477]
AGEi,t 0.0434 -0.0538 0.0132 -0.0223 0.2037
[0.0611] [0.1002] [0.0892] [0.1063] [0.1729]
LOANi,t -0.0191
∗∗∗ -0.0177 -0.0036 0.0016 -0.0170
[0.0070] [0.0225] [0.0059] [0.0075] [0.0239]
Constant 0.5025 0.4313 0.3129 0.7136 0.3003
[0.3334] [0.5300] [0.5065] [0.5723] [0.7797]
Observations 5,194 2,615 5,364 3,937 467
Notes: NoSucc is the dependent variable. MN-manufacturing, CONST-construction, TRD-Trade,
SV-Services, OTH-other industries. All models estimated using a fixed-effects linear probability model.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Inclusion of firm-specific
control variables and industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p <
0.01.
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C.3 Robustness Checks
Table C.8: Robustness Check - Logit Model (1)
(1) (2) (3)
AllSucc PartSucc NoSucc
LPi,t−1 0.3624∗∗∗ -0.1475 -0.3368∗
[0.1364] [0.1380] [0.1876]
CWi,t -0.0046
∗∗ 0.0008 0.0061∗∗∗
[0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0023]
TAi,t−1 -0.0709 -0.0571 0.1972
[0.1025] [0.1131] [0.1555]
AGEi,t -0.0884 0.3218 0.2962
[0.4751] [0.5202] [0.6863]
LOANi,t -0.0624 0.2110
∗∗∗ -0.3306∗∗∗
[0.0670] [0.0734] [0.1271]
Observations 4,439 3,885 1,858
Notes: Estimated using a fixed-effects logit model. Inclusion
of industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses,
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table C.9: Robustness Check - Logit Model (2)
(1) (2) (3)
AllSucc PartSucc NoSucc
LPi,t−1 0.6789∗∗∗ -0.2690 -0.8882∗∗∗
[0.1734] [0.1684] [0.2626]
LPi,t−1*Crisist -0.2798∗∗ 0.0754 0.7288∗∗∗
[0.1402] [0.1454] [0.2339]
LPi,t−1*PostCr -0.4971∗∗∗ 0.2272 0.6528∗∗∗
[0.1431] [0.1489] [0.2343]
CWi,t -0.0044
∗∗ 0.0006 0.0060∗∗∗
[0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0023]
TAi,t−1 -0.0338 -0.0749 0.1541
[0.1029] [0.1137] [0.1560]
AGEi,t -0.3517 0.4344 0.5857
[0.4840] [0.5254] [0.7090]
LOANi,t -0.0476 0.2049
∗∗∗ -0.3770∗∗∗
[0.0672] [0.0735] [0.1308]
Observations 4,439 3,885 1,858
Notes: Estimated using a fixed-effects logit model. Inclusion of
industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses, *p <
0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Chapter 5
The Impact of the Bank of Japan’s
Crisis Management on the
Japanese Banking Sector
Together with Gunther Schnabl
Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the impact of the Bank of Japan’s
crisis management on the banking sector in the wake of the 1998 Japanese
financial crisis. We describe how the low-cost liquidity provision as a
means to stabilize banks has created a growing gap between deposits and
loans in the financial system. Furthermore, we show that the low-interest
rate policy has compressed interest margins as the traditional source of
banks’ income. Efficiency scores are compiled to estimate the effect of the
Bank of Japan’s crisis management on banks’ technical efficiency. The
estimation results provide evidence that the Japanese monetary policy
has contributed to declining efficiency in the banking sector, despite – or
perhaps because of – the increasing concentration within this sector.
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5.1 Introduction
During the second half of the 1980s, the Bank of Japan introduced a low-interest
rate policy to mitigate the appreciation pressure on the Japanese yen.1 This policy
contributed to the emergence of a ’bubble’ in the Japanese stock and real estate
markets, which ended in the early 1990s (Bayoumi and Collyns, 2000). During
most of the 1990s, the destabilizing effect of the resulting balance-sheet recession
(Koo, 2003) was contained by the Bank of Japan gradually cutting the interest
rate to almost zero. This enabled Japanese banks to cover their losses, incurred
from declining asset prices, by providing credit to Japanese enterprises operating in
Southeast Asia (Hoffmann and Schnabl, 2008). The 1997/98 Asian crisis, however,
finally triggered strong adjustment pressure on the Japanese banking sector (Schnabl,
2015). This development accompanied a consolidation process among Japanese banks
and financial institutions (Hosono et al., 2009).
The continuation of the zero-interest rate policy after 1999, and the advent of
unconventional monetary policy measures, have been widely understood as stabilizing
measures for the Japanese banking sector (Posen, 2000; Koo, 2003). The ample
low-cost liquidity provision of the Bank of Japan stabilized asset prices while also
stabilizing the banks’ balance sheets by reducing the number of potential bad
loans. However, the liquidity provisions of the Bank of Japan arguably prevented
Schumpeter’s (1942) process of ’creative destruction’ and thereby thwarted sustained
recovery among Japanese banks (Sekine et al., 2003; Peek and Rosengren, 2005;
Caballero et al., 2008). In this regard, the effect of the Bank of Japan’s’ crisis
management – in the form of a zero interest rate policy and monetary expansion –
on the Japanese banking sector is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view.
Previous empirical studies have shown that the Japanese banking sector exhibits
major technical and scale inefficiencies, with considerable differences among the
various bank types (Fukuyama, 1993; McKillop et al., 1996; Altunbas et al., 2000;
Drake and Hall, 2003; Drake et al., 2009; Assaf et al., 2011). However, few studies
have attempted to understand the impact of the Bank of Japan’s crisis management
on the efficiency of the banking sector. Therefore, we add to the existing literature
by analysing the adjustment of Japanese banks to the low-interest rate policy and
the unconventional monetary policy measures. Based on micro-data, we empirically
1 The Bank of Japan cut short-term interest rates from roughly 8 percent in 1985 to 3.5 percent in
1987.
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test the determinants of Japanese banks’ technical efficiency while controlling for
their adjustment to the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy.
5.2 Japan’s Low-Interest Rate Policy and the Banking Sector
The development of the Japanese banking sector since the 1998–99 Japanese financial
crisis must be seen in the context of protracted stagnation in the domestic economy
(Schnabl, 2015). During the Japanese bubble economy (1985–1990), domestic banks’
credit to the private sector grew markedly, with credit slowly continuing to expand
until 1998. With the Asian and Japanese financial crises, a credit crunch set in
(Ishikawa and Tsutsui, 2005), which can be seen as driven by either supply or demand.
The gradual erosion of the banks’ traditional sources of income triggered a search for
alternative revenues and a struggle to increase their efficiency through mergers and
acquisitions (M&A).
5.2.1 Declining Income
The credit crunch, which lasted from 1998 until the advent of Abenomics2 in January
2013, had two origins. On the one hand, declining asset prices forced Japanese banks
to reduce their risk exposure by curtailing outstanding credit to risky enterprises (Koo,
2003). On the other hand, sluggish investment by the corporate sector and the need
to deleverage lowered the demand by Japanese firms for loans, while simultaneously
increasing their deposits at banks. In this context, the zero-interest rate policy and
unconventional monetary policy measures can be understood as a form of subsidy for
enterprises – in particular, large enterprises.3 The resulting growth in cash reserves
further reduced their demand for credit (Gerstenberger, 2017).
As a result, the total amount of loans reflected on the balance sheets of banks fell
substantially. The increasing inflow of personal and corporate deposits, combined
with declining volumes of credit, led to a widening gap between loans and deposits
(Figure 5.1). The credit business started to recover only from 2012 but without
2 Abenomics refers to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s three-pillared policy package to revive
the Japanese economy, comprising monetary easing, fiscal expansion and structural reforms.
3 The low-interest rate policy reduced the financing costs of enterprises by continuously depressing
interest rates. In addition, the resulting depreciation of the yen subsidized large export-oriented
enterprises.
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helping to reduce the gap. The loan–deposit ratio fell from almost 1 at the beginning
of the 1990s to less than 0.7 in 2015.
Figure 5.1: Deposits and Loans at Japanese Banks
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Source: Bank of Japan. Data for shinkin banks (SB) were not available for
the period before 1999.
Figure 5.2: Interest Rate Spreads in the Japanese Banking Sector
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The stagnation in the traditional credit business became paired with declining margins
in the loans and investment business. The Bank of Japan’s monetary policy gradually
depressed the short-term money market rates, which finally dropped to zero in March
1999. The Bank of Japan continued to reduce interest rates at the long end of the
yield curve through fast-growing bond purchases (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary,
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2016).4 As a result, the spread between average lending and deposit rates (on new
contracts) declined from an average of 3.5 percentage points during the 1980s to
currently less than 1 percentage point, as shown in Figure 5.2a.
Japanese banks partially substituted the decline in lending to the private sector by
the purchase of government bonds (see Section 5.2.2). However, the margin between
the government bond yield and the deposit rate also declined from 3.5 percentage
points in the 1980s to close to (or below) zero during the Abenomics period (Figure
5.2a). The scope for generating profits by transforming short-term borrowing in
the money market into long-term lending also shrank. The transformation margin
can be defined as the spread between the government bond yield and the money
market rate. This margin declined from a peak of close to 2 percentage points in
1996 to zero at present (Figure 5.2b). Moreover, the passive margin – the difference
between the money market rate and the average deposit rate – dropped from around
3 percentage points in the 1980s to zero by 2005. It has been negative since then
(Figure 5.2b).
Japanese banks were not able to compensate for the decrease in interest margins by
boosting the lending volumes. Therefore, the banks’ net interest income substantially
declined, which in turn depressed profits. Between 1999 and 2015, revenue from
the traditional credit business decreased by 22 percent for large city banks, by 13
percent for tier-one regional banks, by 28 percent for tier-two regional banks, and by
25 percent for the shinkin banks (Figure 5.3).5
In addition to declining interest margins, Japanese banks incurred high losses through
writing off non-performing loans. During the 1990s Japanese banks had been advised
to keep bad loans in their balance sheets and to build respective provisions. However,
4 The Bank of Japan cut the short-term interest rate from 6 percent in 1991 to 0 by March 1999.
The size of the balance sheet of the Bank of Japan increased from 18 percent of GDP in January
1999 to 95 percent by the end of 2016, due to extensive bond purchases, particularly government
bonds.
5 City banks are large commercial banks that operate at a national and international level and
have branches in all major cities of Japan. Tier-one regional banks and tier-two regional banks
are mainly active in retail banking and focus on specific regions (e.g. one prefecture). They
mainly engage in lending to the corporate sector, specifically small and medium enterprises
(approximately 70 percent of all loans are granted to SMEs). Tier-one and tier-two regional banks
have different histories. Therefore, statistics of the Japanese Bankers Association are aggregated
in two different categories. Since the financial market liberalizations in the 1990s the business
model of both groups is mainly the same. Today, the main difference between the two groups
is that tier-two regional banks are significantly smaller. Shinkin banks are credit associations
operating within a prefecture, managing deposits and providing loans to and from their owners
(mainly SMEs).
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with the outbreak of the Japanese financial crisis, the strategy towards the problem
of bad loans changed. From 2002 onwards the Financial Revitalization Program
urged banks to resolve the provisions and to write off the bad loans.6 The realized
losses constituted an additional burden for Japanese banks until the start of the
Abenomics. These losses had to be compensated by additional revenues.
Figure 5.3: Net Interest Income by Bank Type
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Source: Japanese Bankers Association, Shinkin Central Bank. Net interest
income defined as interest income minus interest expenses.
5.2.2 Alternative Sources of Income
Additional revenue was initially generated by the substitution of credit to the private
sector by the purchase of central and local government bonds. This became possible
because general government debt, as a share of gross domestic product (GDP),
increased from 70 percent in 1990 to 250 percent in 2016. From 1999 to 2012, the
share of government bonds in total assets increased from 5 percent to 27 percent for
city banks, from 8 percent to 17 percent for tier-one regional banks, from 5 percent to
15 percent for tier-two regional banks and from 12 percent to 25 percent for shinkin
banks. Figure 5.4 shows the composition of investment securities.
6 Between 1999 and 2014, the overall volume of write-offs of bad loans by Japanese banks was
equivalent to 18 trillion yen. Of this, city banks wrote off 12.5 trillion yen, tier-one regional banks
5.6 trillion yen, and tier-two regional banks 0.6 trillion yen (Source: Japan Deposit Insurance
Corporation). This process was supported by recapitalizations equivalent to 13 trillion yen (111
billion USD).
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Figure 5.4: Composition of Investment Securities - all Banks (1993-2015)
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Source: Bank of Japan.
The purchases of government bonds were lucrative until the start of the Abenomics.
The shift in the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy towards aggressive quantitative
easing in 2013, however, made government bond yields more volatile and pushed
them into negative territory. As a result, banks strongly reduced their holdings of
government bonds. By the end of 2015, the share of government bonds in total assets
had declined to 9 percent for city banks, 13 percent for tier-one regional banks and 10
percent for tier-two regional banks. The decline in government bonds on the balance
sheets was less pronounced for regional banks compared with city banks, because
regional banks have (to date) held relatively large amounts in local government
bonds that are less purchased by the Bank of Japan. For shinkin banks, the decline
in central government bond holdings has been widely compensated for by purchases
of local government bonds (Bank of Japan, 2016).
Given their declining income from traditional banking business, Japanese banks had
little choice but to generate higher revenues through fees and commissions. The
financial deregulation in the late 1990s (‘Big Bang’) paved the way for diversifying
into new business areas.7 Japanese banks developed new financial services and
7 The Financial Services Agency’s guidelines state that this includes consultations and support in
connection with business matching and mergers and acquisitions (Ishikawa et al., 2013).
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formed business alliances with non-bank companies.8 Banks expanded their sales
of investment trusts and private pension policies to households, and increased their
corporate customer fees – for example, fees for arranging syndicated loans and sales
of derivatives to firms (Bank of Japan, 2005).
Figure 5.5: Fees and Commissions as Share of Ordinary Income by Bank Type
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Source: Japanese Bankers Association, Shinkin Central Bank.
Regional banks and shinkin banks ceased to follow a purely lending-based business
model to embrace a more service-oriented business model. These banks started to
provide services to corporate customers, to resolve challenges such as establishing
new business relationships, exploring new markets or finding business successors
(Ishikawa et al., 2013). As a result, revenues from fees and commissions, as a share of
total ordinary income, significantly increased across all types of banks (Figure 5.5).
The highest increase has been realized by the large city banks, which became strongly
involved in the investment business and profited from having large, export-oriented
enterprises as customers.
8 In the early 2000s, Japanese banks increased their business alliances with securities and insurance
companies, and entered into consumer finance through joint ventures or partnerships with
consumer finance companies. Cooperating with firms that have physical or electronic networks
(e.g. railway and mobile phone companies), banks started to offer new financial services – such
as small-value payments (Bank of Japan, 2006).
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5.2.3 Adjustment of Costs
Depending on their ability to compensate for declining revenues from traditional
banking business by instituting new sources of income, Japanese banks had to cut
their general and administrative expenses. The pressure to cut costs was stronger for
the small shinkin banks and tier-two regional banks than it was for the larger tier-one
regional banks and city banks. Between 1999 and 2015, personnel expenses declined
by 6 percent for city banks and by 12 percent for tier-one regional banks. In contrast,
the tier-two regional banks reduced their personnel expenses by 25 percent and the
shinkin banks by as much as 35 percent. A similar pattern evolved with respect to
non-personnel expenses, which even increased by 8 percent for city banks and fell
only by 3 percent for tier-one regional banks. Non-personnel expenses dropped by
16 percent for tier-two regional banks and by 19 percent for shinkin banks.9
The pressure to reduce costs has accompanied a process of concentration in the
Japanese banking sector through mergers and acquisitions. Hosono et al. (2009) argue
that one motive for Japanese banks to engage in M&As was to increase efficiency. As
a result, the number of Japanese financial institutions – including city banks, trust
banks, tier-one regional banks, tier-two regional banks and shinkin banks – declined
from 606 in 1990 to 379 in 2016 (JBA, 2017). As shown in Figure 5.6, the number of
city banks has declined from 13 in 1990 to just five at present. While all tier-one
regional banks have survived so far, the number of smaller tier-two regional banks
has dropped from 68 in 1990 to 41 at present. The number of shinkin banks has also
dropped, from 451 in 1990 to 265 in 2016.
Moreover, for all four bank types the number of branches has declined steadily since
the mid-1990s (Figure 5.7a).10 The reduction in the number of branches has been
more severe for smaller banks (tier-two regional banks and shinkin banks) than for
larger banks. A similar pattern has occurred with regard to the numbers of regular
employees, which have been more drastically reduced in tier-two regional and shinkin
banks than among other types of banks (Figure 5.7b). The substitution of regular
employees by part-time employees allowed banks to adjust more easily to volatile
business conditions.
9 All data were provided by the Japanese Bankers Association and the Shinkin Central Bank.
10 There is no distinction between branches with employees that provide all services – called
‘branches’ (shiten: 支店) or ‘main branches’ (honshiten: 本支店) – versus branches with limited
services, in particular ATM machines (shu chou jo: 出張所). The sharp increase in the number
of branches of city banks between 2015 and 2016 was the result of the extension of ATM corners
by Mitsui-Sumitomo Bank, in areas where the Tokyo Olympics will take place.
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Figure 5.6: Number of Banks (1980-2015)
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Source: Japan Financial Directory.
The continuing pressure on profits as a result of the Bank of Japan’s low-interest
rate policy suggests that Japanese banks’ efficiency should have increased because of
the concentration process in the banking sector and other adjustment measures of
the banks. However, the simultaneous decline in competition as a result of increased
concentration, combined with the persistent low-cost liquidity provision by the Bank
of Japan, might have reduced the pressure on Japanese banks to increase their
efficiency (Schnabl, 2015).11 In addition, the squeezing of profits may have reduced
the banks’ resources for implementing measures to enhance their efficiency. Hence,
the impact of Japanese monetary policy crisis management on banks’ efficiency is
ambiguous from a theoretical point of view.
11 For instance, Hosono et al. (2009) provide evidence that M&As in the Japanese banking sector
have not necessarily improved efficiency.
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Figure 5.7: Consolidation Process in the Japanese Banking Sector
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5.3 Development of Bank Efficiency in Japan
As shown above, during the post-bubble period, the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy
has substantially changed the operating environment of Japanese banks. The gradual
reduction in interest rates and the introduction of unconventional policy measures
has eroded the banks’ traditional sources of income. For banks to remain profitable
in a low-interest rate environment, a more efficient utilization of resources is crucial.
5.3.1 Concept of Efficiency Measures
To evaluate the development of Japanese bank efficiency, we estimate for each bank
i and each year t an output-oriented technical efficiency score, TEi,t. This score
reflects the bank’s distance from a pre-specified benchmark, known as the efficiency
frontier (Farrell, 1957).12 Technical efficiency can be defined as a bank’s ability to
produce a maximum set of outputs (such as loans, securities and operating income)
given a set of inputs (such as deposits, employees and branches). Farrell’s (1957)
output-oriented technical efficiency score equals 1 when the bank operates at the
’best practice’ frontier. Higher values than unity indicate inefficiency.13 Following
Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker et al. (1984), we further decompose a bank’s overall
12 Farrell (1957) decomposes a firm’s overall efficiency (or economic efficiency) in technical efficiency,
reflecting a firm’s ability to produce a maximum set of outputs from a given set of inputs, and
price efficiency (or allocative efficiency), reflecting a firm’s ability to choose an optimal set of
inputs given respective prices. We focus on technical efficiency of Japanese banks as input prices
were not available.
13 For details see Appendix D.1.
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technical efficiency score into pure technical efficiency (PTEi,t) and scale efficiency
(SEi,t), with:
TEi,t = PTEi,t × SEi,t (5.1)
The decomposition helps to identify whether Japanese banks’ technical inefficiencies
are the result of inefficient operations (measured by PTEi,t) or alternatively from
not operating at an optimal scale (measured by SEi,t), or both. We are furthermore
able to determine if Japanese banks are operating under increasing, decreasing or
constant returns to scale – hence whether banks are operating below, above or at their
technically optimal scale.14 Prior studies on the Japanese banking sector indicate
that pure technical inefficiencies are more severe than scale inefficiencies, as Japanese
banks have been following a gradual consolidation process ever since the bubble
economy burst (Fukuyama, 1993; McKillop et al., 1996; Drake and Hall, 2003; Azad
et al., 2014).
A common method employed to compute efficiency scores is the Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA). This method measures efficiency as ’relative to a non-parametric,
maximum likelihood estimate of an unobserved true frontier, conditional on observed
data [. . . ]’ (Simar and Wilson, 2007, p.32). The DEA method is a flexible
non-parametric approach that does not require a specific functional form of a
bank’s production function. However, the downside is that DEA does not allow for
random errors and is therefore sensitive to random variations in the data. As the
method has no statistical foundation, the estimates cannot be assessed for statistical
significance (Coelli et al., 2005). We work around this problem by using the bootstrap
approach of Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999), which enables the statistical properties
of non-parametric estimators of banks’ efficiency to be estimated. This allows us to
obtain bias-corrected efficiency scores.15
5.3.2 Input and Output Data
In modelling banks’ production function, we follow the intermediation approach
of Sealey and Lindley (1977) which considers banks as institutions that transform
deposits into loans and other earning assets, using labour and physical capital as
14 Increasing (decreasing) returns to scale indicate that the bank is too small (large).
15 For more information on DEA, see Appendix D.2. For more information on the bootstrap
approach of Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999), see Appendix D.3.
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inputs.16 This is in line with previous studies of the Japanese banking sector (e.g.
Fukuyama, 1993; Drake and Hall, 2003). The banks’ activities are modelled in a
three-input and two-output framework.
Following Assaf et al. (2011) and Fukuyama and Weber (2009), the inputs are total
deposits and short-term borrowed funds (X1), physical capital (land, premises and
fixed assets) (X2), and labour (number of employees) (X3). The outputs are total
loans and bills discounted (Y1), and securities issued (Y2). The inputs and outputs
(excluding employees) are measured in yen and deflated using the GDP deflator
provided by the World Bank. Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for inputs
and outputs according to bank type.
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Inputs and Outputs
CB RB I RB II SB Total
(X1) Deposits (billion yen) 57,479 3,212 1,305 377 1,929
(X2) Physical Capital (billion yen) 568 45 21 6 24
(X3) Employees (number of) 15,067 2,028 1,091 399 988
(Y1) Loans (billion yen) 3,5710 2,261 977 205 1,237
(Y2) Securities (billion yen) 17,130 976 313 110 569
Source: Bankscope, annual reports of individual banks, Nikkei NEEDS database, Japanese
Bankers Association. Values indicate sample mean per bank type. CB: city banks, RB I:
tier-one regional banks, RB II: tier-two regional banks, SB: shinkin banks.
To construct our dataset on Japanese banks, we use information drawn from financial
statements of individual banks provided by the BankScope database. Our dataset is
completed using data from the annual reports of individual banks, the Nikkei NEEDS
database and information from the Japanese Bankers Association. Our final dataset
for the efficiency analysis comprises 6,183 observations from 401 Japanese banks for
the financial years 1999 to 2015. Our sample covers almost the full spectrum of bank
types operating in Japan: it includes 16 city banks, 64 tier-one regional banks, 41
16 In contrast, the production approach assumes that banks primarily produce services for their
account holders (Benston and Smith, 1976).
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tier-two regional banks and 280 shinkin banks.17 The breakdown of the sample is
shown in Table 5.2.18
Table 5.2: Sample Structure of Efficiency Analysis
CB RB I RB II SB Total
1999 9 48 26 254 337
2000 9 48 28 255 340
2001 7 48 32 266 353
2002 7 56 36 269 368
2003 7 58 38 271 374
2004 7 62 40 272 381
2005 6 62 40 272 380
2006 6 62 40 271 379
2007 6 61 39 271 377
2008 6 59 37 269 371
2009 6 61 37 269 373
2010 6 61 37 268 372
2011 6 61 40 267 374
2012 6 62 41 269 378
2013 5 61 39 267 372
2014 5 59 38 263 365
2015 5 57 37 190 289
Notes: CB: city banks, RB I: tier-one regional banks,
RB II: tier-two regional banks, SB: shinkin banks.
5.3.3 Efficiency Scores Results
Table 5.3 summarizes the annual mean efficiency scores for the Japanese banking
sector over the period 1999–2015 as compiled by DEA.19 Columns (1) to (3) list
the average bias-corrected technical efficiency (TE), pure technical efficiency (PTE)
and scale efficiency (SE) estimates. Columns (4) to (6) summarize the share of
banks operating under increasing (IRS), constant (CRS) or decreasing returns to
scale (DRS).
17 Our analysis differs from other studies on Japanese bank efficiency to the extend that our sample
contains both commercial banks (city banks and regional banks) and cooperative banks (shinkin
banks). Fukuyama and Weber (2009) and Assaf et al. (2011) estimate efficiency scores only
for shinkin banks. Altunbas et al. (2000) and Drake and Hall (2003) focus only on commercial
banks. Separate estimations for commercial banks and cooperative banks, however, only allow
a comparison between banks of the same ownership type. Altunbas et al. (2001) argue that
a combined estimation permits a comparison between the different types of banks relative to
the industry ’best practice’ frontier. Other efficiency studies analysing both commercial and
cooperative banks include for instance Altunbas et al. (2001) and Weil (2004). Fukuyama and
Weber (2008) combine both regional and shinkin banks in their efficiency analysis on Japanese
banks.
18 Total numbers differ from the annual numbers in Table 5.2 due to the different participation
behaviour of banks in our sample. Banks which were involved in M&As are pre-merger treated
as separate entities.
19 We used the FEAR software by Wilson (2008) to obtain the bias-corrected efficiency scores.
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Table 5.3: Annual Mean Efficiency Scores of All Banks (1999-2015)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TE PTE SE IRS CRS DRS
1999 1.255 1.219 1.030 0.91 0.04 0.05
2000 1.279 1.247 1.026 0.86 0.04 0.10
2001 1.268 1.240 1.023 0.89 0.06 0.05
2002 1.212 1.196 1.013 0.88 0.05 0.07
2003 1.212 1.195 1.014 0.87 0.04 0.09
2004 1.221 1.198 1.019 0.90 0.04 0.06
2005 1.229 1.203 1.021 0.91 0.04 0.06
2006 1.256 1.229 1.022 0.92 0.03 0.04
2007 1.249 1.213 1.029 0.92 0.05 0.03
2008 1.292 1.249 1.034 0.91 0.04 0.06
2009 1.265 1.226 1.031 0.89 0.03 0.08
2010 1.319 1.261 1.046 0.91 0.03 0.06
2011 1.295 1.247 1.037 0.95 0.03 0.02
2012 1.293 1.256 1.028 0.88 0.05 0.07
2013 1.316 1.276 1.030 0.92 0.03 0.04
2014 1.326 1.292 1.026 0.86 0.05 0.08
2015 1.297 1.258 1.031 0.81 0.06 0.13
Mean 1.269 1.235 1.027 0.89 0.04 0.06
Notes: Bias-corrected values based on the bootstrap procedure. TE is the technical
efficiency score. PTE is the pure technical efficiency score. SE is the scale efficiency
score. Values above unity indicate inefficiencies. IRS/CRS/DRS are the shares of banks
operating under increasing/ constant/ decreasing returns to scale, respectively.
Table 5.3 provides evidence that the Japanese banking sector experienced large
inefficiencies across all sampled years. Relative to the constructed frontier, the
average technical efficiency for all banks in our sample was around 1.27. Hence,
Japanese banks could have increased their output by around 27 percent had the
inputs been used the most efficient way. Over time the average technical efficiency
of the Japanese banking sector increased considerably between 2000 and 2004, but
deteriorated thereafter. Technical efficiency in particular has declined since 2010,
especially after the introduction of Abenomics in 2013.
The mean pure technical efficiency score was 1.24, explaining the largest share of
Japanese banks’ technical inefficiencies. This score implies that the output of the
Japanese banking sector could have been 24 percent higher if banks had operated at
the PTE frontier. Scale inefficiencies have been rather small, at an average of only
1.027. Thus, banks could have increased their output by only 2.7 percent if they
had operated at an optimal scale. However, scale inefficiencies have been increasing
since around 2007 despite an acceleration of the concentration process. According
to the efficiency measure we used, 90 percent of the banks have operated under
increasing returns to scale (i.e. below their optimal scale). This finding implies a
126 CHAPTER 5. JAPANESE BANKING SECTOR
further concentration potential. Only 6 percent or so have operated under decreasing
returns to scale. These findings suggest that although the consolidation process in
the Japanese banking sector has advanced since the 1990s, scale inefficiencies have
not been resolved.
Figure 5.8: Annual Efficiency Scores by Bank Type (1999-2015)
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Notes: Bias-corrected values based on the bootstrap procedure. TE is the technical efficiency score.
PTE is the pure technical efficiency score. SE is the scale efficiency score. Values above unity indicate
inefficiencies.
Figure 5.8 shows the efficiency score estimates between 1999 and 2015 by bank type.20
City banks exhibited rather large technical inefficiencies compared with both types
of regional banks. With an average technical efficiency score of 1.172 during the
sample period, city banks could have increased their output by around 17.2 percent.
Over time the efficiency development of city banks has been rather unsteady, with
periods of significantly declining overall technical efficiency (e.g. 1999-2002, 2006,
2010) followed by periods of improvement (e.g. 2003-2005, 2006-2009, 2012-2015).
Overall, technical efficiency and both components decreased between 1999 and 2015.
The mean scale efficiency score was 1.024, with an average 40 percent of city banks
20 For a more detailed overview of the results, see Table D.1 to Table D.4 in Appendix D.5.
127 CHAPTER 5. JAPANESE BANKING SECTOR
operating under decreasing returns to scale – thus above their optimal scale. Our
findings hence imply that the consolidation of city banks into so-called ’mega banks’
has not necessarily increased their pure technical and scale efficiency.
Tier-one and tier-two regional banks have been – on average – the most efficient
banks according to our measures. Both of these bank types attained a mean technical
efficiency score of 1.10 for our observation period. For both types, scale inefficiencies
have been rather small, such that any further consolidation among regional banks
cannot be expected to considerably improve their efficiency through scale effects.
Furthermore, we find for both types of regional banks that pure technical efficiency
increased considerably between 1999 and 2003 and has slightly decreased since 2003.
Shinkin banks exhibited by far the largest inefficiencies relative to the industry’s
’best practice’ frontier, with an average technical efficiency score of 1.33. Technical
inefficiencies increased from 1.29 in 1999 to 1.39 in 2015, despite a substantial
consolidation process. Shinkin banks’ inefficiencies are mainly driven by pure technical
inefficiencies; however, scale inefficiencies are also larger than that of other bank
types. The average scale efficiency score for shinkin banks is 1.035. According to
the efficiency measure, roughly 96 percent of shinkin banks have operated below
their optimal scale, meaning they are too small. Our findings of relatively large
technical inefficiencies among shinkin banks is in line with previous efficiency studies
and can be attributed to factors such as high amounts of non-performing loans, poor
restructuring, the lack of market power and management failings (Assaf et al., 2011).
Summing up the results of our efficiency analysis, we find that despite their efforts
to cut costs and improve efficiency through gaining economies of scale or scope,
Japanese Banks’ technical inefficiencies could not be resolved in our observation
period. Pure technical efficiencies and scale inefficiencies persist in the Japanese
banking sector.
5.4 Adjustment Measures as Drivers of Japanese Bank Efficiency
Based on the efficiency measures compiled above, we trace the determinants of
the banks’ inefficiencies since the 1998–99 Japanese financial crisis. In particular,
we control for the impact of the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy and the banks’
strategies to cope with the low-interest rate environment.
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5.4.1 Estimation Framework and Methodology
To identify the sources of Japanese banks’ inefficiencies, we regress the efficiency
estimates (described in Section 5.3) on a set of explanatory variables.21 We estimate
the following model:
θˆi,t = β0 + β1zi,t + δt + i,t (5.2)
where the dependent variable θˆi,t is the estimated efficiency score of bank i at time
t. In our analysis we run equation (5.2) for both the estimated technical efficiency
(T̂Ei,t), as well as pure technical efficiency scores (P̂ TEi,t) as dependent variables.
22
The vector zi,t represents a matrix of explanatory variables, including those commonly
mentioned in the literature as having a significant impact on bank efficiency, as well
as variables reflecting Japanese banks’ adjustment strategies to the Bank of Japan’s
monetary policy as described in Section 5.2. Furthermore, we control for year fixed
effects δt. The term i,t is the idiosyncratic error term, assumed to be identically and
independently distributed.
To estimate equation (5.2) we use the bootstrapped truncated regression model
proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).23 Given the bounded nature of the estimated
efficiency scores from T̂Ei,t ≥ 1 and P̂ TEi,t ≥ 1, a truncated regression model leads
to more consistent and accurate estimates than Tobit or OLS models, which have
traditionally been used in two-stage efficiency studies of the banking sector (e.g.
McKillop et al., 2002; Fukuyama and Weber, 2009).
5.4.2 Variable Definition
The data basis for our regression analysis is the dataset presented in Section 5.3.2.
Owing to missing data, the sample for our regression analysis is slightly smaller than
the original sample, and comprises 5,823 observations from 389 banks. Descriptive
statistics of all explanatory variables are shown in Table 5.4.
Control variables that were found to have a significant impact on Japanese bank
efficiency are market share (MS), non-performing loans (NPL), return on average
21 For more information and an overview of efficiency studies using a two-stage approach, see Simar
and Wilson (2007). Studies on the Japanese banking sector using a two-stage approach include
Altunbas et al. (2000), Fukuyama and Weber (2009) and Assaf et al. (2011).
22 We omit ŜEi,t from our regression analysis as a bank’s scale efficiency is the quotient of T̂Ei,t
and P̂ TEi,t and is determined by the bank’s size. This is in line with previous studies.
23 For more information see Appendix D.4.
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assets (ROAA) and bank size (Fukuyama and Weber, 2009; Assaf et al., 2011).
Market share is proxied by the ratio of deposits of bank i to total banking sector
deposits; previous studies showed that the market share has a positive impact on
efficiency (Fukuyama and Weber, 2009). Non-performing loans are measured by
risk-monitored loans divided by total loans. Non-performing loans are expected to
have a negative impact on Japanese bank efficiency, as evidenced by previous studies
(Altunbas et al., 2000). Furthermore, we expect the return on average assets to be
positively correlated with bank efficiency (Assaf et al., 2011).
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Regression Analysis
Mean SD Min Max
T̂E 1.25 0.16 1.00 2.22
P̂TE 1.21 0.14 1.00 2.16
MS 0.17 0.66 0.01 17.22
NPL 7.45 4.10 0.00 37.35
ROAA 0.09 0.45 -7.24 2.07
NIM 1.71 0.38 0.10 3.51
SECLOAN 0.51 0.28 -0.01 2.95
GOVSEC 0.38 0.21 -0.07 8.28
NIOI 0.07 0.47 -12.37 28.66
To control for the impact of the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy, we include the
net interest margin (NIM), defined as a bank’s net interest revenue as share of
its average total earning assets (in percent). Whereas the net interest margin is
traditionally regarded as reflecting asset productivity (e.g. Assaf et al., 2011), we
use it as an indicator of a bank’s exposure to the low-interest rate environment and
unconventional monetary policy.24 A positive coefficient of NIM in our estimation
model would imply that an increase in the net interest margin would lower efficiency
(i.e. increase inefficiency).25 A decline in net interest margins – as it occurred
in our observation period – would thus have had a positive impact on Japanese
banks’ efficiency.26 In contrast, a negative coefficient implies that an increase in
the net interest margin would increases technical efficiency (i.e. reduce inefficiency).
24 Busch and Memmel (2015) and Claessens et al. (2017) show empirically that banks’ net interest
margins significantly react to changes in interest rates triggered by central banks.
25 Higher values of T̂Ei,t and P̂ TEi,t indicate lower efficiency and higher inefficiency.
26 Analysing the efficiency of shinkin banks, Fukuyama and Weber (2009) find that technical
efficiency decreases as the net interest margin increases. Fukuyama and Weber (2008) argue
’[...] that the cooperative nature of these banks allows managers to engage in expense-preference
behaviour. Higher net interest margins might thus offer sufficient cushion to allow managers to
indulge in such behaviour, rather than pursue efficiency with greater effort’ [p.285]. A decline in
margins might thus incentivize banks to increase efficiency to mitigate a loss in revenue.
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Declining net interest margin would thus be associated with a loss in efficiency, either
because the bank is less able or willing to increase efficiency.
As discussed in Section 5.2, Japanese banks have increasingly invested in securities –
particularly government bonds – and have raised the share of non-interest income
(fees and commissions). As proxies for changes in the bank’s portfolio mix, we include
the securities-to-loan ratio (SECLOAN) and the share of government securities
among total securities (GOV SEC). The ratio of non-interest operating income to
total operating income (NIOI) is meant to capture the effect of banks’ efforts to
diversify their revenue structure. The impact of a bank’s diversification strategy on
its efficiency is theoretically ambiguous.27
Bank size is captured by a set of dummy variables to allow for non-linearities in
the relationship between efficiency and bank size, with thresholds chosen following
Berger and Mester (1997). The definitions of small, medium, large and huge banks,
and the distribution across the bank types, are shown in Table 5.5. We assume that
there is no clear link between bank size and efficiency.28 Furthermore, we control
for the distinct organizational and governance characteristics of banks by including
dummies for each bank type (CB, city banks; RB I, tier-one regional banks; RB II,
tier-two regional banks; SB, shinkin banks).29
Table 5.5: Bank Size Dummy Variables
Definition CB RB I RB II SB
SMLBANK TA<114 billion yen 0% 0% 0% 23%
MEDBANK 114 billion yen≤TA<1.14 trillion yen 0% 13% 54% 70%
LARBANK 1.14 trillion yen≤TA<11.14 trillion yen 20% 86% 46% 7%
HUGBANK 11.14 trillion yen≥TA 80% 1% 0% 0%
Notes: 114 billion yen equal around 1 billion USD. TA: total assets, CB: city banks, RB I: tier-one
regional banks, RB II: tier-two regional banks, SB: shinkin banks.
27 A higher share of securities can have a positive impact on a bank’s efficiency, because securities
investment is associated with lower operating costs than the provision of loans as the latter involves
evaluation and monitoring activities (Sarmiento and Gala´n, 2015). However, simultaneously the
expansion of non-interest income by providing more fee-based services and products involves
more resources. Therefore, an adjustment of a bank’s revenue structure might be associated with
decreasing efficiency.
28 For a sample of Japanese commercial banks, Altunbas et al. (2000) identify a positive impact of
size, measured by total assets, on efficiency. However, for Japanese shinkin banks, Fukuyama
and Weber (2009) find a negative relationship between size and bank efficiency.
29 The bank-size dummy thresholds are chosen in a way that avoids a multi-collinearity problem
with bank-type dummies. All bank types include at least two different size groups.
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5.4.3 Estimation Results
Table 5.6 reports the estimation results of equation (5.2) for both T̂Ei,t and
P̂ TEi,t scores as dependent variables.
30 Column (1) and (3) show the results for a
model including the explanatory variables which are usually used in the literature.
Column (2) and (4) extend the estimation models by including variables that may
influence a bank’s efficiency in a low-interest-rate and unconventional monetary
policy environment. This includes the net-interest margin, the securities to loan
ratio, the share of government bonds and the ratio of non-interest operating income
to total operating income. In addition, dummies for bank size and bank type are
included.
Our results show that all traditional control variables (MS, NPL, ROAA) are
statistically significant with the expected sign, apart from the coefficient of ROAA
which is not statistically significant in the extended model. The results confirm
findings of previous studies that a higher market share increases efficiency. Furthermore,
a higher non-performing loan ratio is linked to a lower degree of efficiency. The
negative coefficient of ROAA implies that a higher return on average assets is linked
to a higher degree of efficiency.
Our results also show that the net interest margin has a statistically significant effect
on bank efficiency. The negative coefficient implies that a higher net interest margin
increases both technical and pure technical efficiency. The decline in banks’ net
interest margin – as it occurred in our sample period – can thus be interpreted as
having impeded Japanese banks’ efficiency development. The effect is rather large.
Ceteris paribus, a 1-percentage-point decline in the net interest margin increases
a bank’s pure technical efficiency score by around 0.26 points, which captures a
significant decline in efficiency. This may indicate one of two things: (1) depressed
competition owing to consolidation in the banking sector, and/or the provision of
low-cost liquidity by the Bank of Japan, have reduced the pressure on banks to
improve their efficiency, or (2) the loss in banks’ traditional source of income has
constrained their ability to improve their efficiency. Either way, declining short- and
long-term interest rates are clearly linked to a decline in Japanese bank efficiency.
Shifting their portfolio from loans to securities has helped Japanese banks to
mitigate the negative impact on efficiency. A higher securities to loan ratio is
associated with higher technical efficiency as well as higher pure technical efficiency
30 Estimated using the simarwilson STATA command by Tauchmann (2016).
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Table 5.6: Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TE TE (ext.) PTE PTE (ext.)
MS -0.0468∗∗∗ -0.0501∗∗∗ -0.0665∗∗ -0.1603∗∗∗
[0.0162] [0.0174] [0.0291] [0.0346]
NPL 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗
[0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006]
ROAA -0.0255∗∗∗ -0.0056 -0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0046
[0.0052] [0.0049] [0.0054] [0.0050]
NIM -0.2173∗∗∗ -0.2565∗∗∗
[0.0095] [0.0089]
SECLOAN -0.2378∗∗∗ -0.1741∗∗∗
[0.0089] [0.0092]
GOV SEC -0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0168∗
[0.0111] [0.01010]
NIOI -0.0031 -0.0046
[0.0042] [0.0040]
MEDBANK -0.0251∗∗∗ -0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0822∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
[0.0053] [0.0051] [0.0059] [0.0054]
LARBANK -0.0722∗∗∗ -0.1150∗∗∗ 0.0705∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗
[0.0107] [0.0108] [0.0115] [0.0118]
HUGBANK -0.0883 -0.1238∗∗ 0.0975 0.1586∗
[0.0741] [0.0643] [0.0860] [0.0866]
RB I -0.3006∗∗∗ -0.2286∗∗∗ -0.2637∗∗∗ -0.2446∗∗∗
[0.0652] [0.0588] [0.0683] [0.0683]
RB II -0.2748∗∗∗ -0.1691∗∗∗ -0.2417∗∗∗ -0.1931∗∗∗
[0.0660] [0.0616] [0.0695] [0.0705]
SB 0.0923 0.2036∗∗∗ 0.0949 0.1209∗
[0.0650] [0.0601] [0.0695] [0.0712]
Constant 0.1408∗∗∗ 0.1271∗∗∗ 0.1289∗∗∗ 0.1171∗∗∗
[0.0018] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015]
Observations 5,823 5,219 5,618 5,032
Notes: T̂Ei,t and P̂ TEi,t are the dependent variables. All models estimated using a truncated
regression model. Negative coefficients indicate positive effect on efficiency and vice versa. Reference
categories are SMLBANK and CB. Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
(negative coefficients, significant at the 1-percent level). Moreover, a higher share
of government securities seems to have additionally boosted efficiency (negative
coefficients, significant at the 1-percent level). This supports our assumption that
in an environment of low private-sector loan demand – and therefore increasing
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competition in the loan market31a switch to lending to the public sector (which is less
resource-consuming) has been lucrative for Japanese banks. Furthermore, we find
that the coefficient of non-interest operating income is negative for both technical
efficiency and pure technical efficiency, but statistically not significant.32
The results with respect to the effect of bank size on efficiency are ambiguous. Small
banks are used as a reference group. For technical efficiency, all coefficients for
medium-sized, large and huge banks are negative and mostly statistically significant.
This suggests that a larger bank size is linked to higher technical efficiency.33 However,
the positive coefficients of the bank-size dummies in the PTE estimation models
indicate that larger banks have higher pure technical inefficiencies than small banks.
The reversal of the coefficient signs in the TE and PTE models can be explained by
the existence of scale inefficiencies that are captured in the TE score, but not the
PTE score. Our results thus imply that positive scale-efficiency effects of larger size
over-compensate the negative size-effects on pure technical efficiency. These findings
suggest that the ongoing consolidation process in the Japanese banking sector has
reduced scale inefficiencies by increasing the size of banks, but that this had the
adverse side effect of increasing pure technical inefficiencies.
Furthermore, our estimation results confirm the findings reported in Section 5.3
concerning the efficiency differences between the types of banks. With city banks used
as a reference group, tier-one regional banks emerge as the most efficient type. This
applies to both technical and pure technical efficiency (largest negative coefficients,
significant at the 1-percent level). In addition, tier-two regional banks show a higher
technical and pure technical efficiency than city banks, although the gap is smaller
than for tier-one regional banks. In contrast, shinkin banks exhibit larger technical
and pure technical inefficiencies than any other type of bank. However, the coefficient
is statistically significant for only two out of four specifications.
To check whether our results are robust to different sampling of the baseline dataset
that we use for the computation of the efficiency scores, we re-estimate TE, PTE and
31 As of the beginning of the 2000s, competition among banks in the loan business intensified,
putting lending rates under pressure and further lowering interest margins. City banks have
expanded their lending activities to rural areas, whereas regional banks have expanded to urban
areas. Some regional banks have set up branches in neighbouring prefectures or major cities
(Bank of Japan, 2006, 2008, 2012).
32 The negative coefficient is in line with findings of DeYoung (1994) for commercial banks in the
U.S.
33 The negative coefficients of MEDBANK, LARBANK and HUGBANK mean that technical
inefficiencies are lower compared with the reference category SMLBANK.
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SE scores separately for two subgroups of banks: commercial banks (including city
banks and both types of regional banks) and cooperative banks (including shinkin
banks). We regress the newly compiled efficiency scores on the set of explanatory
variables described above. The estimation results generally confirm the findings of
our baseline regression.34
5.5 Conclusion
Since the bursting of the Japanese bubble economy, and increasingly since the Asian
and Japanese financial crisis, Japanese banks have been under persistent pressure to
adjust. We show that the Bank of Japan’s crisis management helped to prevent a
financial meltdown in the short term. However, the expansionary monetary policy
has undermined the traditional source of income for Japanese banks, which previously
strongly favoured credit provision to households and enterprises. Furthermore, it has
become an important driving force for gradual consolidation within the Japanese
banking sector, which has led to a drop in the number of banks, branches and regular
employees. This trend suggests that the banks’ efficiency should have improved due
to gaining economies of scale.
However, our analysis provides evidence that the Bank of Japan’s low-interest rate
policy and unconventional monetary policy measures have contributed to declining
efficiency in the Japanese banking sector. Despite substantial effort by banks to
increase their efficiency, the erosion of traditional sources of income is identified as
having triggered losses in technical efficiency. A lower degree of competition because
of greater concentration, and the persistent provision of low-cost liquidity by the
Bank of Japan might have contributed to the decline.
In particular, our analysis suggests that among city banks that have formed large
financial conglomerates (so-called ‘mega banks’), the concentration process seems
to have gone too far and has therefore contributed to reduced efficiency. For small
regional and shinkin banks, even a drastic consolidation process seems not to have
been enough to achieve sufficient efficiency gains.
The announced continuation of the ultra-expansionary monetary policy by the Bank
of Japan is likely to accelerate the concentration process among banks. This is
because the interest rate margin can be expected to become further depressed, and
34 See Appendix D.6 for a detailed discussion of the estimation results of the robustness check.
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the role of public bonds as an instrument to stabilize profits will decline further.
However, as our analysis has shown, concentration is accompanied by declining pure
technical efficiency which is linked to welfare losses. Therefore, we recommend a
gradual exit from ultra-expansionary monetary policy. This would ensure more
efficient allocation of capital in the Japanese economy, based on competition among
banks rather than low-cost liquidity provision by the central bank.
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Appendix D
D.1 Estimating Efficiency Scores
We assume as set of banks each producing y outputs using x inputs. The production
technology is described by S and models the transformation of inputs x ∈ RN+ , into
outputs y ∈ RM+ . Hence, S models the set of all feasible input/output vectors:
S = {(x, y) : x can produce y} (D.1)
Farrell’s (1957) output-oriented measure of technical efficiency models the maximum
proportionate increase in output y for a given set of input x and technology S:35
θ(x, y) ≡ sup{θ : (x, θy) ∈ S} (D.2)
where θ(x, y) being greater than or equal to 1. Note, that the Farrell output-oriented
technical efficiency measure is equivalent to the reciprocal of Shephard’s (1970)
output distance function:
Do(x, y) ≡ inf{θ : (x, y/θ) ∈ S} (D.3)
with Do(x, y) ≤ 1 (Fa¨re et al., 1985). Figure D.1 illustrates the technical efficiency
concept for the one-input-one-output case using output-oriented measures. Banks A,
B, C and D produce output y using input x and an unknown technology S. The line
SCRS represents the technology frontier assuming constant returns to scale. Following
Farrell’s (1957) definition, bank A is technically efficient as it lies at the technology
frontier SCRS and produces the optimal output y
∗
A given input xA. Banks B, C and
D are technically inefficient as their outputs yB, yC and yD are below their optimal
output levels y∗B, y
∗
C and y
∗
D. Farrell’s (1957) output-oriented technical efficiency
scores correspond to the ratios:
TECRSB = 0y
∗
B/0yB (D.4)
TECRSC = 0y
∗
C/0yC (D.5)
TECRSD = 0y
∗
D/0yD (D.6)
35 Input-oriented efficiency measures focus on the optimal (i.e. minimal) set of inputs for a target
output set.
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The technical efficiency score TE = 1 if the bank operates at the best practice
frontier, and TE > 1 if the bank exhibits technical inefficiency.
Figure D.1: Output-Oriented Technical Efficiency Measures
•
••
•
•
•
••
•
••
SCRS
SVRS
SNIRS
D
A
B
C
x
y
xD
yD
y∗D
yA = y
∗
A
yC
yB
y∗B , y
∗
C
xA xB , xC0
Notes: Illustration of output-oriented technical efficiency measure and
components. Lines SCRS , SV RS and SNIRS correspond to the constant returns
to scale, variable returns to scale and non-increasing returns to scale production
frontiers, respectively.
The assumption of a constant returns to scale technology frontier is only appropriate
if all banks operate at an optimal scale. However, it can be shown that if banks are
not operating at their optimal scale, the technical efficiency estimate is confounded
by scale inefficiencies. Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker et al. (1984) extend the
technical efficiency concept and propose a decomposition of TE into pure technical
efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE) by relaxing the constant returns to scale
assumption for the underlying technology:
TE = PTE × SE (D.7)
Assuming banks A, B, C and D are using a variable returns to scale technology,36 as
indicated in Figure D.1 by the SV RS frontier, banks A, B and D would be technically
efficient as all three are operating at the production frontier (TEV RSA = TE
V RS
B =
TEV RSD = 1). However, banks B and D are technically inefficient as regards to the
36 Variable returns to scale encompasses both decreasing as well as increasing returns to scale.
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constant returns to scale frontier SCRS (TE
CRS
B > 1 and TE
CRS
D > 1). The reason
for the difference is that B and D are not operating at their optimal scale, hence
they exhibit scale inefficiencies. TEV RS can hence be regarded as measuring pure
technical efficiency PTE. The scale efficiency measure corresponds to:
SE =
TECRS
TEV RS
(D.8)
As regards to our example illustrated in Figure D.1 the (overall) technical efficiency
score (TE) the pure technical efficiency score (PTE) and the scale efficiency score
(SE) of bank C correspond to:
TEC = TE
CRS
C = 0y
∗
C/0yC (D.9)
PTEC = TE
V RS
C = 0yB/0yC (D.10)
SEC = 0y
∗
C/0yB (D.11)
Although the scale efficiency score enables to determine whether scale inefficiencies
exist or not, it does not indicate whether the bank is operating under increasing
or decreasing returns to scale. To determine the nature of the scale inefficiencies
a third technology frontier with the assumption of non-increasing returns to scale
must be imposed (line SNIRS in Figure D.1) and efficiency scores TE
NIRS estimated
accordingly (Coelli et al., 2005; Banker et al., 1984). The nature of scale inefficiencies
are determined by comparing TENIRS and TEV RS. If TENIRS = TEV RS the bank
exhibits decreasing returns to scale, if TENIRS 6= TEV RS it is operating under
increasing returns to scale.37 Referring to our example banks C and B display
decreasing returns to scale and bank D increasing returns to scale.
D.2 Data Envelopment Analysis
The output distance functions Dto(x
t
i, y
t
i) needed to construct technical efficiency
scores can be estimated using either econometric or mathematical programming
techniques with both differing in the way the efficiency frontier is estimated (Coelli
et al., 2005). The former, known as Stochastic Frontier Analysis, is a parametric
method that imposes a functional form on the production frontier and estimates
37 Note that output- and input-oriented models may lead to different results in the findings of the
nature of scale inefficiencies. See Golany and Yu (1997) for how to treat this problem.
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econometrically the function’s parameters. It is susceptible to misspecification. The
second approach is a linear programming technique that constructs the efficiency
frontier by enveloping input/output data of the decision making unit (DMU), with
the non-parametric frontier being formed by the ’best practice’ DMUs (Drake et al.,
2006). The approach is referred to as Data Envelopment Analysis (Charnes et al.,
1978).
The basic CRS output-oriented DEA model to estimate the relative efficiency at
time t1 can be described as follows. Assuming N inputs and M outputs for each
bank i with i = 1. . . , L, the linear programming model is given by:
[Dt1o (x
t1
i , y
t1
i )]
−1 = max
θiλi
θ
s.t.: θyt1im ≤
L∑
j=1
λt1j y
t1
mj, m = 1, . . . ,M,
L∑
j=1
λt1j x
t1
nj ≤ xt1in, n = 1, . . . , N,
λt1i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , L.
(D.12)
where xt1i = (x
t1
i1, ..., x
t1
in, ..., x
t1
iN)
′ ∈ RN+ is the set of inputs for each bank i at time
t and yt1i = (y
t1
i1 , ..., y
t1
im, ..., y
t1
iM)
′ ∈ RM+ is the set of outputs; λt1i = (λt11 , ..., λt1L )′ is
a vector of bank-specific weights conveying information on each bank’s benchmark
comparators.38
To estimate the scale efficiency score and to determine its nature the above described
DEA model must additionally be run with (1) variable returns to scale and (2)
non-increasing returns to scale imposed. Hence, the following additional restrictions
must be included:
L∑
j=1
λt1i = 1(for VRS)
L∑
j=1
λt1i ≤ 1(for NIRS)
38 Note that an efficient bank i with θi = 1 will be its own benchmark, hence λi includes only 0s
except for a 1 in the ith position (Loukoianova, 2008).
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D.3 Bootstrapping Efficiency Scores
Though the DEA method has been widely used in the empirical literature on
efficiency, it suffers from the drawbacks of not allowing for random errors and having
no statistical foundation (Coelli et al., 2005). To work around these problems Simar
and Wilson (1998) introduced a statistical model that allows to determine statistical
properties of DEA estimators in the multi-input and multi-output case by applying
a bootstrapping procedure.39 The basic idea of bootstrapping is to approximate the
distribution of the true estimator is by constructing pseudo-samples and re-calculating
the parameter of interest (Assaf et al., 2011). The re-sampling of the original data is
based on assumptions of the true data-generating process and can be done directly
from the original data (na¨ıve bootstrap), or by employing a fitted model (smoothed
bootstrap). The model developed by Simar and Wilson (1998) is based on the later.
The bootstrap approach for efficiency scores can be summarized as follows:
1. Computation of efficiency scores θi for each DMU i = 1, . . . , L by solving the
linear programming model as described above.
2. Generation of random sample of size L from {θˆi; i = 1, ..., L} using kernel
density estimation and reflection method as described by Silverman (1986),
providing {θ∗1b, ..., θ∗Lb}.
3. Computation of a pseudo data set {(x∗ib,yi), i, ..., L} where x∗ib = θˆi/θ∗ib, i =
1, ..., L to form the reference technology.
4. Given this pseudo data set, computation of the bootstrapped efficiency scores
θˆ∗ib of θˆi for each i = 1, . . . , L by solving the bootstrap counterpart of the DEA
model described above (i.e. inclusion of x∗ib).
5. Repetition of step 2 to 4 B times40 to get for DMUs i = 1, . . . , L a set of
bootstrap efficiency estimates θˆ∗ib, b = 1, . . . , B.
The computation of the bootstrap estimates allows making statistical inference on
the efficiency scores, particularly, it allows for the construction of confidence intervals.
The (1− α) confidence interval for each DMU is defined as:
θˆi + aˆα ≤ θi ≤ θˆi + bˆα (D.13)
39 Bootstrapping was introduced by Efron (1979). For more information see Hall (1992) and Efron
and Tibshirani (1993).
40 Simar and Wilson (1998) suggest B=2000.
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where aˆα and bˆα are computed following the procedure of Simar and Wilson (2000) by
sorting (θˆ∗ib − θˆi) for b = 1, . . . , B in increasing order and deleting (α2 × 100)-percent
of the elements at either side of the list. The values −aˆα and −bˆα are set equal to
the endpoints of the sorted array.
Furthermore, it is possible to obtain bias corrections of the efficiency scores (e.g.
Tortosa-Ausina et al., 2008). The bias of each efficiency estimation θˆi can be
calculated using the bootstrap sample, with the bias being defined as:
b̂iasi(θˆi) = θ¯
∗
i − θˆi (D.14)
with θ¯∗i =
1
B
∑B
b=1 θˆ
∗
i . The bias-corrected estimator θ˜i of each efficiency score θi is
thus defined as:
θ˜i = 2θˆi − θ¯∗i (D.15)
D.4 Truncated Regression Model
In order to determine potential correlates of technical efficiency, the estimated
efficiency scores θˆi can be regressed on a set of explanatory variables zi:
θˆi = ziβ + i (D.16)
Simar and Wilson (2007) argue that the efficiency scores calculated using DEA suffer
from strong correlation as the calculation of a given efficiency score depends on all
other observations in the data set. Moreover, the error term i is by assumption
correlated with the set of explanatory variables zi, as xi and yi are correlated with
zi. This implies that conventional regression analysis cannot be applied to equation
(D.16) as the basic assumption of error terms being identically and independently
distributed is violated (Odeck, 2009). To overcome these limitations Simar and Wilson
(2007) propose a procedure based on truncated regression models complemented by
bootstrapping simulations. In our analysis we employ the following algorithm:
1. Computation of efficiency scores θˆi for each DMU i = 1, . . . , L as described in
Appendix D.2.
2. For all θˆi > 1 estimation of βˆ and σˆ using a truncated regression of θˆi on zi.
3. In order to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates A = {(βˆ∗, σˆ∗ )b}Lb=1 loop over
following steps L times:
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(a) For each i draw i from a N(0, σˆ
2
 ) distribution with left truncation at
(1− ziβ).
(b) For each i compute θ∗i = ziβˆ + i.
(c) Estimation of βˆ∗ and σˆ∗ using a truncated regression of θ
∗
i on zi.
4. Bootstrapped values in A and the original estimates of βˆ and σˆ are used to
construct estimated confidence intervals for each element of β and σ.
D.5 Detailed Results
Table D.1: Annual Mean Efficiency Scores of City Banks (1999-2015)
TE PTE SE IRS CRS DRS
1999 1.114 1.108 1.005 0.00 0.78 0.22
2000 1.150 1.132 1.016 0.11 0.33 0.56
2001 1.141 1.122 1.017 0.14 0.43 0.43
2002 1.224 1.183 1.034 0.14 0.43 0.43
2003 1.182 1.159 1.019 0.29 0.43 0.29
2004 1.190 1.121 1.062 0.14 0.29 0.57
2005 1.166 1.127 1.035 0.00 0.33 0.67
2006 1.201 1.169 1.027 0.33 0.33 0.33
2007 1.195 1.144 1.043 0.33 0.33 0.33
2008 1.195 1.168 1.023 0.00 0.33 0.67
2009 1.168 1.158 1.008 0.33 0.33 0.33
2010 1.218 1.167 1.044 0.33 0.50 0.17
2011 1.155 1.157 0.998 0.00 0.50 0.50
2012 1.173 1.176 0.997 0.33 0.50 0.17
2013 1.167 1.143 1.021 0.00 0.40 0.60
2014 1.158 1.129 1.026 0.00 0.60 0.40
2015 1.155 1.127 1.026 0.40 0.40 0.20
Mean 1.172 1.146 1.023 0.17 0.43 0.40
Notes: Bias-corrected values based on the bootstrap procedure. TE is the technical
efficiency score. PTE is the pure technical efficiency score. SE is the scale efficiency
score. Values above unity indicate inefficiencies. IRS/CRS/DRS are the shares of banks
operating under increasing/ constant/ decreasing returns to scale, respectively.
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Table D.2: Annual Mean Efficiency Scores of Regional Banks I (1999-2015)
TE PTE SE IRS CRS DRS
1999 1.147 1.132 1.013 0.75 0.06 0.19
2000 1.149 1.140 1.008 0.58 0.13 0.29
2001 1.126 1.122 1.004 0.69 0.21 0.10
2002 1.069 1.074 0.996 0.64 0.14 0.21
2003 1.068 1.072 0.996 0.64 0.12 0.24
2004 1.080 1.084 0.996 0.79 0.10 0.11
2005 1.085 1.086 0.999 0.74 0.10 0.16
2006 1.103 1.102 1.001 0.79 0.06 0.15
2007 1.079 1.081 0.997 0.77 0.13 0.10
2008 1.130 1.126 1.003 0.80 0.03 0.17
2009 1.102 1.102 1.000 0.66 0.03 0.31
2010 1.135 1.129 1.005 0.74 0.03 0.23
2011 1.094 1.094 0.999 0.89 0.07 0.05
2012 1.082 1.087 0.995 0.65 0.10 0.26
2013 1.101 1.105 0.996 0.82 0.07 0.11
2014 1.102 1.105 0.997 0.64 0.14 0.22
2015 1.106 1.105 1.001 0.54 0.14 0.32
Mean 1.102 1.102 1.000 0.72 0.10 0.19
Notes: Bias-corrected values based on the bootstrap procedure. TE is the technical
efficiency score. PTE is the pure technical efficiency score. SE is the scale efficiency
score. Values above unity indicate inefficiencies. IRS/CRS/DRS are the shares of banks
operating under increasing/ constant/ decreasing returns to scale, respectively.
Table D.3: Annual Mean Efficiency Scores of Regional Banks II (1999-2015)
TE PTE SE IRS CRS DRS
1999 1.159 1.151 1.007 0.92 0.00 0.08
2000 1.146 1.134 1.010 0.86 0.00 0.14
2001 1.134 1.128 1.005 0.84 0.03 0.13
2002 1.081 1.080 1.002 0.83 0.08 0.08
2003 1.077 1.076 1.001 0.79 0.03 0.18
2004 1.082 1.078 1.004 0.85 0.07 0.07
2005 1.092 1.085 1.007 0.93 0.05 0.03
2006 1.103 1.096 1.006 0.93 0.07 0.00
2007 1.086 1.082 1.004 0.90 0.10 0.00
2008 1.128 1.120 1.007 0.81 0.08 0.11
2009 1.104 1.098 1.006 0.81 0.08 0.11
2010 1.131 1.120 1.010 0.86 0.08 0.05
2011 1.103 1.092 1.011 0.93 0.05 0.03
2012 1.078 1.081 0.997 0.73 0.12 0.15
2013 1.097 1.095 1.002 0.87 0.08 0.05
2014 1.105 1.103 1.001 0.74 0.13 0.13
2015 1.110 1.105 1.004 0.70 0.11 0.19
Mean 1.105 1.099 1.005 0.84 0.07 0.09
Notes: Bias-corrected values based on the bootstrap procedure. TE is the technical
efficiency score. PTE is the pure technical efficiency score. SE is the scale efficiency
score. Values above unity indicate inefficiencies. IRS/CRS/DRS are the shares of banks
operating under increasing/ constant/ decreasing returns to scale, respectively.
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Table D.4: Annual Mean Efficiency Scores of Shinkin Banks (1999-2015)
TE PTE SE IRS CRS DRS
1999 1.290 1.246 1.037 0.96 0.02 0.02
2000 1.322 1.284 1.031 0.93 0.02 0.05
2001 1.313 1.278 1.028 0.95 0.03 0.02
2002 1.259 1.238 1.018 0.96 0.02 0.02
2003 1.262 1.238 1.019 0.95 0.01 0.04
2004 1.274 1.244 1.025 0.95 0.02 0.03
2005 1.283 1.249 1.028 0.96 0.01 0.02
2006 1.315 1.279 1.029 0.96 0.01 0.02
2007 1.312 1.263 1.040 0.97 0.01 0.01
2008 1.352 1.295 1.044 0.96 0.03 0.01
2009 1.326 1.273 1.041 0.96 0.02 0.01
2010 1.389 1.312 1.060 0.97 0.01 0.01
2011 1.373 1.308 1.051 0.99 0.01 0.00
2012 1.377 1.323 1.041 0.97 0.01 0.02
2013 1.399 1.344 1.042 0.97 0.01 0.01
2014 1.412 1.365 1.035 0.95 0.02 0.04
2015 1.394 1.338 1.045 0.92 0.02 0.06
Mean 1.331 1.286 1.036 0.96 0.02 0.02
Notes: Bias-corrected values based on the bootstrap procedure. TE is the technical
efficiency score. PTE is the pure technical efficiency score. SE is the scale efficiency
score. Values above unity indicate inefficiencies. IRS/CRS/DRS are the shares of banks
operating under increasing/ constant/ decreasing returns to scale, respectively.
D.6 Robustness Checks
Previous studies on the efficiency of Japanese banks estimate efficiency scores for
either commercial banks (e.g. Altunbas et al., 2000; Drake and Hall, 2003) or
cooperative banks (e.g. Fukuyama and Weber, 2009; Assaf et al., 2011). In our
analysis, however, we combine both types of banks to estimate Japanese banks’
efficiency relative to the industry ’best practice’ frontier and be able to compare the
results between the different bank types. To check whether our regression results
are sensitive to our sample choice we re-estimate TE, PTE and SE scores for two
subgroups of banks: commercial banks (including city banks and both types of
regional banks) and cooperative banks (including shinkin banks). We follow the
procedure as described in Section 5.3. Separately for both subgroups, we regress the
newly compiled efficiency scores on the set of explanatory variables described above.
The regression results for the subgroup of shinkin banks are shown in Table D.5.
Previous findings for the standard control variables (MS, NPL, ROAA) and the
variables capturing the effect of the low-interest rate environment and adjustment
measures (NIM , SECLOAN , GOV SEC, NIOI) can be confirmed. Differing from
the results of our baseline regression we find that an increase in bank size has a
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negative effect on both overall technical and pure technical efficiency. This implies
that for the case of shinkin banks positive scale effects of an increased size did not
outweigh the negative size effects on pure technical efficiency.
Table D.5: Robustness Check - Shinkin Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TE TE (ext.) PTE PTE (ext.)
MS -0.8669∗∗∗ -1.0906∗∗∗ -0.9746∗∗∗ -1.2228∗∗∗
[0.0851] [0.0872] [0.0950] [0.0873]
NPL 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
[0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0006]
ROAA -0.0134∗∗ -0.0014 -0.0084 0.0043
[0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0063] [0.0060]
NIM -0.2262∗∗∗ -0.2375∗∗∗
[0.0107] [0.0114]
SECLOAN -0.0587∗∗∗ -0.0570∗∗∗
[0.0096] [0.0099]
GOV SEC -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.0533∗∗∗
[0.0128] [0.0143]
NIOI -0.0051 -0.0060
[0.0046] [0.0048]
MEDBANK 0.0135∗∗ -0.0002 0.0583∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗
[0.0062] [0.0061] [0.0070] [0.0069]
LARBANK 0.0446∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗ 0.0697∗∗∗ 0.1024∗∗∗
[0.0212] [0.0229] [0.0257] [0.0299]
Constant 1.1408∗∗∗ 1.6837∗∗∗ 1.0858∗∗∗ 1.6546∗∗∗
[0.0132] [0.0282] [0.0146] [0.0295]
Observations 4,096 4,086 3,856 3,854
Notes: T̂Ei,t and P̂ TEi,t are the dependent variables. All models estimated using a truncated
regression model. Negative coefficients indicate positive effect on efficiency and vice versa. Reference
category is SMLBANK. Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
The results for the group of city banks and regional banks are shown in Table D.6.
Regarding the control variables, we find that positive market share effects are much
smaller for the group of commercial banks than for shinkin banks. Furthermore,
the coefficient of the non-performing loans ratio is statistically significant only in
column (1). This implies that city banks and regional banks might have been
better able to cope with the problem of non-performing loans than shinkin banks.
Furthermore, our results confirm the negative effect of declining interest margins
on banks’ pure technical efficiency. In contrast to our findings from the baseline
regression, a higher securities to loan ratio and a higher share of government securities
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is linked to declining overall technical efficiency and pure technical efficiency. The
results confirm our previous findings that a larger bank size is linked to a decline in
pure technical efficiency. Furthermore, we cannot confirm a statistically significant
difference between the efficiency of city banks and regional banks.
Table D.6: Robustness Check - City Banks and Regional Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TE TE (ext.) PTE PTE (ext.)
MS -0.0166∗∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.1028∗∗∗ -0.0560∗∗∗
[0.0079] [0.0029] [0.0301] [0.0150]
NPL -0.0052∗∗ 0.0007 -0.0039 0.0013
[0.0023] [0.0020] [0.0029] [0.0020]
ROAA -0.0068 -0.0103∗ -0.0107 -0.0102
[0.0089] [0.0061] [0.0116] [0.0062]
NIM -0.0201 -0.0404∗∗
[0.0148] [0.0163]
SECLOAN 0.2000∗∗∗ 0.1644∗∗∗
[0.0233] [0.0222]
GOV SEC 0.0693∗∗∗ 0.0574∗∗
[0.0210] [0.0231]
NIOI 0.0291 0.0300
[0.0254] [0.0243]
LARBANK -0.0201∗ -0.0244∗∗∗ 0.1037∗∗∗ 0.0075
[0.0105] [0.0074] [0.0174] [0.0084]
HUGBANK -0.0223 -0.0078 0.1789∗ 0.0630∗
[0.0494] [0.0254] [0.0922] [0.0356]
RBI -0.0249 0.0102 -0.0705 -0.0201
[0.0486] [0.0248] [0.0697] [0.0300]
RBII -0.0339 0.0342 -0.1006 0.0008
[0.0491] [0.0268] [0.0724] [0.0319]
Constant 1.8721∗∗∗ 1.7259∗∗∗ 1.7099∗∗∗ 1.7272∗∗∗
[0.0525] [0.0529] [0.0776] [0.0611]
Observations 1,568 954 1,438 844
Notes: T̂Ei,t and P̂ TEi,t are the dependent variables. All models estimated using a truncated
regression model. Negative coefficients indicate positive effect on efficiency and vice versa. Reference
categories are MEDBANK and CB. Standard errors in parentheses *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01.
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Referat:
Die Dissertation untersucht die Folgen der Niedrigzinspolitik fu¨r den Unternehmens-
sektor und besteht aus vier eigensta¨ndigen Aufsa¨tzen.
Im ersten Aufsatz “Is the Interest Rate Channel still working? Post-Crisis Evidence
from German SMEs” wird der Zusammenhang von Kapitalkosten und Unternehmens-
investitionen untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass Unternehmen mit pessimistischen
Gescha¨ftserwartungen weniger sensitiv auf Kapitalkostena¨nderungen reagieren.
Im zweiten Aufsatz “Declining Interest Rates and German SMEs’ Use of Bank
Debt” wird der Zusammenhang von Zinsa¨nderungen und der Kreditnachfrage von
Unternehmen untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass fallenden Zinsen zu einem Ru¨ckgang
der Kreditnachfrage beitragen ko¨nnen.
Im dritten Aufsatz “Impaired Capital Reallocation in a Low-Interest Rate Environment
– Evidence from German SMEs” werden die Folgen der Niedrigzinspolitik fu¨r die
effiziente Allokation von Kapital im Unternehmenssektor untersucht. Es wird gezeigt,
dass der Produktivita¨tsru¨ckgang im deutschen Unternehmenssektor u.a. auf eine
Missallokation von Kapital zuru¨ckgefu¨hrt werden kann.
Im vierten Aufsatz “The Impact of the Bank of Japan’s Crisis Management on the
Japanese Banking Sector” werden die Folgen der Geldpolitk der Bank of Japan fu¨r
den japanischen Bankensektor untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass die geldpolitischen
Rettungsmaßnahmen zu einem Ru¨ckgang der Effizienz im Bankensektor beigetragen
haben.
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